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JURISDICTION OF COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 78-2a-3(h) of Utah Code Annotated. 
POINT I 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court committed error in finding that Judge Low had 
previously awarded alimony to Elizabeth Vienna and valued the business 
at $1,600,000.00 in his August 18, 2004 Memorandum Decision. 
The standard of review is clearly erroneous; correctness, Cummings v. 
Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 UT App. 1991 (citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987); Petersen v. Petersen, 818 P.2d 1305, 1307-1308 (Utah 1987); Dunn v. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Addendum "2"; §30-3-5 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended); Addendum "4". 
CITATION OF RECORD 
Addendums "5", "6", "8", "9", "10", "11"; R1227-1235, R1653-1806, R1808, 
R1817, R1825, R1828, R2456-2725, R3280, R3624, R3659, R3663, R3770D@2-11, 
R3772D, R3773C@2,5,6,7,10,125,186,187,188,189, R3440, R3595, R3730. 
POINT II 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court made adequate findings in its award of alimony. 
The standard of review is abuse of discretion/clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion, Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
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Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80 P.3d 153, 485 Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah App. 2003). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND REGULATIONS 
Section 30-3-5(8) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) in Addendum "4". 
CITATION OF RECORD 
Addendums "5", "6", "8", "9", "10", "11"; R1227-1235, R1653-1806, R1808, 
R1817, R1825, R2456-2725, R1828, R3280, R3624, R3659, R3663, R3770D@2-11, 
R3772D, R3773C@71-75, R3773C@79-134, R3440, R3595, R3730. 
POINT III 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in finding Team Builders International, Inc. 
valued at $1,600,000.00. 
The standard of review is clear abuse of discretion, Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 
1149 (Utah App. 1988); Bettingerv. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389 (Utah App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND REGULATIONS 
Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended); Addendum "4". 
CITATION OF RECORD 
Addendums "5", "6", "8", "9", "10", "11"; R1227-1235, R1653-1806, R1808, 
R1817, R1825, R2456-2725, R1828, R3280, R3624, R3659, R3663, R3770D@2-11, 
R3772D, R3773C@41-44, R3773C@79-134, R3440, R3595, R3730. 
POINT IV 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court was required to recognize the legal effect of 
admissions admitted and conclusively established. 
The standard of review is a correctness, Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, H 5, 989 
P.2d 1073 (Utah 1999). 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in Addendum " 1 " . 
CITATION OF RECORD 
Addendums "7", "8", "9", "10", "11"; R2050, R2249-2265, R 2261, R2456-2742, 
R3035, R3280, R3624, R3633, R3659, R3730, R3773C@7,25,49,50,78,152,153. 
POINT V 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court should have granted summary judgment on the 
value of the North Logan home. 
The standard of review is correctness, Weese v. Davis County Com'n, 
834 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992); Mecham v. Consolidated Oil & Transp., Inc., 53 P.3d 479, 
452 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah App. 2002); Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 
1988). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Addendum "3". 
CITATION OF RECORD 
Addendum "3", "8", "9", "10", "11"; R2456-2725, R3280, R3624, R3659, R3663, 
R3730, R3773C@2,74,179-180,189. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case: 
On March 1, 2002, Bart Kotter filed for divorce seeking, in pertinent part, 
custody of the parties' two (2) minor children, award of the family business known as 
Team Builders International, Inc., an equitable division of the personal and real 
3 
property, and support for the minor children [R003,010]. Elizabeth Vienna filed an 
answer and counterpetition seeking custody of the minor children, award of the family 
business known as Team Builders International, Inc., spousal support and support for 
the minor children, and an equitable division of the personal and real property [R039]. 
B. Course of Proceeding: 
A bifurcated Decree of Divorce was signed and entered on December 20, 2002 
[R287]. An Order of Custody was signed and entered on March 2, 2004 awarding 
Bart Kotter custody and control of the parties' two (2) minor children [R1182,1225]. The 
parties agreed to binding arbitration on the issue of who was to be awarded the family 
business known as Team Builders International, Inc. [R1808;Addendum "5"]. 
Arbitration took place on July 2, 2004 [R1817,1825,3770D]. On August 18, 2004, the 
trial court entered its Memorandum Decision awarding Team Builders International, Inc. 
to Bart Kotter [R1828;Addendum "6"]. On April 12, 2005 Bart Kotter served on 
Elizabeth Vienna Request for Admissions [R2050;Addendum "7"]. Elizabeth Vienna 
failed to respond to said request, and Bart Kotter filed a Motion for First Request for 
Admissions to be Deemed Admitted on May 27, 2005 [R2261]. On January 6, 2006, 
the trial court signed an Order granting Bart Kotter's motion that admissions be deemed 
admitted [R3035]. On June 10, 2005, Bart Kotter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
on All Remaining Issues [R2456-2725]. On December 21, 2005, Bart Kotter filed a 
Motion in Limine [R2933-2939]. On May 4, 2006, the trial court entered its 
Memorandum Decision granting Bart Kotter's Motion in Limine and partially granting 
summary judgment on some of the remaining issues [R3280;Addendum "8"]. On 
February 23, 2007, Bart Kotter filed a Notice of Appeal on the following issues: alimony 
4 
(amount ar id period); North Logan home valued at $850,000.00; value of Team Builders 
Inter nationa. . ,.- I 
Bart Kotter paying Flizaheth Vienna $5 000 00 '^ " •• ^vahip nn th- last rinv nf 
each month for I ., », «. - :i\au; .,/: *,-. •• ... -., ..oU^r. .'-. UJ|. 
C. Disposition of the Cour t below: 
Trial was held on May 31, 2006 [R3773C] A Memorandum Decision was 
in 
er were signed on January 26. 2007 [R3624.3663]. 
o iAiEMEN I OFFAC i S 
Bail' Kotter and Elizabeth Vienna were married on the 4"" day of /> uqusl, III984 
I here have been two (Z) children born as issue of this marriage, to wit: LuuAl J K 'M 
KOTTER, boi n on the 27th day of Augi ist, 1995; and BRIGHTON KIMO KOTTER, born 
on the 3rd day of June, 2000 [R003-016;Addendum "10"]. 
real estate sales, real estate ii i u esting, and worked foi tl ie I Jnited States Charnbei of 
Elizabeth Vienna's education includes a certificate in international relations, a 
bachelor's deyiee hum lllah Statu Univeisil1^ , din ' » '*•' "Imiiiy Lwitilu,ale *s •-* '**" *"\il 
language from Seattle University, Elizabeth Vienr la has been an apprentice fr x real 
estate appraiser, an auton lobile salesperson, airline flight attendant, anc :ie,o .- ^ctles 
position in numerous different places [R3773C@191;R3624;Addendun i " 10"]. 
During the last eight (8) years of the parties' marriage, Bart Kotter and 
Elizabeth ^ 'IN i in ft upeia l i 'd a hiisiness hi! in is. I I M I I I Ihnlitui ' i llliiil I IM I IU I I I I I , llliiii 
5 
[R3773C@41] which involves network marketing of distributors through word-of-mouth 
advertising of health and wellness technologies [R3773C@12]. During the marriage, 
the parties' acquired a home and two (2) lots located in North Logan, Utah and a home 
located in Hailey, Idaho [R3773C@19-77;R3624]. 
Bart Kotter filed for divorce on the 1st day of March, 20021 [R003-006]. At the 
time of the filing of the divorce, Bart Kotter was living in the North Logan home and 
Elizabeth Vienna was living in the Hailey, Idaho home with the parties' two (2) minor 
children [R3773C@29,31;Addendum "10"]. 
An Answer and Counterpetition were filed by Elizabeth Vienna on May 13, 2002 
[R039-045]. On April 22, 2002, Attorney Nathan Hult made an appearance on behalf of 
Elizabeth Vienna [R025]. On May 8, 2002, Nathan Hult withdrew as counsel for 
Elizabeth Vienna[R028]. Thereafter, Attorney Jeff Thorne made an appearance. On 
June 11, 2002, the parties entered into a stipulation which was reduced to and signed 
as an order on July 9, 2002, which set forth the temporary custodial and financial 
arrangements during the course of the proceedings. The Findings and Order on Order 
to Show Cause provided in pertinent part: 
"Keith Christensen2 shall take the income from Team Builders 
International, Inc. and pay the parties' monthly expenses, including the 
following: (a) the mortgage of the home located in North Logan and the 
mortgage of the home located in Hailey, Idaho; (b) any costs, attorney 
fees, and accounting fees submitted by either party for the prosecution of 
this matter; (c) past credit card expenses the parties have incurred [paying 
a minimum of $10,000 on said credit cards]; (d) the approximate sum of 
$14,000 to J.H.A.M. Trust for the reimbursement of platinum qualification; 
1
 An Amended Complaint was filed on March 8, 2002 [R010]. 
2
 Keith Christensen is the accountant for Team Builders International, Inc. 
6 
and (e) the balance should be split equal ly between the part ies. Each 
party should be responsib le for any debts they have accumula ted , 
including any business debts, utilities, and other associated debts." 
[R74-78]3 
On A [ igust 14, 2002, the part ies slightly modif ied the July 9, 2002 Findings and 
O j : 
any reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by either Petit ioner or 
Respondent or T e a m Bui lders International. The remain ing balance shoi ild 
be split be tween the part ies on a monthly basis." [R121-124;R3802] . 
On December ? ;•) ,- r M .-v r - ' i k i ns made an appearance on behalf of 
Elizabetl i J iei in la [R2( -• juaKins lecused I lit i iself, Judge Low was 
assigned to the case on December 9, 2002 [R205]. 
Bas s cl on i the parties' stipulatioi i, a bifi treated Decree or Divorce was signed and 
entered on the 20th day of Decer i iber, 2002 dissoh i in ig the bonds of marnaqe iv.prvinq 
the issues of "custody, child support, personal property, real proper ty, debts, retirement, 
.i Il til iei in c slate : II \i ;si les" [R282 289] 
On December 27, 2002, the parties entered \r.\c ., •-* - , r </t*: discovery plan and 
"I , - - J ^ : - * u t V ^ 9 6 ] . 
< - M ; L :»-e trial court slightly modif ied the <in,-mnai a»i ^ngements and 
o> jred tnat i t w o u k ; • i .!•..; ; ous orders ot the d. ..wu. >. x, e r hat 
Bart Kotter's new wife, Mel issa Kotter4, should not be deducted as a business expense 
[R3803] . 
3
 The trial court had i 10 electronic recording of the • -I* " ; 2002 hearing.. 
4 
7 
Trial was held on October 30, 2003 and conducted on the 31st day of October, 
and the 4th, 5th, 13th, 14th, 21st, 25th, 26th days of November 2003 on the limited aspects 
of the case involving only custody and visitation/parenting time. Other issues involving 
financial and property aspects were reserved for later adjudication. An Order on 
Custody was signed and entered on March 2, 2004, awarding Bart Kotter the care, 
custody, and control of the parties' minor children [R1059;R1161-1189]. 
On January 29, 2004, the trial court entered an order again modifying the parties' 
financial arrangements by appointing Gary D. Jones, CPA, as special receiver with 
authority to receive Nikken payments and make distributions from the funds as agreed 
by the parties or court order and make monthly accountings [R1051-1053]. 
A hearing was held on December 15, 2004. At the hearing, Elizabeth Vienna 
again addressed the issue of the business expenses of Team Builders International, 
Inc., including the salary of Bart Kotter and his new wife, Melissa Kotter, together with 
tax issues regarding FICA, pension, and deductions for Bart Kotter's office in the home 
[3771D]. 
Based on the December 15, 2004 hearing, an order was entered on 
February 22, 2005, slightly modifying its previous order and directing Gary D. Jones to: 
"(a) First, expenses incurred by Gary Jones shall be taken from the 
Nikken proceeds; (b) Payment of the mortgages on the parties' homes in 
Hailey, Idaho and North Logan, Utah; (c) Payment on the agreement 
between J.H.A.M and Team Builders International, Inc.; (d) The expenses 
of Petitioner Bart Kotter in running Team Builders International Inc., 
including $6,250.00 each month's salary, $2,000.00 each month's salary 
for Melissa Kotter's salary, and business expenses deemed reasonable 
by Gary D. Jones; (e) The remaining proceeds are to be split between the 
parties on a 50/50 basis" [R1985-1987]. 
8 
Elizabeth Vienna filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with supporting 
III • .* * : • ' 
family business, Team Builders International, it ic. Bai f Kotter filed a cot inter Motion for 
par i ja l summary Judgment with supporting memorandum and attida mt 01 i , 
2004 asserting he should be awarded Team Builders International, Inc.
 LR1227-
1Icj5;K1653-1806 JHP nnt+pr was fuiiy i : ! and supported by affidavits the 
matter was set * ,
 :,r;. ;.<. -
 i
 j , 
the parties decided that rather \";h- proceeding witn . >^  araun^ns or: eir pending 
into a written agreement for voluntary binding arbitration TO detennne ily who would 
ha dWditJ'Liil IIMJ business |K Inu&.AUduiuJuiii '!» | I '.JI..*,. J , . t r 
Voluntary Binding Arbitration stated: 
"1he arbitrator shall only determine that Petitioner or Respondent shall be 
awarded the business. Any other issues regarding the business, including 
the value, timing of payment, and nature of the payments are reserved for 
adjudication or stipulated resolution " [R1808] 
Jusl pnoi to enteiing inlo arbitration, line final court made the following 
observations: 
5
 Dated May 19, 2004, and in support of Bart Kotter's Motion for Partial Summary Judgn lent, 
Keith Christensen, accountant for Team Builders International, Inc., filed an affidavit in support of 
Bart Kotter's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment stating that the valuation for Team Builders 
International, Inc. was, as of the date of the Decree of Divorce, $1,629,100.00 [R1610]. 
b
 The agreement foi voluntai y arbitration provided: "Utah law shall apply. The arbitrator shall be 
the sole judge of all issues of law and fact regarding the separate issue. The arbitrator will present each 
party with a written copy of the award within fifteen (15) days following the hearing. There can be no 
appeal from any decision made by the arbitrator, including, but not limited to, errors in application of law or 
fact, except that the parties or arbitrator violated one of the provisions of this agreement. Each party has 
the right to request the arbitrator to clarify any perceived clerical errors in the decision. The parties have 
agreed to an informal hearing as directed by the arbitrator," [R1808] 
9 
"This raises the next question, and that was addressed by Mr. Skabelund 
very clearly in chambers, and that is there are other issues out there 
besides the business itself. There was some suggestion that we ought to 
address them all at once or not at all. Frankly, my suggestion at this point 
is that we take them one at a time, because if you roll them all together 
one absolutely and necessarily effects the other." [R3770D@3-5] 
The trial court then went on to state: 
"It's simply a decision as to where the business should go, and, I might 
indicate, where this business goes will immeasurably color what happens 
to the balance of the issues. Alimony, for example, if that's still an issue, 
property, debts, obligations, all of those kinds of things that need to be 
addressed." [R3770D@3-5] 
The parties in the trial court then retired to the jury room and conducted 
arbitration [R3770D@9]. 
After the arbitration took place, the parties met and the trial court made the 
following observation: 
"Alright, I want to make a record of what happened over the past two 
hours or hour and a half, whatever it is. We have been in the conference 
room discussing this matter. Each side has an opportunity to discuss it. 
I want you both to understand what we are doing here. [R3770D@10-11] 
I don't know what the value of the business is, and I don't know how it 
should possibly be distributed between the two parties. That's not before 
me. Only who gets the business is before me. If Elizabeth gets the 
business or Bart gets the business, later on we will decide how 
compensation will be awarded to the other side in exchange. Hopefully 
you folks will come up with some good ideas. [R3770D@10-11] 
We've thrown a figure around of $1.6 million. I don't know if it's worth 
$1.6 million, or $6, or $6 billion. Unfortunately, I'll probably never know 
the answer to that. We have to find an innovative approach to resolve the 
distribution of the assets between the parties whatever the value may be." 
The trial court concluded, stating: 
"Alright, I'll take the matter under advisement and get the decision out. 
You locked me into 15 days. I'll do what I can." [R3770D@10-11] 
10 
O " A , ! n , , ^ + AO or)04, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision which 
awarded Team Builders Internation? 
since Bart Kotter was awarded the business tnat mere snouui r> some wpe ot a 
III islhmti \\ 1111 in in ill in i i iiiiill In I III" iheth V I P I I I I m in i M I I I IM Ih m-ipik mil
 ril nlities 3S 
may be found." The Memorandum Decision also stated 
« g e c a u s e | i e | i a s cust0C|y a f 1(j pa r t ja | |y f o r the reason he can spend t ime 
with the chi ldren, the court would be inclined to award the business to the 
Respondent [Petit ioner] on the condit ion that she [he] pays the Petit ioner 
[Respondent ] one-hal f interest in the purported $1.6 mill ion dollai 
concern " [R1828] 
j h e award of the business would be affected by augment ing and 
offsett ing equit ies. The Court is unfortunately uninformed at this point 
relative to the same . , , the Court f inds that the award of the business 
would be more appropr iate to the Petit ioner and the Court is wil l ing to 
award the business to the Petit ioner should he 1) pay the Respondent oi lie 
half the va lue of the same and 2) provide her wi th a substant ial al imonv 
award. Some of the reasoning here is that the Court is not convinced the 
Respondent can turn her one half of the business into the kind of money 
the Peti t ioner can earn through the operat ion of the business. She could, 
on a 1 0 % return receive perhaps $80,000.00 on the $800,000.00, if that is 
the value, and that added to an al imony award of around $200,000.00 
a l imony wou ld result in her receiving $280,000.00, about half what their 
net represented anni lal rett irn on the business has been;" [R1828] 
The trial court f inally conch ided that: 
" I he re exist no bright line determinat ive factor here for making the award. 
The Court can only determine f rom the ev idence where the preponderance 
lies It lies in favor of the Petit ioner receiving the award of the business 
:*•. 1 i an ordered judgment in favor of the Respondent for one half tl le 
value, augmented or offset with the distr ibution of the other equit ies 1he 
Respondent wou ld then also be awarded al imony according to needs and 
abil it ies as may be f o u n d / ' [R1828;Addendum "6"] 
On Augus t 30, 2004, At torney J im Jenkins witl idrew as counsel for 
(Mi rabeU i /'in \ r i : n i [I! 13 7 7 IB;R 18 J 6]. • 2 mi i Decei i ibei i 
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made an appearance of counsel for Elizabeth Vienna [R1945]. On March 16, 2005, 
Ann Wasserman withdrew as counsel for Elizabeth Vienna [R2010]. 
On April 12, 2005, Bart Kotter served Request for Admissions on 
Elizabeth Vienna [R2050;R2249-2265]. Bart Kotter's Request for Admissions included, 
but were not limited to, the following: 
"ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit the value of the North Logan, Utah home 
located at 2006 East 2750 North, North Logan, Utah, with 51/2 additional 
acres is valued at $600,000. 
ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit there is a negative equity position of $300,000 
in the North Logan home located at 2006 East 2750 North, North Logan, 
Utah. 
ADMISSION NO. 23: Admit the value of the business, Team Builders 
International, is $800,000. 
ADMISSION NO. 25: Admit you are not entitled to alimony." [R2249-
2262; the entire Request for Admissions are found in Addendum "4"] 
Elizabeth Vienna failed to timely answer said Request for Admissions. On 
May 27, 2005, Bart Kotter filed a Motion for Request for Admissions to be Deemed 
Admitted [R2249-2265]. 
On June 16, 2005, Attorney Ann Wasserman made a re-entry of appearance as 
counsel for Elizabeth Vienna [R2749]. 
On September 20, 2005, Judge Thomas L. Willmore was assigned to the case 
replacing Judge Gordon J. Low [R2822]. On November 3, 2005, the trial court entered 
a Memorandum Decision granting the admissions to be deemed admitted [R2875]. An 
Order was signed and entered January 6, 2006 stating: "Request for Admissions 1-25 
served upon Respondent on April 12, 2005 are hereby admitted into evidence." 
[R3035]. 
12 
f ' ' 1, 2005, Bart Kotter filed a Motion, Memorandum,,, and supporting 
. i l l in i t w i l l s I n i " . i l l in in in ic in ,(" I ill I II 11 mi mi n l iiii iiiilll 11 ill I it i, 11 il I in mi in mi I", M I l i e s | R i M 5 b i ' 4 l j y | "i ni l 
Decemb^ •"« 2005, Bart Kottei also filed a Motion in Limine requesting: 
"(1) a motion in limine prohibiting Respondent from presenting any 
evidence or disputing any evidence or proof as requested in Petitioners 
interrogatories and request for production of documents served upon 
Respondent on March 20, 2003, July 21, 2003, and April 13, 20048; 
(2) a motion in limine prohibiting Respondent from presenting any 
evidence or disputing any evidence or proof as ordered by the court on 
September 30, 2004 and/or October 5, 20059. Petitioner's Memorandum 
in Support of his Motion in Limine requested an order 'prohibiting 
Respondent from presenting any evidence as to any of the properties or 
encumbrances thereon, valuations, proposals of distribution, inch iding at ly 
information as to an award of alimony/" [R2933-2939] 
Elizabeth Vienna failed to respond to either motion, and on May <- -x-): -ne trial 
court entered its Memorar icii IIII i i D e c i s i o n grantir ^ h -» . .ant 's ivio; 
: »* • -iter's Motior i for Partial Summary Judgment requested that the trial court make a finding 
that Team Builders International, Inc. had a value of $818,874.57, that Bart Kotter be awarded the 
North Logan home and lots with the finding that there was $237,670.00 negative equity in the 
North Logan home, awarding the Hailey home to Elizabeth Vienna with a value of $875,000.00 leaving a 
positive equity of $334,699.65, equitable division of the personal property requesting that Bart Kotter be 
given an equitable offset of $287,975.16, equitable offset in the personal property acquired in favor of 
Bart Kotter of $114,531.00 against Elizabeth Vienna's one-half value of Team Builders International, Inc., 
equitable division of the debt accumulated during the course of the marriage, and requesting that 
Bart Kotter be entitled to an offset of $56,405.00 against Elizabeth Vienna's one-half award of 
Team Builders International, Inc. to equal out the legal fees and expenses and a finding that 
Elizabeth Vienna is not entitled to alimony [R2456-2488]. 
8
 The March 20, 2003, the July 2 1, 2003 and April 13, 2004 interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents were served on Elizabeth Vienna and were not responded to within the stated 
time provided in Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Interrogatories and Request 
for Production of Documents included, but was not limited to, a request that Elizabeth Vienna provide 
employment information, detailed monthly living expenses, financial information, business information, 
and personal and real property information rR9cm-9Q?Qi 
The September 30, 2004 Order i 'ember 7, 2004 hearing) provided in part: 
"Petitioner is ordered to prepare a report of the marital assets and their valuations, the marital debts arid 
obligations, and a proposal of distribution, including an award of alimony. Respondent shall respond 
within 30 days." The October 5, 2005 Order provided: "discovery to be completed by December 1, 2005," 
[R3771C;R1902;R1906;R3772B] 
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and granting summary judgment partially on some remaining issues [R3280;Addendum 
"8"]. The trial court's Memorandum Decision stated, in part, the following: 
"Subsequently, the parties agreed to binding arbitration with Judge Low 
concerning the issues of award of business, value of business and 
alimony. Three days of mediation occurred on July 2, 2004 and on 
August 18, 2004.10 Judge Low issued a Memorandum Decision awarding 
the business to Petitioner subject to Respondent receiving one-half of the 
business value which Judge Low made findings on and that she would 
receive a 'substantial alimony award'. Memorandum Decision 
August 18, 2004,5. 
The Court finds that Respondent has failed to comply with Rule 7 and 56. 
The Court finds Respondent has failed to file any memorandum and 
affidavits controverting Petitioner's facts and filings. The Court finds 
Respondent has failed to set forth specific facts demonstrating genuine 
issues for trial. The Court finds that it is appropriate that partial summary 
judgment be entered against Respondent. 
As further basis for granting partial summary judgment, the Court finds 
that Petitioner served Requests for Admissions on Respondent's counsel 
on April 12, 2005. Respondent failed to timely answer the requests for 
admissions. Petitioner filed a Motion for Requests for Admissions to be 
Deemed Admitted on May 27, 2005. On November 3, 2005, the Court 
issued a Memorandum Decision granting that the admissions be deemed 
admitted. Subsequently, an Order admitting the admissions was signed 
on January 6, 2006 . . . 
. . . Therefore, the Court finds that the requests are admitted and the facts 
admitted are conclusively established. 
As a further basis for summary judgment, the Court finds that Judge Low 
entered findings in the case after 3 days of binding mediation10. These 
findings are set forth in his August 18, 2004 Memorandum Decision and 
became the law of case. Many of these findings apply to the motion for 
summary judgment and are binding on the parties. Judge Low's findings 
will be discussed further as the Court rules on each issue raised in the 
motion for summary judgment. . . 
. . . Regarding the value of the business, the Court finds that at no time in 
the arbitration hearing with Judge Low did Petitioner ever assert the 
10
 Arbitration took place only on July 2, 2004 [R3770D]. 
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business was worth $818,000,00. Hie parties always represented the 
value of $1,600,000.00. On that basis, Judge Low issued his ruling and 
this Court accepts Judge Low's findings 
. . . I he parties also own a house in North Logan, titan, ret,. .. -„ 
provided to the Court the only evidence the Court has of the hou ilue. 
This property was appraised at $650,000.00 by Allen Burris ?h 
mortgage balance in June 2005 was $886,670.00. The court accepts 
these figures as its finding because they are undisputed by Respondent 
Fherefore, the Court: fir ids the North Logan house has a negative net 
equity in excess of $200,000.00 . . . 
# B m in j u ( j g e Low's Memorandum Decision of August 18, ^004, he found 
that Petitioner should provide Respondent '...with a substantial alimony 
award.11" Fhen Judge Low used a yearly alimony award of $200,000.00 as 
an example. Judge Low also ruled that alimony would be awarded 
ording to needs and abilities as may be foiind ' 
. ught of Judge Low's decision, the Cour t finds that for purposes of 
summary judgment Petitioner has not provided the Court with sufficien* 
information concerning each factor. Therefore, the issue of alimony wr 
be considered at the May 31, 2006 trial and each party will be expects » 
provide competent testimony as to the alimony factors 
Because of the remaining issues which are set for trial, the Court 
denies Petitioner's motion to strike. The Court finds Respondent has 
failed to answer interrogatories and requests for production of documents 
and the Court ordered Respondent to answer them on September 30, 
2004. Also, Respondent has failed to comply with the Court's pretrial 
order of October 5, 2005 Because Respondent has blatantly disregarded 
the Court's orders, the Court grants Petitioner's Motio 
[R3280,3624f3659,3663;Addendums "8", "10", "11"]. 
Oi i January 26. 2007. i u . • ial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
1
 partially awards Petitioner Summary Judgment and gi ants Petitior le i 's 
Motion in Limine, but reserved the issues of division and value of perse ml 
property, value of real property, value ofbt isiness incomes of the parties, 
alimony, debts and attorneys fees ' 
The trial court entered its Order stating: 
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". . . partially awards Petitioner Summary Judgment and grants Petitioner's 
Motion in Limine, subject to the trial of the issues. After the trial, the court 
issued a Memorandum Decision on July 27, 2006" 
[R3624,3633;Addendums "8", "10", "11"]. 
At a pre-trial conference on December 15, 2005, the trial court inquired as to 
whether the matter had been settled when Ms. Wasserman, counsel for 
Elizabeth Vienna, stated: "Judge Low had already found the value of the business at 
$1.6 million," at which point Bart Kotter's counsel stated: "That's not what he found." 
Ms. Wasserman then stated: "At the same time, Judge Low also threw out a number 
for a lump sum of alimony on top of that, which I acknowledge was not a finding that, 
here it is, but it was something like an additional $200,000.00, or something like that, for 
alimony, but he clearly found that the business was worth $1.6 million . .." At 
approximately this point, the trial court then found Judge Low's August 18, 2004 
Memorandum Decision and made the following observations: 
"It appears that Judge Low is mainly talking about who is going to run the 
business, and he's throwing around some general figure of $1.6 rather 
than saying it is $1.6 million. In any event, I'll have to look at it in more 
detail prior to the hearing." [R3771D@4-13] 
On January 9, 2006, Attorney Ann Wasserman withdrew as counsel for 
Elizabeth Vienna [R3773B]. 
Trial. The trial court conducted a bench trial on May 31, 2006. Elizabeth Vienna 
represented herself. At the commencement of the trial, Judge Willmore made the 
following introductive statement: 
"Previously, Judge Low has ruled on custody and parenting time. Also, he 
has ruled on who would run the business and made general rulings with 
regard to the value of the business and alimony as reflected in the prior 
memorandum . . . I've issued a Memorandum Decision on May 4, 2006, 
which took care of some of the issues regarding the parties' tortured case. 
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Ihe remaining issues for the trial court today are as follows; Petitioner's 
claimed business expenses, division of debts, attorneys' fees, costs, 
division of personal property, alimony, and final division concerning values 
of business and real property that the court has previously ruled on." 
[R3773C@2] 
Then 
trial court: 
"Mr. Skabelund: . . . since Your Honor did grant the Motion in Limine, 
she's therefore unable to present any evidence. I don't believe she has 
any evidence that she'll present today relative to alimony, so that claim be 
stricken and that we proceed on other issues. 
The Court: Didn't Judge Low make the decision concerning alimony? 
Mr. Skabelund: Your Honor, that's an interesting point. Let me explain 
that. We have never, in any hearing, presented any evidence relative to 
alimony. There was some sort of discussion back in chambers about 
alimony, but no evidence was ever present* * J • exhibits were e >er 
presented, and so, no." 
The Court: Didn't Judge Low rule in his Mc n 
concerning the business and other issues? 
Mr. Skabelund: In the Memorandum Decision, he s.^ wouid 
likely be an award of alimony, 
The Court: Didn't he say "stibblaiilia! .iim .,, '", the nature of 
$200,000.00 a year? 
Mr. Skabelund: Yes, he did say that. I -• _ I believe that was just 
based upon discussions in chambers. 1 here has never been ai \\ 
evidence at any time presented towards an award of alimony 
The Court: Did you file an objection to that in his Memoranr!- ? 
Mr. Skabelund: No, I did not. 
The Court: It seems to me that's the law of the case. He says in here, 
and I'm looking at the August 18, 2004 Memorandum Decisioi i, am id I'm i i 
not saying it should be $200,000.00, but I think the amount needs to be 
looked at. Judge Low clearly said he awarded your client the business 
based upon two things, that he pay one-half of the value and he provide 
her with a substantial alimony award. So it was clear that there were 
something with regards to alimony. Then he went on in the same 
paragraph and talked about 200,000. 
Mr. Skabelund: I have no idea where he came up with u: / 
understanding is 
The Court: I'm not saying that's the amount that should be awarded 
I think I made it clear in my Memorandum Decision that there needs to be 
proof. I understand that you want to limit Ms. Vienna because she has 
totally, and I've covered this in my Memorandum Decision, she has 
blatantly, I think is the word I used, blatantly disregarded court orders and 
has failed to comply. I think you're entitled to a continuance if you want a 
continuance, but, otherwise, I understand that you feel that there is some 
sort of conflict between the granting of the Motion in Limine and whatever 
request she may have on whether there should be alimony, but I think 
where Judge Low has conditioned the award on the business upon your 
client paying some sort of alimony and paying her one-half the value, that 
issue has been preserved. It's just a question of, obviously, I'm going to 
receive testimony from you and your witnesses, but it's a question of what 
testimony I'm going to receive from her because of your blatant disregard 
of court orders it severely limits what you can present, Ms. Vienna, 
through your course of conduct. 
Mr. Skabelund: Your honor, I understand. 
The Court: The same thing goes with the value of the personal property. 
Your Requests for Admissions on that went to value. If you recall right, 
and other related issues, so I need to hear evidence as Ms. Vienna 
presents her side of the case. You object appropriately when you think 
it's violating the granting of the Motion in Limine, and I'll rule on it." 
[R3773C@5-8] 
Bart Kotter testified11 that he had $46,120.00 of personal property in his 
possession and Elizabeth Vienna had $110,072.00 of personal property in her 
possession [R3773C@17-29]; he was living in the North Logan, Utah home that was 
purchased in July of 1998 for $700,000.00 [R3773C@51,75] which had a current 
appraisal of $650,000.00 based on an appraisal done in 2004 by Allen Burris 
[R3773C@31,71,73,74,76], a certified appraiser, and there was a balance owing of 
$850,078.79 with Washington Mutual [R3773C@30;R3730] with a negative equity in 
excess of $300,000.00; the parties had two (2) North Logan, Utah building lots that had 
been appraised for $46,000.00 each by Jack Draxler, a certified appraiser, there was a 
mortgage of approximately $75,000.00 with Lewiston State Bank, and the lots had been 
11
 Exhibit "3" dealt in pertinent part with personal property in Bart Kotter's possession; personal 
property in Elizabeth Vienna's possession; and Affidavits of Allen Burris, Jack Draxler, and Patricia Lentz, 
and other related issues. Said exhibit was introduced and received [R3773C@15-29,41]. Exhibit "3" tabs 
1-8 were admitted into evidence [R3773C@201;R3730]. 
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sold for $58,500.00 and $59,000.00 with a net equity in the lots of $40,130.00. Bart 
Y ollei testillied III lal i Ului i \u\ Jiin lenkins, previous counsel foi Elizabetl i iei m iia, I lad 
placed an attorney's lien oi i the proceeds of said lots [R3773C@32- 37]. 
Bart Kotter testified that Elizabeth Vienna resides in the Hailey, Idaho home, 
there was an appraisal done on Hie 1 Iniloy hi uric for $875,000,00 by Patricia I ei itz, a 
certified appraiser, there is a mortgage on said hoine with Washington Mutual currently 
nt $r>3? 819 1 1 - ^ 1 tl 1 -, tMi ill,/ in ,uil IKmilIin- ml riliniil p 'KI (Hill fill |F»'',T,,'>r 
©30-32]. 
3Sb .A.- . . . • uizabetl i V ienna 
introduced two appraisals13 on the Nnrth i ogan home dated March 4, 2002 and 
Novembei <.-./,,
 Lk^, . iC@45-o^. w; Jart Kotter testified that these appraisals 
were for refinancina r- -^oses. Based on the appraisals, thp\ Ihia 1 increased a home 
loan to $836,000.00 [R3773C@7P "^ Ban - otie« Testified the parties paid 
Elizabeth Vienna while she was directing her cross -examination, she disputed the 
i it inn i y lii n j 11 i in u I mi III in i " i "i ul in in 11' i il'Sl i2)V.j aim siaied tl lat si le sigi led a listing 
11
 Bart Kotter objected on the basis that Elizabeth Viet ma did no; * ^ g , ^ o & J 
Requests for Production of Documents three (3) times and trial exhibits w t »_ •_ . . • :-d tc each party 
before trial (the Order on Petitioner's Motion in Limine prevented introduction as to the North Logan home 
value). The Admissions established the value of the North Logan home at $600,000.00 The trial court 
overruled the objection stating: "I'm going to hear the evidence." [R3773C@ 46-50] 
1J
 over Bart Kottei 's objection, the court received Elizabeth Vienna's [Respondent's] ExhiL lM 
and "2". The exhibits show appraisals of $1,850,000.00 and $1,755,000.00 [R3773C@79;R3730]. 
14
 Tl le J '! 2 aci es wei e also i efei i e :::! I : as tl ne 5"! s aci es [R37 1 3C@74]. 
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agreement for $745,000.0015 [R3773C@53.55]. Bart Kotter then testified that he 
previously offered to buy the Hailey home for what she was selling it for less the real 
estate commission of $745,000.00 [R3773C@55,60]. 
Bart Kotter testified that Team Builders International, Inc. was awarded to him 
[R3773C@41], the finances were taken care of by the court-appointed accountant 
(special master), Gary Jones, and his accountant, Keith Christensen, that Gary Jones 
allowed him a $5,000.00 per month salary [R3773C@42], that for a period of nine 
months he did not have a salary and as a result was driven deeply into debt of 
approximately $70,000.00, and he used just about every resource of credit to stay 
afloat [R3773C@42-44]. 
Gary Jones testified that he is a certified public accountant, that in approximately 
February of 2004 the court appointed him special master [R3773C@79-80], that his 
responsibility was to receive the funds for Nikken for Team Builders International, Inc., 
and that he was instructed to first pay J.H.A.M. Incorporated, which was roughly a 
quarter of each month's income, pay the mortgages on the North Logan, Utah home 
and the Hailey, Idaho home (about $11,700.00), pay $200.00 per month on the old debt 
to American Express, pay his own fees, and pay the business expenses of 
Team Builders International, Inc. what he determined were reasonable, ordinary, and 
necessary with the remaining amount split between the parties, which varied as much 
as over $10,000.00, but more recently, two and a half years later, it's only been maybe 
15
 Elizabeth Vienna also made the statement in her cross-examination of Bart Kotter that she had 
personal belongings that were in storage, she had no money to pay for the storage, she received a note 
saying they were going to auction off the Hailey home, and that she signed a listing agreement just before 
2006 but that Bart Kotter was unwilling to sign it [R3773C@55 -56]. 
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$5,000 [R3773C@80-85]. Mr. Jones testified there have been months there was 
*ier party 
; i-"i"ie from 30% to IB0*-, the last fi or fi no. : "s between 1R% r^-.r< ' Bl - .IPC ,ric, «.,« 
2004 to 2005 more like 30% percent aecline \\Ui , 3 t 
insufficient income of the parties, Mr Joi les joined in a motion to sell the Nortl 1 Logan 
building lots through the request of the parties, especially from Elizabeth Vienna for her 
"varioiis and sundry • • . . - -
and for a few other things [R3773C@86,8 7\ - ma *es testified • r - > • >ugh 
II I  III'-. t l l S l . U S M l l l l ' i 
insufficient resources \r ieot ih<-.. , -PP.' pxnpndiUieb L, -' -" ^ w^. *-i »-^ f ^ i . ^ . , y 
knowledgeable-, li.^.r •.. ., li-zauew n^ was \ . , i y j ; : I Q » ^ 
more money to take care of my needs." [R377C-
On cross-examination, Mr. Jones testified that .it paid oi jt two salaries, one to 
Bart Kotter for $5 nnn r : ir $2,00C 
were part of the business expenses [R3773C@88,89], ones testit v-.is 
I II II II II II Hi 11 I HI I I M l i i l l l l ' i t | ||| I IHHl l lc i l l l ' I • 11 1111 ' HI I" Ill III IIIIMI III II II III ), III II III H i l t ' I I I ' I , H U M I ' M ' W d S 
following Bart Kotter s instiuctions that he was negotiating with Washington Mut J 
1
 * 1ii ect c- , 
•ones testified that for the last 7 or 8 months thprp had hppn no o? tti^, 
money to split between the parties \UM /3L(ti'!J I . a. i;cu^.d upon the history of 
the business and the decline of the business it certainiy looked like the business was in 
a declining pattern. Mr. Jones testified that it appeared, based on the decline of the 
Nikken business, there would be no future funds to split between the parties 
[R3773C@92]. 
Mr. Jones testified that Bart Kotter's attorney's fees of $3,000.00 each month 
came out of the business expenses [R3773C@96,97]. 
Keith Christensen, after stating his background and credentials, stated he is a 
certified public accountant for Team Builders International, Inc. [R3773C@99-101]. He 
described Team Builders International, Inc. as a multi-leveled marketing business for 
the selling of magnets and health products and that he had other clients who did the 
same type of business [R3773C@102]. Referring to Exhibit "2"16, he valued the 
business under the cash-flow method [R3773C@103;R3730]. He testified that he 
came up with an original valuation of $1,629,100.00 as of December 20, 2002 (also 
referred to as the January 1, 2003 valuation) [R3773C@104-105,138;R3730@a], 
however, if you remove the J.HAM.17 contract, the value came in a little over 
$800,000.00 [R3773C@106]. This valuation was revisited a number of times. 
Mr. Christensen testified that based upon the 2003 evaluation there had since been a 
13% or 15% decline per year, similar to other Nikken businesses18, and from January 1, 
In examination of Christensen, he referred to Exhibit "2" - A through F, which provided the 
business valuation, explanation of the decline of business value, business value less what had been paid 
to Elizabeth Vienna, comparison of the personal funds received by each party, property settlement 
proposal, and budget and shortfall of Bart Kotter. Exhibit "2" was offered and received 
[R3773C@99;R3730]. 
17
 In March of 2002, Team Builders International, Inc. had contracted with JHAM, another Nikken 
distributorship, to administer that down line resulting in a net average monthly income of approximately 
$10,000.00 to $11,000.00. It was the testimony of Mr. Christensen that JHAM could terminate the 
contract at any time [R3773C@106-107]. 
18
 Mr. Christensen testified that he was also an accountant for other Nikken businesses similar to 
the parties' business [R3773C@123]. 
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2003 to the end of May 2006 the Nikken check had gone from $77,000.00 to 
$32,000.00 per month [R3773C@105-113]. I'v- n the der *am Ruil. 
International, Inc , cunent market, and average rate oi decline, Mr Lnns'- is - <. w 
ihi; il h ,iin huililt-'is l i i lr imlnii i il In In |\ | M' MIJM III) mil "Mi 111)11 Mil14 
[R3773C@113,130 13 11. 
I* fill) i hristenscn (reterrmc) -, gave 
further testimony for 2003 2006 there had been a total of $878,687.00 that had been 
.tly paid to Elizabeth Vienna from learn Builders International, Inc. and that for the 
same period Bart Kotter received $818,000.00 [R3773C@114;R3730]. 
Mr. Christensen testified (referring to Exhibit "2", tab F20) as to both the business 
1
 i>2i b'd* >" a-ic average •>»• • ithly payments of >m \ ') Ui) ano tor the iast •« • !•- = 
t i 
Melissa Kotter had been recer.- * w $? non on . - ... ^H. i R ' ^ 7 3 0 ^
 l 0 the 
various expenses as set t-^i- * . u . s LUJU- • , n K,JI.,L) < <^e »«. Meals din.f +k~+ 
there is an average deficier ^ • iv... rxutlc. * u i ^ * 4 t: ia^ " n rRT"*^, fP* < P'- 7° ] 
Mr Christensen then went mruugh and describea trie "\<.ntniv expenses inc; . .: 
'\mnn<Mn f ^pi'p'Vi Ami * J 
i9 gasec j U p 0 n a d e c | i n e j n business of approximately 13% per year and based upon current 
decline, there has been 10% less revenues since the projected valuation back in 2003. Since January 1, 
2003, there has been an average check decline from $77,000.00 per month to $32,000.00 per month. 
Based upon the above, Mr. Christensen gave an evaluation of $358,000.00 $477,000.00 
[R3773C@113]„ 
'""" Exhibit "2" tab F is tl le mor itl lly budget for Bai t K :)1 h w A it! i a detailed expenditures and schedule 
of each creditor [R3730]. 
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MBNA [R3773C@124;Exhibit "2" tab F;R3730]. Mr. Christensen testified that a lot of 
Mr. Kotter's financial problems were because hundreds of thousands of dollars had been 
spent on legal and accounting fees the last four years [R3773C@125]. 
On cross- examination, Mr. Christensen stated there had been about 
$700,000.00 spent in legal and accounting fees. Mr. Christensen agreed based on the 
court's question: "If they would have put the $700,000.00 back into those 3 or 4 years 
the business whether the business would have been more in line with the valuation 
[R3773C@128] completed as of January 1, 2003 . . . when revenues are going down, 
often times businesses will spend more to increase, but they are also going to pull back 
on other expenses" [R3773C@134]. The trial court stated that "the parties have had a 
good life, but it seems to me that they have tried to live on the standard of living they 
were living on together with the $75,000.00 per month coming in, and now, for the last 
four years or so, it hasn't come and they are trying to support two families and pay a lot 
of attorney and accounting fees" [R3773C@134]. Mr. Christensen testified the assets 
of the business include: video conference material, equipment hardware, and that they 
buy inventory of $1,500.00 to $1,600.00 a month from Nikken [R3773C@140]. 
Once Bart Kotter rested, the trial court inquired whether Elizabeth Vienna had 
any other witnesses besides herself, and she stated, "I do not." The trial court then 
asked her if she wished to testify, and she stated, "Not particularly. The only issue 
I would give any feedback on at all is what I paid for all the belongings in Bart's house" 
[R3773C@141]. After a lengthy discussion with Elizabeth Vienna, the trial court finally 
stated: 
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The Court: Ms, Vienna, did yoi i read the Memorandum Decision I issued 
on May 4th? 
Ms. Vienna: Yes, I did. 
The Court: Do you understand that I outlined in there what the parties 
need to be prepared to do with regards to the various issues, such as 
alimony, debt, business expenses, attorneys' fees, and the such? 
Ms. Vienna: The only thing that looks like is missing that I don't know 
about the actual value of Bart's personal property. Everything else I think 
I've answered, [R3773C@143 
Again, the trial court v^ •: •- ,. uisuuso,, - ma, and finally si le 
stated, "I guess I'll testify" [R3773C@144] Ms. Vienna briefly testified there was 
$250,000.00 in personal belongings in the North Logan home [R3773C@145] and 
1
 it $60,001 nil |n in Il II r l ii | nthe i h i l •-: ^-•-;fd) \4r)\ <-n Mh.il 
Todd McNeley had been renting : * > .,: y. e< < place* |K3/Y3C@145] . Ms Vienna 
1 1 1 1 1 1 ( 1 1 
repair and that she hnu. , tiers to tin- - ^ j innee . ompany T - <: u M : : . - _ IUOI 
repaired [R37 72 .* .enna tei»;.in. i agree t, l t j * t a ^ 1 : , imp was 
valued at least $900,000.00 [R3773C@150]. Oi i cross-examination, Ms. Vienna was 
shown Bart Kotter's [Petitioner's] Exhibit "4" (Pet i t ioned D~nuests for Admissions) 
III Is . } 'lei ill iia testified that I le i pi e\ ioi is attoi i ie} ! lad n."* n 
the admissions that were served upon her [R3773C(0J1;>*5 \ ^ ^s states ^ her 
I in 11 •  "i in n 1 1 s n i l f i 1 1 1 1 ,/ A , mi i mi I , i s s f > 11 in in, 11 in, III in „ in if II s I . i I Ill, I'H •" mi mi in t 1 1 n 111 in I mi II if in mi e s |' 111 I I III 1 1 III III i <-» s i • ., 1 1 
,:: g a r t |^0^er 0bjected at that time claiming this went back to the Motioi i ii i Lin iii te wl ilct i 
precluded her from talking about the property or property lists and that the values were admitted in the 
Requests for Admissions. The court stated: "The rule that deems they are admitted says they are 
deemed conclusively I understand your concerns where you didn't receive any documents. That's 
certainly going to the weight that I will give to her testimony, I'll I lear her testimony, but it will also effect 
the weight I give it/' [R377^.^146-147] 
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this point in time." Ms. Vienna admitted she had not responded to the admissions 
[R3773C@153].22 
At the time Ms. Vienna rested, Bart Kotter motioned the trial court to have 
Elizabeth Vienna's "claim for alimony be denied" asserting she had presented no 
evidence and the three factors had not been met. The court responded, "I'll take that 
into consideration when I make my formal and full decision on all issues" 
[R3773C@154-155]. 
Denise Iverson stated that she is employed by the State of Utah Department of 
Workforce Services [R3773C@171] as an employment counselor, lists job openings, is 
familiar with the labor market, has looked up the website for the Department of Labor in the 
Hailey/Sun Valley area, part of her responsibilities were to look on the internet to determine 
what the job market is in other locations [R3373C@172], and that based upon the fact 
Elizabeth Vienna has a degree from Utah State University, a certificate in teaching English 
as a second language, and a certificate in International Relations, that depending on her 
resume, she could get income at least starting in the $40,000's and moving up from there 
[R3773C@174]. Ms. Iverson then testified that it would be conservative to say Ms. Vienna 
is capable of making $45,000.00 per year [R3773C@175]. 
Candace Peterson testified she is a practicing realtor with Home Realty Network 
[R3773C@179] and that it is very difficult to sell a home over $650,000.00 
[R3773C@181]. She stated she is familiar with the Bart Kotter North Logan home, that 
Exhibit "4" - Requests for Admissions - was discussed throughout the course of the 
proceedings and commented on by the trial court on a number of occasions. Exhibit "3" was offered and 
received into evidence [R3773C@78;R3730]. 
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anything over $500,000.0 ' - alley is a hai d sale [R3773C@180] , and tl lat 
[R3773C@180] . 
Once the trial was concluded, the trial court inquired as to Ms Vienna's summer 
visitation with the parties' minor chi ldren. Ms. Vienna stated, "This mont l 11 got 
$1,400.00. I averaged up the prior five months and it's been less than $1,000.00 a 
till lat II • hi e ::l. Il II iia ::! i 
here and slept in my car last night. People are feeding me at home I K : 3 ; / JC@201] . 
Ms. Vienna stated, "I cai i"t feed them. I have mushrooms that are slit i i'v ii i nny fridge 
why Ms. Vienna had not looked for a job. The trial court then quest ioned Ms. Vienna: 
T o r four years you haven't looked for a job" [R3773C@204] . The trial court and the 
general d i ^u t j ^ i o i i .is tu U . , luniuVc v iuy t imn aniann]oniiniit i w illlii 
the children, other related issues with the parties' minor chi ldren, and attorney's fees 
I 
arguments. I'm going to take this matter under a*i - semen t [R3773C@2 1 3 l 
Post-thai. 
[R3659;Addendum w< ; *u**v < ourt s i g n e r ^ n " ^ i -n -n r i ; i K i i nn^n tu^ -»n 
Conclusions i i .JU- . qnuary? ..^ .,wb3;Aaae . 
I I']. 11 le court's findings stated in pertinent part: 
"
A
 limony 
The parties were divorced on December 20, 2002 after an 18-year 
marriage. On February 9, 2004, Petitioner was awarded the care, 
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custody, and control of the parties' minor children. During the last 
eight (8) years of the parties' marriage, Petitioner and Respondent 
operated a business known as Team Builders International, Inc. During 
the marriage, Petitioner obtained no special training or received any 
education. Respondent, on the other hand, received a degree in 
International Relations, a bachelor's degree from Utah State University, 
and obtained a teaching certificate in English as a Second Language from 
Seattle University. 
During the course of the divorce proceedings, Respondent has asserted a 
claim for alimony. However, since this action commenced, there had 
been no temporary alimony award. Previously, Judge Low awarded 1A of 
the business income to Respondent which constituted temporary alimony. 
The court finds that the issue of alimony has been difficult for this court to 
determine. Because this case has continued on for so long, much has 
changed in the case with regards to the parties' financial conditions and 
the value of the business. Further, according to the testimony at Trial, the 
income from Team Builders International, Inc. has changed. Additionally, 
the Respondent has failed to comply with court orders with regard to 
production of documents and answers to interrogatories, has chosen to 
represent herself at Trial, and has failed to provide a complete picture of 
her financial ability and financial needs. The court must determine 
alimony based upon the law of the case and the current financial 
circumstances of the parties. The law of the case was established by 
Judge Low in his August 18, 2004 Memorandum Decision. In the 
Memorandum Decision, Judge Low indicated that the Respondent was to 
receive a substantial alimony award "according to needs and abilities as 
may be found. 
Therefore, it was recognized early in the case that alimony would be 
awarded to the Respondent. 
Jones Factors 
The court considered the evidence relative to the factors set forth in Jones 
v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) and as set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated §30-3-5(8)(a), including: These factors were carefully 
considered by the Court and are fully set forth in the Court's July 27, 2006 
Memorandum Decision. The findings on these factors have not been fully 
stated in this document by Petitioner23. 
23
 The trial court's relevant portion in its July 27, 2006 Memorandum Decision states: 
"Therefore, the Court finds that I must consider the alimony factors set forth in U.C.A. §30-3-
5(8)(a). The Court finds that the parties were married on August 4, 1984. As of the date of the bifurcation 
the parties had been married more than 18 years. During the course of the marriage the parties have had 
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two children bom to them. The custody of the children has been awarded previously to Kottei wl lich is a 
factor that is considered by the Court with regard to the financial ability of Kotter to pay. Case law from the 
Utah Supreme Court would classify this marriage as a long term marriage requiring an award of alimony if 
the other factors are met. 
The Court must also consider whether Vienna worked in and operated a business which was 
awarded to Kotter. The Court finds that prior to separation, both parties participated fully in the business. 
This fact is supported and set forth in Judge Low's Memorandum Decision of August 18, 2004. While the 
Court has previously awarded Vienna one half of the value of the business, it is through their joint efforts 
that the business still provides income to Kotter and this factoi weighs in Vienna's behalf for an award of 
alimony to her. 
Next, the Court must look at the ability of Kotter to provide support:. I he parties have built a very 
successful business. The parties have received a large amount of income through the years from the 
business. It is undisputed by Vienna that the business income had declined during the last several years. 
The Court accepts the testimony of Gary Jones that there has been a decline in business income between 
16 to 30 percent. Also, Gary Jones testified that Kotter received approximately $5000.00 per month 
business income and Melissa Kotter received $2000.00 per month business income. These amounts go 
to the payment of Kotter's monthly expenses and his ability to provide support. 
The Court also finds that the parties have spent huge amounts of business incoine on attorneys 
fees and experts. The testimony at trial was that in excess of $600,000.00 has been spent on attorneys 
and in excess of $100,000.00 had been spent on accountants and other experts. These fees have 
resulted in an enormous drain upon the business. This fact was supported in the testimony of 
Keith Christensen. The Court places great weight on the fact that the attorney fees and expenses will i not 
continue which will result in substantially more income to Kotter through business. 
Gary Jones testified that after business expenses and attorney fees had been paid during the last 
year there was approximately $5000 to $10,000 left each month to be distributed to the parties. Ihe Court 
has no other evidence before it disputing this fact. The Court considers this to be very i eliable evidence. 
Therefore, the Court finds that Kotter's monthly income is $7500.00 per month. 
The Court must also consider Vienna's earning capacity or ability to produce income. For some 
reason, Vienna has chosen not to pursue employment during the pendency of these proceedings. At trial, 
when questioned, she did no assert that she had any physical or mental disability that prevented her from 
working. Vienna has a college degree and other education and training. Also, she has been involved 
extensively in building up the parties business. At trial, Denise Iverson, from the Department of Workforce 
Services testified that Vienna has excellent training and excellent job possibilities. In her opinion, Vienna 
could earn approximately $40,000.00. The only evidence presented by Vienna to dispute this testimony 
was that she had applied at a few places and had been unable to find a job. The Court accepts the 
testimony of Ms. Iverson and finds that Vienna has the ability to earn income in the amount of $40,000.00 
per year. 
Finally, the Coui 11 i lust consider the financial conditio! i ai id needs of Vienna. This factor was not 
properly addressed by Vienna. She chose to represent herself and failed to provide the Court a monthly 
budget. Kotter provided a monthly budget. Vienna provided testimony in a round about way of her 
financial condition. In particular, the fact that she was having a difficult time in exercising visitation with 
her children because she did not have any money. Also her financial condition was presented by 
Gary Jones in his testimony about distributions on her behalf from the business income 
While the Court finds that there was not a monthly budget and financial condition information was 
woefully inadequate, that simply goes to the weight the Court would give the testimony in awarding 
alimony. Based upon what was presented to the Court, the Court finds that Vienna has a need to receive 
alimony from Kotter. Based upon what has been presented, the Court hereby awards alimony in the 
amount of $3000.00 per month from Kotter to Vienna which shall begin with the month of July 2006. The 
Court will not set Vienna's alimony at an amount to equalize it with Kotter's monthly income at $7500.00 
because Kotter has custody of the children and the related expenses for them. The Court hereby awards 
alimony pursuant to ' • n A §30-3-5(8)(h) for the duration of the marriage or i, intil terminated or modified by 
the Court" [R36591 
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(a) Financial conditions and needs of the spouse claiming support. 
Respondent provided no evidence (although the court requested 
numerous times if Respondent was going to present any testimony) as to 
her financial conditions and/or needs. However, the court finds that 
Respondent's needs of support which is partial based on the fact that 
Respondent received a portion of the business income from June 11, 
2002 to pay her mortgage, credit cards, and other expenses] 
(b) Ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for 
himself/herself. Respondent presented no evidence as to her current 
income or her income making ability. Petitioner presented evidence that 
Respondent holds a degree of a special certificate in International 
Relations from Utah State University and a bachelor's of arts in political 
science and speech from Utah State University. Petitioner also presented 
evidence that Respondent holds an ESL Certificate to teach English as a 
secondary language from Seattle University. Denise Iverson, an 
employment specialist, testified that Respondent, based upon her 
background and training, could easily make as much as $40,000 or more 
per year. At trial, the Respondent testified that she did not assert any 
physical or mental disability that prevented her from working, but for some 
reason the Respondent has chosen not to pursue employment during the 
pendency of these proceedings. The court finds that the Respondent, 
prior to separation, worked in and fully participated in the business; 
(c) Ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Accountant 
Keith Christensen of Christensen, King & Associates, Accountant 
Gary Jones, the Petitioner, and the files and records contained in this 
matter established that Petitioner has insufficient ability to provide 
additional support to the Respondent. The evidence established that 
Team Builders International, Inc. is currently experiencing average yearly 
decline in revenue of 18.52% while the business expenses remain 
constant (This decline in revenue is similar to other major Nikken 
distributorships). Evidence established that Petitioner has business and 
personal debt in excess of $1,642,476.55. The court finds that there have 
been huge amounts of business expenses, including $700,000 in 
attorney's fees, accounting fees, and experts, which has resulted in 
enormous drain on the business. Petitioner asserted that he had 
insufficient income after the payment of the minimum business and 
personal expenses. The court did not accept all of the Petitioner's 
evidence and arguments as set forth in the July 27, 2006 Decision. 
The court finds that this is a long-term marriage, that Petitioner receives 
approximately $5,000 per month business income, and that his wife, 
Melissa Kotter, receives approximately $2,000 per month in business 
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income. The court finds that the Petitioner has a monthly income :>f 
$7,000 per month. 
Based upon the above, the court awards alimony in the sum of $3,000 per 
month from Petitioner to the Respondent which should begin July 2006. 
Alimony should continue for the duration of the marriage (18 years), or 
until it is terminated or modified by the court, or if Respondent remarries 
dies, or is cohabiting with another person, or in accordance with the 
provisions found in Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 et seq. 
Team Builders International Inc. 
I he court reaffirms and reiterates in its entirety the court i uling of 
August 18, 2004, that the business known as Team Builders International, 
Inc., a distributor of Nikken, all personal property1 titled or associated with 
the business, at id all income should be and is hereby awarded to 
Petitioner. 
Value 
At trial, the only evidence presented of the valuation of the business was 
presented by Accountant Keith Christensen of Christensen, King & 
Associates. Keith Christensen estimated the value of Team Builders 
International, Inc. at the time of the divorce (December 20, 2002) at 
$1,629,100.00 (with JHAM). Respondent presented no evidence as to the 
value of Team Builders International. The Petitioner's Trial evidence 
established that since January 1, 2003, the business income has been 
declining at the rate of 18.52% per year (with JHAM). On January 1, 
2003, the business was grossing $77,024.51 per month and had average 
stipulated business expenses of $19,000.00 per n lonth for an average of 
$58,024.51 net per month. As of May 31, 2006, the business was 
grossing an average of $32,285.69 per month and had average stipulated 
business expenses of $19,000.00 per month which net the business 
$13,285.69 per month. Based upon the current rate of decline in income 
where the expenses remain relatively constant, the evidence established 
that the value of the business, as of May 31, 2006, is between 
$358,402.00 and $477,50000 (with JHAM). 
In a prior trial with Judge Low, he valued the business based on valuation 
testimony presented by Petitioner. The business was valued at 
$1,600,000.00 and awarded to Petitioner on August 18, 2004. Because 
Petitioner controlled the business since August 18, 2004, the Court chose 
to value it as of the date he was awarded it and controlled it. The court 
accepts the language as set forth in the Memorandum Decision of 
Judge Low dated August 18, 2004 that the business has a value of 
$1,600,000 and equally divides the parties' equity interest valued at 
$800,000. The Petitioner then presented evidence that Respondent, 
II 
since this action commenced, has been paid in excess of $878,687.00 
toward the payment of Respondent's portion of the business. The court 
does not accept this argument as explained in the July 27, 2006 
Memorandum Decision. 
Real Property 
The court finds that during the course of the marriage, the parties have 
accumulated the following real property: (1) a home currently occupied by 
the Respondent located at 10 Desperado, City of Hailey, County of Blaine, 
State of Idaho; (2) a home currently occupied by Petitioner located at 
2006 East 2750 North, City of North Logan, County of Cache, State of 
Utah, with attached acres of land; and (3) two building lots in the City of 
North Logan, County of Cache, State of Utah. 
Hailev home. The court finds that the home located at 10 Desperado, 
City of Hailey, County of Blaine, State of Idaho, is occupied by the 
Respondent and was acquired on December 24, 2001, by the parties for 
$700,000.00. It has a current mortgage amount of $532,839.14 and is 
appraised at an amount of $875,000.00 leaving $342,160.86 in positive 
equity in the Hailey home. 
North Logan home. The court had previously found in Petitioner's Motion 
for Summary Judgment the value of the North Logan home at 
$650,000.00. Over Petitioner's objections, the Respondent presented 
two (2) exhibits on the North Logan home for $1,755,000.00 dated 
November 2, 2001, and one for $1,850,000.00 dated March 4, 2002. The 
court finds that the North Logan home and attached acreage is occupied 
by the Petitioner and was purchased in July 1998 for $750,000.00. The 
evidence established that the most recent appraisal (May 4, 2004) on the 
home and acreage is appraised at $650,000.00 by Allen Burris, and this 
value is in line with testimony of realtor, Candace Peterson. This value 
was based upon the actual marketability of the home. The home has 
been on the market for the last four and one-half (41/4) years with no 
interested buyers. Notwithstanding, the court finds that there was 
substantial conflicting reliable evidence concerning the value of the home. 
The court finds that it makes no sense that Washington Mutual would lend 
money to the Petitioner for more than the house if worth. Additionally, the 
court found that the home has been on the market for many years, and 
that, based upon the testimony of Candace Peterson, the larger, more 
expensive homes are very difficult to sell because people would just as 
soon build their own home if they have money rather than to buy an 
existing home. However, the Court finds the most reliable evidence are 
the Washington Mutual appraisals. Notwithstanding, the court now finds 
that the North Logan home is valued at $850,000.00 and finds that there 
is no positive or negative equity in the North Logan home (2006 East 
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2750 North, North Logan, Utah 84341), and, as such, Respondent's 
judgment set forth herein should not attach. 
North Logan building lots. The court finds that the parties' acquired two 
(2) building lots in 1999. They were appraised for $46,000.00 per lot. The 
lots were sold in May 2006 for $117,500.00. After the payment of the 
mortgage and costs of sale on said lots, there was a remaining balance of 
$40,103.15, which the court ordered split between the parties. By court 
order, the $40,103.15 was deposited with the court. Thirty-seven 
Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-seven Dollars and Sixty-six Cents 
($37,457.66) was paid to Respondent's attorney, Jim Jenkins, for past 
due attorney fees leaving a balance of $2,645.49 that remains with this 
court, which should be awarded to Petitioner. 
Division of real property. Respondent should be awarded the Hailey 
home and the Petitioner should be awarded the North Logan home and 
attached acreage. Petitioner should receive $188,486.51 credit against 
Respondent's share of the business. This is calculated by the Hailey 
home equity of $171,080.43 and proceeds from the building lot of 
$17,406.08 that was awarded to Petitioner but was paid to Respondent's 
attorney from attorney fees." [R3624;Addendum "10"] 
Based upon the Findings of Fact, the trial court made the following order, and 
stated in pertinent part: 
". . . awards alimony in the sum of $3,000.00 per month from Petitioner to 
the Respondent which shall begin July 2006. Alimony shall continue for 
the duration of the marriage (18 years), or until it is terminated or modified 
by the Court, or if Respondent remarries, dies, or is cohabiting with 
another person, or in accordance with the provisions found in Utah Code 
Annotated §30-3-5 et seq . . . The court values the business [Team 
Builders International, Inc.] at $1,600,000 and equally divides the parties' 
equity interest valued at $800,000 . . . finds that the North Logan home is 
valued at $850,000 and finds there is no positive or negative equity . . . 
and awards this home to Petitioner24. . ." [R3663;Addendum "11"] 
24
 In the Memorandum Decision dated January 26, 2007, the trial court stated that "Petitioner's 
findings and order did not conform with the court's decision, nor has Petitioner complied with 
Rule 52(a)(7)(f)(2). Thereby the Court has reviewed the proposed findings and order and has 
interlineated the statements that do not conform with the Court's decision" [R3659]. In a Memorandum 
Decision dated November 7, 2006, the court stated: "The Petitioner continues to object to the Court's 
valuation of the business. The Court will not continue to accept arguments concerning the valuation of the 
business. If the Petitioner feels the business valuation is improper, then the recourse is to appeal to the 
Court of Appeals." The January 26, 2007 Order states: "Petitioner is entitled to a total credit of 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. In the trial court's award of alimony and valuation of the family business, the 
trial court relied entirely on the Memorandum Decision of Judge Low dated August 18, 
2004. However, the trial court was factually mistaken. Judge Low only decided who 
was to be awarded the business. The record is clear that just prior to and after the 
arbitration Judge Low was only deciding "who gets the business." 
2. The trial court failed to make adequate findings of the necessary factors in 
awarding alimony, including the financial conditions and needs of the spouse claiming 
support, ability of recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for herself, and ability 
of payor spouse to provide support. Elizabeth Vienna provided no evidence on any of 
those factors. The facts were provided by the trial court, and the findings of the trial 
court were unclear, controverted, and not capable of supporting the judgment. 
Additionally, there are numerous other reasons why it was a clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion in awarding alimony. 
3. The only evidence of the value of Team Builders International, Inc. was 
presented by Keith Christensen of Christensen, King & Associates who valued the 
business between $358,402.00 and $477,500.00. Further, there were inadequate 
findings by the trial court justifying a departure from the trial date as the valuation date 
of the Team Builders International, Inc. 
$347,211.74 (See paragraphs 52, 53, 58, 59, 63, 64, and 65) against Respondent's $800,000.00 share of 
the business set forth in paragraph 51. Petitioner owes Respondent $452,788.26 which shall be paid at 
the rate of $5,000.00 per month payable on the last day of the month beginning November 30, 2006 for 12 
total months at no interest, then on December 1, 2007 the total unpaid balance shall be paid in full. If the 
total unpaid balance is not paid in full on December 1, 2007 then interest at the legal rate of 6.36% per 
annum shall accrue on the full amount owing as of July 27, 2006 until paid in full." [R3595] 
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4. The trial court refused to recognize the admissions that had been 
admitted and conclusively established. Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
does not allow the trial court to disregard their legal effect. Thus, the admissions were 
conclusively established. 
5. Since Elizabeth Vienna failed to file a response to Bart Kotter's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that 
"summary judgment shall be entered". Thus, the North Logan home's value should 
have been set at $650,000.00 because there is no genuine issue of material fact. 
ARGUMENT 
(POINT I) 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT 
JUDGE LOW HAD PREVIOUSLY AWARDED ALIMONY TO 
ELIZABETH VIENNA AND VALUED THE BUSINESS AT $1,600,000.00 
IN HIS AUGUST 18, 2004 MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
In the trial court's award of alimony and valuation of the family business, the 
court relied entirely on a Memorandum Decision of Judge Low dated August 18, 2004. 
The trial court stated in part in paragraph 40 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
"The court must determine alimony based upon the law of the case and 
the current financial circumstances of the parties. The law of the case 
was established by Judge Low in his August 18, 2004 Memorandum 
Decision. In the Memorandum Decision, Judge Low indicated that the 
Respondent was to receive a substantial alimony award according to 
needs and ability as may be found. Therefore, it was recognized early in 
the case that alimony would be awarded to Respondent." 
In setting the value of the business at $1,600,000.00, the trial court stated, in 
paragraph 51 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the following: 
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"In a prior trial with Judge Low, he valued the business based on valuation 
testimony presented by [Petitioner]. The business was valued at 
$1,600,000.00 and awarded to Petitioner on August 18, 2004. Because 
Petitioner controlled the business since August 18, 2004, the court chose 
to value it as of the date he was awarded it and controlled it. . . The court 
accepts the language as set forth in the Memorandum Decision of 
Judge Low dated August 18, 2004 that the business has a value of 
$1,600,000.00 and equally divides the parties' equity interest valued at 
$800,000." 
For a court of appeals to reverse a factual finding of a trial court, the court of 
appeals must find that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous, that is, the trial 
court's ruling contradicts the great weight of the evidence or the court reviewing 
evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, 
England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 318 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah App. 1997). 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: 
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." 
The statement made by Judge Low in his Memorandum Decision of August 18, 
2004 that, "The court is willing to award the business to the Petitioner should he: (1) pay 
the Respondent one-half of the value of the same; and (2) provide her a substantial 
alimony award" was taken totally out of context by the trial court. Judge Low's 
August 18, 2004 Memorandum Decision was based solely upon who would be awarded 
Team Builders International, Inc. 
Prior to the arbitration with Judge Low, the parties entered into a voluntary 
binding arbitration agreement that stated: 
"The arbitrator shall only determine that Petitioner or Respondent shall be 
awarded the business. Any other issues regarding the business, including 
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the value and timing of payment and the nature of the payment, are 
reserved for adjudication or stipulated resolution." 
Although Bart Kotter's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and the supporting Affidavit of Keith Christensen set forth a value of 
$1,600,000.00 (as of December 20, 2002) of Team Builders International, Inc.,, that 
issue was not before Judge Low. The only issue before Judge Low was "who was to be 
awarded the business." The parties agreed to arbitrate only that issue as stated in 
Judge Low's August 18, 2004 Memorandum Decision that "rather than the court then 
deciding the matter with respect to Rule 56 procedural considerations, the court 
entertained the parties in an arbitration setting off the record with the parties and 
counsel present discussing various ramifications of the division or award of the 
business assets." The intent of the parties and Judge Low that Judge Low would only 
decide the issue of "who would be awarded the business" was clearly stated on July 15, 
2004 just moments prior to the arbitration and after the arbitration. Judge Low stated: 
"It's simply a decision as to where the business should go, and, I might 
indicate, where the business goes will immeasurably color what happens 
to the balance of the issues, alimony for example, if that's still an issue, 
property, debts, obligations, all those kinds of things that need to be 
addressed." 
After the parties had then retired to the jury room, the parties then met and went 
back on the record and Judge Low made the following observation: 
"I don't know what the value of the business is, and I don't know how it 
should possibly be distributed between the two parties. That's not before 
me. Only who gets the business is before me. If Elizabeth gets the 
business or Bart gets the business, later on we will decide how 
compensation will be awarded to the other side in exchange. Hopefully 
you folks can come up with some good ideas. We have thrown around a 
figure of $1.6 million. I don't know if it's worth $1.6 million, $6, or $6 
billion. Unfortunately, I'll probably never know the answer to that. We 
37 
have to find an innovative approach to resolve the distribution of the 
assets between the parties, whatever the value may be." 
To add to the confusion, in a hearing of December 15, 2005, Elizabeth Vienna's 
counsel, Ann Wasserman, stated: "Judge Low had already found the value of the 
business at $1.6 million." Bart Kotter's counsel immediately refuted that statement 
stating: "That's not was he found, Your Honor." Ms. Wasserman then stated: 
"Judge Low also threw out a number for a lump sum of alimony on top of that but 
acknowledged that, which I acknowledge was not a finding . . ." 
Judge Willmore then reviewed Judge Low's August 18, 2004 Memorandum 
Decision and stated: 
"I'm not sure it's quite what either of you say. I read through it. As far as 
value, it appears that Judge Low is mainly talking about who is going to 
run the business, and he's throwing around some general figure of $1.6 
rather than saying it is or finding that it is $1.6 million." 
Paragraphs 40 and 51 of the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. The 
evidence establishes that Judge Low made no such finding. The prejudicial effect to 
Bart Kotter is great. But for the trial court's reception of Judge Low's Memorandum 
Decision as the "law in the case", it is likely the trial court would have had to recognize 
all of Bart Kotter's admissions, granted summary judgment, and found Elizabeth Vienna 
was not entitled to alimony and a different value of Team Builders International, Inc. 
(POINT II) 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS IN ITS 
AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
A. Whether the trial court made adequate findings on all the necessary factors in 
awarding alimony. 
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Three factors have long been considered, and must always be considered, 
before awarding alimony: (1) the financial needs and condition of the recipient spouse; 
(2) the ability of the recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for himself or 
herself; and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support, Utah Code Annotated 
§30-3-5(8); Daws v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988) (citing Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
In considering these factors, the trial court is required to make adequate factual 
findings on all material issues, unless the facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, 
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment," Haumont v. 
Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted); Howell v. Howell, 
806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (finding reversible error where trial court 
failed to make findings on all material issues unless the "pertinent facts in the record 
[were] 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment'" (citation omitted). 
If the trial court considers these factors in setting an award of alimony, we will not 
disturb its award absent a showing that such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion, Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d at 424. However, 
where a trial court fails to enter specific findings on the needs and condition of the 
recipient spouse, making effective review of the alimony award impossible, that omission 
is an abuse of discretion, Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Here, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enter specific findings on 
Wife's financial needs and condition, and the pertinent facts in the record are not "clear, 
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uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment," 
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d at 1213 (citation omitted); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 
at 414 (citations omitted). 
1. The financial needs and conditions of the recipient spouse: 
The trial court's findings state: 
"(a) Financial conditions and needs of the spouse claiming support. 
Respondent provided no evidence (although the court requested 
numerous times if Respondent was going to present any testimony) as to 
her financial conditions and/or needs. However, the court finds that 
Respondent's needs of support which is partial based on the fact that 
Respondent received a portion of the business income from June 11, 
2002 to pay her mortgage, credit cards, and other expenses" 
The Memorandum Decision states: 
"This factor was not properly addressed by Vienna. She chose to 
represent herself and failed to provide to the court a monthly budget. 
Kotter provided a monthly budget. Vienna provided testimony in a round 
about way of her financial conditions, in particular, the fact that she was 
having a difficult time in exercising visitation with her children because she 
did not have any money, and her financial condition was presented by 
Gary Jones in his testimony about distributions on her behalf from the 
business income." 
One of the most glaring findings of the trial court was that Elizabeth Vienna 
"provided no evidence". In fact, Ms. Vienna presented no evidence at all as to her 
financial conditions and needs of support. As explained in Martinez v. Martinez, 
818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991), usually the needs of the spouse are addressed in light of the 
standards they had during the marriage. Here, the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to enter findings as to the financial needs and conditions of the recipient spouse. 
Elizabeth Vienna provided no monthly budget thus enabling the trial court to determine 
her monthly need and to establish whether this was in line with the standard of living 
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she enjoyed during the marriage. The trial court's findings that: (1) Elizabeth Vienna 
received a portion of the business income from June 11, 2002 to pay her mortgage, 
credit card, and other expenses; (2) Ms. Vienna provided testimony in a "round about 
way of her financial condition" by having a difficult time in exercising visitation with her 
children because she did not have any money; and (3) Ms. Vienna's financial condition 
presented by Gary Jones in his testimony about distribution on her behalf from the 
business income, are simply isolated statements of need and not determinative of 
Elizabeth Vienna's needs based upon the parties historical standard of living.25 See 
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), holding the trial court 
"should not have awarded plaintiff more than her established needs required, 
regardless of defendant's ability to pay this excess amount and remanding for 
'reassessment of the alimony award in accordance with the precept that the spouse's 
demonstrated need must, under Jones, constitute a maximum of permissible alimony 
award.'" 
2. The ability of the recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for 
himself or herself: 
The trial court's findings state in pertinent part: 
"Respondent presented no evidence as to her current income or her 
income making ability. Petitioner presented evidence that Respondent 
holds a degree of a special certificate in International Relations from Utah 
State University and a bachelor's of arts in political science and speech 
from Utah State University. Petitioner also presented evidence that 
Respondent holds an ESL Certificate to teach English as a secondary 
25
 This is not evidence at all. This was a statement made by Ms. Vienna after the trial had been 
concluded, and, her claims of inability to exercise her visitation because of her financial situation, 
Mr. Jones testified that he was not personally knowledgeable of the financial needs of Elizabeth Vienna. 
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language from Seattle University. Denise Iverson, an employment 
specialist, testified that Respondent, based upon her background and 
training, could easily make as much as $40,000 or more per year. At trial, 
the Respondent testified that she did not assert any physical or mental 
disability that prevented her from working, but for some reason the 
Respondent has chosen not to pursue employment during the pendency 
of these proceedings. The court finds that the Respondent, prior to 
separation, worked in and fully participated in the business." 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision also stated in relevant part: 
"The court accepts the testimony of Ms. Iverson and finds that Vienna has 
the ability to earn income in the amount of $40,000 per year." 
Again, the operative words are that Elizabeth Vienna presented no evidence as 
to her current income or income making ability. When determining an alimony award, it 
is appropriate and necessary for the trial court to consider all sources of income that 
were used by the parties during their marriage to meet their self-defined needs, 
Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1998). Here, the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to enter specific findings as to all sources of Elizabeth Vienna's 
income, her historical earnings, her current sources of income, and why she remained 
unemployed despite the fact she presented no physical or mental disability, and has a 
college education and other education and training. Although the trial court imputed an 
ability to earn of $40,000.00 per year, the trial court failed to account for $5,000.00 a 
month Elizabeth Vienna would be receiving from Bart Kotter for her one-half share of 
Team Builders International, Inc. as ordered by the trial court in paragraph 7 of the 
January 26, 2007 Order. 
3. The ability of the payor spouse to provide support: 
The trial court's findings of fact stated: 
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"Accountant Keith Christensen of Christensen, King & Associates, 
Accountant Gary Jones, the Petitioner, and the files and records 
contained in this matter established that Petitioner has insufficient ability 
to provide additional support to the Respondent. The evidence 
established that Team Builders International, Inc. is currently experiencing 
average yearly decline in revenue of 18.52% while the business expenses 
remain constant (This decline in revenue is similar to other major Nikken 
distributorships). Evidence established that Petitioner has business and 
personal debt in excess of $1,642,476.55. The court finds that there have 
been huge amounts of business expenses, including $700,000 in 
attorney's fees, accounting fees, and experts, which has resulted in 
enormous drain on the business. Petitioner asserted that he had 
insufficient income after the payment of the minimum business and 
personal expenses. The court did not accept all of the Petitioner's 
evidence and arguments as set forth in the July 27, 2006 Decision." 
The Memorandum Decision of July 27, 2006 further provides: 
"The Court accepts the testimony of Gary Jones that there has been a 
decline in business income between 16 to 30 percent. Also, Gary Jones 
testified that Kotter received approximately $5000.00 per month business 
income and Melissa Kotter received $2000.00 per month business 
income. These amounts go to the payment of Kotter's monthly expenses 
and his ability to provide support. 
The Court also finds that the parties have spent huge amounts of 
business income on attorneys fees and experts. The testimony at trial 
was that in excess of $600,000.00 has been spent on attorneys and in 
excess of $100,000.00 had been spent on accountants and other experts. 
These fees have resulted in an enormous drain upon the business. This 
fact was supported in the testimony of Keith Christensen. The Court 
places great weight on the fact that the attorney fees and expenses will 
not continue which will result in substantially more income to Kotter 
through business. 
Gary Jones testified that after business expenses and attorney fees had 
been paid during the last year there was approximately $5000 to $10,000 
left each month to be distributed to the parties. The Court has no other 
evidence before it disputing this fact. The Court considers this to be very 
reliable evidence. Therefore, the Court finds that Kotter's monthly income 
is $7500.00 per month." 
It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to include Bart Kotter's current 
wife's $2,000.00 per month business income in factoring Bart Kotter's "monthly 
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expenses and his ability to provide support" because it was not historical income the 
parties enjoyed during the marriage, Griffith v. Griffith supra. Likewise, it was an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to factor in that attorney's fees and expenses will not 
continue which will "result in substantially more income to Bart Kotter through the 
business." This is purely speculative and is more likely to be used to retire other 
business debt. Additionally, the trial court failed to factor in the $5,000.00 a month 
payment Bart Kotter was ordered to pay Elizabeth Vienna in accordance with 
paragraph 66 of the Order. Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that 
Gary Jones testified that after the business expenses and attorneys' fees had been 
paid during the last year there would be approximately $5,000.00 to $10,000.00 left 
each month to be distributed to the parties. The testimony of Gary Jones (trial court's 
special master) was that the income was split between the parties in the last 214 years 
. . . "It's only been maybe $5,000.00," but in the last 7 or 8 months "there have been no, 
or very little, money to split between the parties, and that based upon the decline .. . 
there would be no future funds to split between the parties." 
B. It was a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion to award alimony. 
Bart Kotter realleges the arguments set forth in Point I and Point 11(A) above and 
Point IV below. Keith Christensen testified there is currently average expenditures of 
$21,536.00 with average monthly payments of $18,120.00, and for the last 9 months 
there has been no money to pay Bart Kotter a paycheck. As stated in the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision of May 4, 2006, the trial court found Elizabeth Vienna had failed 
to answer Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents and failed to 
comply with the trial court's pre-trial order resulting in the trial court granting 
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Bart Kotter's Motion in Limine because of Elizabeth Vienna's blatant disregard of court 
orders. As a result, Bart Kotter went to trial without any financial or other information of 
Elizabeth Vienna he would have had if she was in compliance with court orders. 
(POINT III) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING TEAM BUILDERS 
INTERNATIONAL, INC.'S VALUE AT $1,600,000.00. 
The trial courts have considerable discretion in adjusting financial and property 
interests of the parties, and courts of appeal will not disturb trial court's decision unless 
it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion, Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
In setting aside Judge Low's Memorandum Decision discussed in Point I above, 
the only other evidence of the value of Team Builders International, Inc. was presented 
by Keith Christensen of Christensen, King & Associates that it had a business value, as 
of May 31, 2006, between $358,402.00 and $477,500.00. The trial court's findings 
stated: 
"At trial, the only evidence presented of the valuation of the business was 
presented by Accountant Keith Christensen of Christensen, King & 
Associates. Keith Christensen estimated the value of Team Builders 
International, Inc. at the time of the divorce (December 20, 2002) at 
$1,629,100.00 (with JHAM). Respondent presented no evidence as to the 
value of Team Builders International. The Petitioner's Trial evidence 
established that since January 1, 2003, the business income has been 
declining at the rate of 18.52% per year (with JHAM). On January 1, 
2003, the business was grossing $77,024.51 per month and had average 
stipulated business expenses of $19,000.00 per month for an average of 
$58,024.51 net per month. As of May 31, 2006, the business was 
grossing an average of $32,285.69 per month and had average stipulated 
business expenses of $19,000.00 per month which net the business 
$13,285.69 per month. Based upon the current rate of decline in income 
where the expenses remain relatively constant, the evidence established 
that the value of the business, as of May 31, 2006, is between 
$358,402.00 and $477,500.00 (with JHAM). . . Because Petitioner 
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controlled the business since August 18, 2004, the Court chose to value it 
as of the date he was awarded it and controlled it" 
In general, a trial court has granted broad discretion in its decision to admit or 
exclude evidence, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 983 (Utah 1994). In the absence of an 
abuse of discretion, the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be 
disturbed, State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 975, 977 (Utah App. 1989). The appellate courts 
"will presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the 
record clearly shows to the contrary," State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 N4 (Utah 
App. 1991) (quoting State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah App. 1990). 
As stated in Point I of this argument, the trial court's finding of $1.6 million on 
Team Builders International, Inc. was clearly erroneous, contradicted the weight of the 
evidence, and at least was a mistake. Since the record is void of any other evidence as 
to the value of Team Builders International, Inc., it is an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to find differently than what was presented by Bart Kotter. 
A. The trial court abused its discretion in not valuing Team Builders 
International Inc. at the time of trial. 
Normally, property should be valued at the time of trial, but the trial court may 
value property at any time of separation or other time provided the decision is 
supported by adequate findings justifying a different valuation date, Morgan v. Morgan, 
854 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1993); Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991); 
Dunnv. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah App. 1990); Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 
260 (Utah App. 1993); and Bettingerv. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389 (Utah App. 1990). 
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The only finding the trial court made why the property was not valued at the time 
of trial was "Because [Bart Kotter] controlled the business since August 18, 2004, the 
Court chose to value it as of the date he was awarded it and controlled it." 
However, the trial court's findings do not adequately justify the finding of a 
different date. In the course of these proceedings, the income stream from 
Team Builders International, Inc.'s income and expenses was controlled by the court 
through its appointed special master, Gary Jones. By court order, after payment of the 
mortgages on the parties' homes, JHAM, accounting fees, and business expenses, the 
remaining proceeds were equally split between the parties up until the date of trial. The 
record clearly establishes Elizabeth Vienna benefitted by this procedure more than 
Bart Kotter in that she received $878,687.00 from the benefits of Team Builders 
International, Inc. while Bart Kotter received only $818,659.00. The award of 
Team Builders International, Inc. to Bart Kotter was in name only. 
(POINT IV) 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE LEGAL EFFECT OF 
ADMISSIONS ADMITTED AND CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED. 
An Order Admitting Admissions was signed by the trial court on January 6, 2006. 
The court further stated: "The admissions admitted are conclusively established in a 
May 4, 2006 Memorandum Decision." The admissions are in pertinent part: 
ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit the value of the North Logan, Utah home 
located at 2006 East 2750 North, North Logan, Utah, with 51/2 additional 
acres is valued at $600,000. 
ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit there is a negative equity position of $300,000 
in the North Logan home located at 2006 East 2750 North, North Logan, 
Utah. 
ADMISSION NO. 23: Admit the value of the business, Team Builders 
International, is $800,000. 
ADMISSION NO. 25: Admit you are riot entitled to alimony. 
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At the trial conducted on May 31, 2006, the trial court conditioned the admissions 
on what testimony the court was going to receive from Elizabeth Vienna and received 
the admissions into evidence. The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a 
question of law and we review the trial court's decision for correctness, Ostler v. Buhler, 
1999 UT 99 H5, 989 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1999). Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides: 
"Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the 
court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial 
order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal 
or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on 
the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the 
purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission by him for any 
other purpose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding." 
Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not allow the trial court to 
disregard its legal effect of the rule. The application of Rule 36 was set forth in State ex 
rel. E.R., 2 P.3d 948 (Utah 2000). The Appellate Court stated: 
"When requests for admissions are properly served and no written answer 
or objection has been submitted, the result is automatic. The requests for 
admissions as a matter of law are deemed admitted by simple operation 
of the rule." 
At no time did Elizabeth Vienna request a withdrawal or amendment of the 
admissions served upon her. The admissions conclusively establish she was "not 
entitled to alimony", establish the value of the North Logan home with 514 acres at 
$600,000.00, and the value of "Team Builders International is $800,000.00." 
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(POINT V) 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE VALUE OF THE NORTH LOGAN HOME. 
On appeal from summary judgment, the appellate courts resolve only legal 
issues. Appellate courts determine whether the trial court erred in applying governing 
law and whether trial court correctly held that no genuine issue of material fact was in 
dispute, Weese v. Davis County Com'n, 834 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992). 
On May 4, 2006, the court entered its Memorandum Decision granting 
Bart Kotter's motion establishing the North Logan home at $650,000.00 with a negative 
equity in excess of $200,000.00 because these figures were undisputed by 
Elizabeth Vienna. Over Bart Kotter's objection, the trial court allowed Elizabeth Vienna 
to present evidence at the trial of May 31, 2006 on the North Logan home resulting in 
changing its value from $650,000.00 to $850,000.00. When the trial court issued its 
order on January 26, 2007 granting summary judgment, it departed from its May 4, 
2006 Memorandum Decision stating it "reserved the value of the real property for 'trial 
of the issues'." Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, the response, by affidavits or 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing there 
is a genuine issue for trial, summary judgment is inappropriate and shall 
be entered against a party failing to file such response." 
The trial court correctly concluded in its Memorandum Decision of May 4, 2006: 
"Respondent has failed to file any memorandum or affidavits controverting facts and 
filings. The court finds that Respondent has failed to set forth specific facts 
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demonstrating genuine issues for trial. The court finds that it is appropriate that partial 
summary judgment be entered against Respondent." 
The effect of Rule 56(e) is conclusive. Since Eliabeth Vienna failed to file any 
such response, then summary judgment must have been entered establishing the value 
of the North Logan home at $650,000.00. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Bart Kotter respectfully requests the court to grant his relief reversing Elizabeth 
Vienna's award of alimony, setting the value of Team Builders International, Inc. 
between $358,000.00 and $477,000.00, setting the value of the 
North Logan home at $650,000.00, remanding to the trial court to assess (after credits 
and offsets on all the financial issues of the divorce) what amount (if any) Bart Kotter 
owes Elizabeth Vienna for the value of Team Builders International, Inc., and for such 
other and further relief as this court deems just and proper. 
DATED this df day of June, 2008. Q K* S—\ 
^©regory/Skebelund 
Attorney for BART KOTTER 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the above and foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jarrod H. Jennings 
Corporon & Williams, P.C. 
405 South Main, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM 1 
Rule 36 
Utah Rules 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Part V Depositions and Discovery 
Rule 36 Request for admission. 
Rule 36. Request for admission. 
(a) Request for admission. 
(1) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purpose of the 
pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request 
that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the 
genuineness of any documents described in the request. The request for admission shall contain a notice 
advising the party to whom the request is made that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed 
admitted unless said request is responded to within 30 days after service of the request or within such 
shorter or longer time as the court may allow. Copies of documents shall be served with the request 
unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. Without 
leave of court or written stipulation, requests for admission may not be served before the time specified 
in Rule 26(d). 
(2) Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is 
admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as 
the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney, 
but, unless the court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to serve answers or objections 
before the expiration of 45 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If objection is 
made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in 
detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall 
fairly meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify 
his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so 
much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of 
information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has made 
reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable 
him to admit or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an admission has been requested 
presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he may, subject to 
the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it. 
(3) The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the sufficiency of the 
answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall order that an 
answer be served. If the court determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this 
rule, it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served. The court 
may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition of the request be made at a pretrial 
conference or at a designated time prior to trial. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of 
expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(b) Effect of admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the 
court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
16 governing amendment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the 
admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense on the merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose of the 
pending action only and is not an admission by him for any other purpose nor may it be used against 
him in any other proceeding. 
Advisory Committee Note. For a complete explanation of the 1999 amendments to this rule and the 
interrelationship of these amendments with the other discovery changes, see the advisory committee 
note appended to Rule 26. The Supreme Court order approving the amendments directed that the new 
procedures be applicable only to cases filed on or after November 1, 1999. 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Rule 52 
Utah Rules 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Part VI Trials 
Rule 52 Findings by the court. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests 
for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to 
the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the 
court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, 
except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground 
for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is 
based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. 
The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are 
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in 
the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for 
judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Rule 56 
Utah Rules 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Part VII Judgment 
Rule 56 Summary judgment. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the 
action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary 
judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part 
thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance 
with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although 
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, 
by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually 
and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in 
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action 
the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or 
served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order 
as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented 
in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them 
to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of 
contempt. 
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ADDENDUM 4 
30-3-5 
Statutes and Session Law 
Title 30 - Husband and Wife 
Chapter 03 - Divorce 
30-3-5 Disposition of property -- Maintenance and health care of parties and children -- Division of 
debts -- Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time -- Determination of 
alimony -- Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
30-3-5, Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division 
of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time — Determination of 
alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every 
decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental 
expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or 
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's 
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery 
Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial 
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may 
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the 
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and 
father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may 
include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under 
this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made 
and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the 
prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by 
a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been 
previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to 
provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by 
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during 
the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of 
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have 
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of 
one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the 
marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been 
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been 
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition 
which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding 
alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the 
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's 
improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage 
existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances 
that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former 
spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall 
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are 
determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Amended by Chapter 129, 2005 General Session 
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ADDENDUM 5 
James C. Jenkins (#1658) 
Olson & Hoggan, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
(435)752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
BART KOTTER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AGREEMENT FOR VOLUNTARY 
BINDING ARBITRATION 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
Civil No. 024100102 
ELIZABETH KOTTER, 
Respondent. 
\ & HOGGAN, P.C.I 
TORNEYS AT LAW 
8 WEST CENTER 
P.O. BOX 525 
I, UTAH 84323-0525 
435)752-1551 
MONTON OFFICE: 
1 23 EAST MAIN 
P.O. BOX 1 15 
DNTON, UTAH 84337 
435) 257-3885 
Petitioner and Respondent hereby stipulate that they are equal owners of the Royal Diamond 
level Nikken franchised distributorship #9522600, sometimes referred to as Team Builders or Team 
Builders International, and Team Builders International, Inc., and any other reference and hereinafter 
referred to as "the Business". On or about April 6, 2004, Respondent filed her Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment herein. On or about June 18, 2004, Petitioner filed his Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment herein. Both Motions are pending. In consideration of the pending motions, the 
parties agree to binding arbitration of the separate issue of "As between the Petitioner and 
Respondent, who should be awarded the Business", subject to the following terms and conditions: 
1. The arbitrator shall only determine that Petitioner or Respondent shall be awarded 
the business. Any other issues regarding the Business, including the value, timing of payment, and 
nature of payment are reserved for adjudication or stipulated resolution. 
2. Plaintiffs and Defendants understand they may have a constitutional right to a trial, 
but waive that right in favor of binding arbitration on the above-described separate issue. 
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3. The Honorable Gordon J. Low shall be the only arbitrator. The fact that Gordon J. 
Low acts as arbitrator hereunder shall in no wise disqualify him from otherwise acting as trial judge 
in the adjudication of any other issue in this action. 
4. Utah law shall apply. The arbitrator shall be the sole judge of all issues of law and 
fact regarding the separate issue. The arbitrator will present each party with a written copy of the 
award within fifteen (15) days following the hearing. There can be no appeal from any decision 
made by the arbitrator, including, but not limited to, Errors in application of law or fact, except that 
the parties or arbitrator violated one of the provisions of this agreement. Each party has the right to 
request the arbitrator to clarify any perceived clerical errors in the decision. The parties have agreed 
to an informal hearing as directed by the arbitrator. 
5. All discovery allowed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply to this 
proceeding, and for the purposes of this arbitration, the parties agree that they have disclosed all 
relevant information and documents reasonably requested by the other. 
6. The Rules of Evidence, construed liberally in favor of admission, apply to the conduct 
of the arbitration hearing, but shall not be binding in the discretion of the arbitrator. 
7. The arbitrator may rely upon any or all exhibits filed herein, including those filed in 
support of or opposition to said pending motions for summary judgment, together with any testimony 
heretofore presented in this action. 
8. Both parties agree that the Arbitrator's decision shall be entered herein as a partial 
judgment. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment forthwith upon application for entry 
in accordance with this agreement. 
9. This document contains the entire agreement between the parties. The terms of this 
agreement are contractual and not a mere recital. No promise, inducement or representation other 
than what is set forth in this agreement has been made, offered or agreed upon by either party. The 
undersigned have fully read the foregoing agreement in its entirety, have been fully advised by 
counsel and the sign the same knowingly and voluntarily. 
DATED this _ day ofJunet 2004. 
C. Jefikkfs 
Attorney for Respondent 
regory N. Skabelund 
Attorney for Petitioner 
ACCEPTED AND APPROVED t h i s ^ day of June, 2004 
Gordon J. Low 
District Judge and Arbitrator 
J:\JCJ\DIVORCE\Kotter, ElizabetfAkotter.arbitration agreement.wpd 
ADDENDUM 6 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
BARTKOTTER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
ELIZABETH KOTTER, 
Respondent. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THE CASE 
The parties were married August 4, 1984, and divorced by a bifurcated order on 
December 20,2002. Custody of the two children was determined by an order of the Court issued 
the April 4,2004. The matter is now before the Court initiated by a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgement filed by the Respondent the 6th day of April, 2004. The matter has been fully briefed 
and supported by affidavits on both sides. The matter was set for oral argument on the same on 
July 2,2004. 
The parties came prepared at that time to submit the matter, rather than on oral argument 
for partial summary judgment, for a decision by the Court based on what was described in an 
agreement as binding arbitration. The reason for the binding arbitration agreement was that the 
parties and counsel felt the issues before the Court on the awarding of the business assets was 
sufficiently briefed and was probably not properly procedurally appropriate for partial summary 
disposition and that submitting the same for final "arbitration" decision would be the most 
economical and effective way of presenting the issue. Rather than the Court then deciding the 
matter with respect to Rule 56 procedural considerations, the Court then entertained 
* MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* Case No: 024100102 DA 
the parties in a "arbitration" sitting off the record with parties and counsel present and discussing 
various ramifications of the division or award of the business assets. 
The Court was then requested by counsel to review the pleadings and submissions filed in 
support of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in its consideration of the "arbitration" 
award. The Court has done so. 
Additionally, on the 27th of July, 2004, counsel and the Court met in chambers, but off the 
record and discussed the Court's concerns and its direction in the matter. The Court then 
entertained another conference with counsel, at their request and on the record, on the 12th of 
August, 2004. 
The file contains the formal agreement for voluntary arbitration as signed by the parties in 
open court. Throughout this "arbitration" proceeding, the Court acted in the capacity as a judge 
to issue a final decision relative to the business asset. Apart and aside from consideration of the 
rules of procedure under Rule 56 or otherwise as addressed in the arbitration agreement, the 
judge acts as a judicial officer pursuant to the terms and provisions of that agreement 
procedurally in arriving at its decision. Both parties, further on the record, stipulated that they 
had presented all information they felt was appropriate and necessary in order to make this 
decision and that the usual constraints of Rule 56 in the Utah Rules of Evidence could be 
suspended pursuant to the agreement in order for this judicial determination to be made. 
BUSINESS 
Approximately ten years after the marriage and after the parties had been involved in 
various employment opportunities. Principally by the Petitioner, they became associated with the 
business known as Nikken, a multi-level network marketing enterprise. The parties are each 50% 
co-owners and participants in the business and each party recognizes the other's ownership 
interest. In her motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Respondent emphasizes that she was 
always involved in the operation of the business but assumed a different role than that of the 
Petitioner. Her supporting documentation largely suggests that she is competent and able to 
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conduct the business as she was the "brains and force" behind the business and fully capable of 
maintaining the same for her benefit and that of the children. The Petitioner, on the other hand, in 
his response to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, with his plethora of letters and 
affidavits in support, largely focuses on his business expertise, his enthusiasm for the same, his 
relationship with other network participants and that his involvement is necessary for the 
continuation and success of the business and should it be awarded entirely to the Respondent, the 
business would surely fail. 
It should be pointed out first and foremost in this matter that the Court's concern is not 
for future success of the business. It's focus is on the parties and the fair, equitable distribution of 
the assets including and specifically this asset between the two of them. Not unconnected to that 
is the financial welfare of the children. The effect that the award of this business to one party or 
the other may have on the network marketing system of Nikken or other network distributors is 
of no import to the Court and whether the business continues to operate and exist as a business 
entity is of no import to the Court except and only as it may be instrumental in equitably 
distributing the assets to the parties and provide for the children and the parties. 
Much of the focus of the affidavits, in fact almost universally so filed by the Petitioner, 
concern the future success of the business. Many of the affidavits supplied are relative to the self 
interest of the various affiants that specifically should the business be awarded to the Respondent 
that their own business would suffer as a result. It should be again emphasized that the Court's 
focus is not on the preservation of the business, the business is not an entity before the Court, it is 
not a party for adjudication here. Whether it succeeds or fails is of no import to the Court except 
as above stated. Nor does what affect the awarding of the business to one party or the other might 
have on other network marketers involved in the Nikken come within the Court's horizon. The 
Court cannot prognosticate the future success or failure of this business but its success is 
something the Court has concern but only for the reasons above stated. 
It should be noted that custody of the children was placed primarily with the Petitioner 
and much of the emphasis there was with his ability to spend time with the children. All the 
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affidavits suggest that his time and energy could and should be focused to the business. This is of 
some major concern to the Court. 
It is apparent that the primary focus of the Petitioner is a continuation of the business and 
he thinks he can continue it and the Respondent will cause it to fail should it be awarded to her. 
The Respondent however feels she can operate the business and that she should be awarded the 
same as that is her sole employment as she has not had other meaningful work experience and 
does not have custody of the children. The Petitioner can likely find other employment and he 
needs to spend time with the children that this network marketing business may limit. 
The Court is convinced that either party can operate the business. Whether either would 
do so successfully or fail in it the Court is unable to definitely foretell. However, despite the 
Respondent's greater formal education, the Petitioner is more likely to be able to readily find 
other beneficial employment. Because he has custody and partially for the reason he can spend 
time with the children, the Court would incline to award the business to the Respondent on the 
condition she pays the Petitioner one-half interest in the purported $1.6 million dollar concern. 
The assurance of that payment is of concern to the Court. If the Petitioner's predictions 
are true, the supporting documents persuade the Court that though either party could operate the 
business, it is more likely that the long term success and growth would be enhanced by an award 
of the same to the Petitioner. (The Court at the 12th of August hearing augmented this discussion 
and would by reference include that discussion here.) For over the past two years the Petitioner 
has operated the business. The reasons behind the Respondent's preclusion are not important at 
this point and to the instant issue. But the fact remains that the Petitioner has maintained the 
business, the relationship and the operating continuity which lends credence to his claims of 
ability to operate the same successfully and raises issues as to the Respondent's ability to step 
into that position should the business be awarded to her. 
The award of the business would be affected by augmenting and offsetting equities. The 
Court is unfortunately uniformed at this point relative to the same. 
Because the supporting documentation preponderates in favor of the Petitioner being able 
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to more successfully run and grow the business, the Court finds that the award of the business 
would be more appropriate to the Petitioner and the Court is willing to award the business to the 
Petitioner should he 1) pay the Respondent one half the value of the same and 2) provide her 
with a substantial alimony award. Some of the reasoning here is that the Court is not convinced 
the Respondent and turn her one half value of the business into the kind of money the Petitioner 
can earn through the operation of the business. She could, on a 10% return receive perhaps 
$ 80,000.00 on the $ 800,000.00, if that is the value, and that added to an alimony award of 
around $ 200,000.00 alimony would result in her receiving $ 280,000.00, about half what their 
net represented annual return on the business has been. The Petitioner on the other hand would 
have the balance of the proceeds which would actually exceed that plus all the business 
expenses. 
There exist no bright line determinative factor here for making the award. The Court can 
only determine from the evidence where the preponderance lies. It lies in favor of the Petitioner 
receiving the award of the business asset, with an ordered judgment in favor of the Respondent 
for one half the value, augmented or offset with the distribution of the other equities. The 
Respondent would then also be awarded alimony according to needs and abilities as may be 
found. This Memorandum Decision will be formalized as part of the ultimate Findings and 
Judgment to be prepared at the appropriate time. 
Dated this/ 7 day of August, 2004. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 024100102 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail JAMES C. JENKINS 
ATTORNEY RES 
88 W CENTER 
P.O. BOX 525 
LOGAN, UT 84323-0525 
Mail GREG SKABELUND 
ATTORNEY PET 
2176 N MAIN 
NORTH LOGAN UT 84341 
Dated t h i s J&_ day of faf/Aj.u+J' 2 0 £ ^ A 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Paqe 1 (last) 
ADDENDUM 7 
Gregory Skabelund #5346 
Attorney at Law 
2176 North Main, Suite 102 
Logan, UT 84341 
(435) 752-9437 
IN THE FIRST-JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BART KOTTER, 
Petitioner, 
v 
ELIZABETH KOTTER, 
Respondent. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No. 024100102 
Judge Gordon J. Low 
The undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to Rule 4-502 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, that I have this day served a copy of this document and the 
FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS upon Respondent, ELIZABETH KOTTER, by 
mailing a true and correct copy of the same to Respondent addressed as follows: 
Elizabeth Kotter 
PO Box 1955 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
DATED this iZ. day of April, 2005. 
fegory Skabelund 
"Attorney for Petitioner 
CERT1FIC.S16/BART KOTTER 
I PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
I EXHIBIT NO. <-}-
CASE HO. &?$-[- |f ,p) 
IN Pi/inrurc ~S\ 2,1 If A ,-3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Elizabeth Kotter 
PO Box 1955 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
DATED this / £jday of April, 2005 
CERTIFIC.S15/BART KOTTER 2 
Gregory Skabelund #5346 f \ f ('] ! . ! ;V i 
Attorney at Law u - ^ ' — : ' 0 k i 
2176 North Main, Suite 102 
Logan, UT 84341 
(435)752-9437 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BART KOTTER, 
Petitioner, FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
v Case No. 024100102 
ELIZABETH KOTTER, Judge Gordon J. Low 
Respondent. 
TO THE RESPONDENT ELIZABETH KOTTER, 
Under Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, you are required to respond 
to these Requests for Admissions. These Requests must be responded to within thirty 
(30) days of the date of service. Any request not. responded to within thirty days after 
service of the request, shall be deemed admitted. A denial shall fairJy meet the 
substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify 
his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is requested, he 
shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering 
party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or 
deny unless he states that he has made reasonable inquiry and that the information 
known or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. 
ADMISSIONS 
ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that the market value of the Hailey property at 
10 Desperado, Hailey, Idaho, is valued at $1,100,000 or mare. 
ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit there is $600,000 of equity in the Hailey property at 
10 Desperado, Hailey, Idaho. 
ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit the value of the North Logan, Utah home located at 
2006 East 2750 North, North Logan, Utah, with 5!4 additional acres is valued at 
$600,000. 
ADMISSION NO. 4; Admit there is a negative equity position of $300,000 in the 
North Logan home located at2006 East 2750 North, North Logan, Utah. 
ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that you and Todd McNeiey have been cohabiting for 
the last twelve (12) months. 
ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that you and Todd McNeiey have sexual relations 
with each other on almost a daily basis and have done so for the last twelve (12) 
months. 
ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit Todd McNeiey resides with you at 10 Desperado, 
Hailey, Idaho. 
ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that yours and Todd McNeley's common residence 
has been 10 Desperado, Hailey, Idaho, for the last twelve (12) months. 
ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit Todd McNeiey receives mail and that his clothing, 
toiletries, and all other personal effects are at 10 Desperado, Hailey, Idaho. 
ADMISSION NO. 10: Admit that yours and Todd McNeley's common residence 
is 10 Desperado, Hailey, Idaho. 
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ADMISSION NO. 11: Admit that you have taken extended vacations with 
Todd McNeley. 
ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit that you have received $141,839.57 more than 
Bart Kotter in the years 2003 and 2004 for legal fees. 
ADMISSION NO. 13: Admit you were compensated $25,000 in wages in 2003 
while you were not actually working for Team Builders International. 
ADMISSION NO. 14: Admit you received $272,623.54 more than Bart Kotter in 
disbursements for the years 2003 and 2004. 
ADMISSION NO. 15: Admit that Bart Kotter is due $76,250 in unpaid wages for 
2003 and 2004 for Team Builders International. 
ADMISSION NO. 16: Admit that Melissa Kotter is due $62,000 in unpaid wages 
for 2003 and 2004 for Team Builders International. 
ADMISSION NO. 17: Admit that Bart Kotter is due $122,676.77 for 2003 and 
2004 for debt incurred by the business, Team Builders International. 
ADMISSION NO. 18: Admit you attempted to have the business, Team Builders 
International, terminated. 
ADMISSION NO. 19: Admit you attempted to get Nikken to have a business 
arrangement between Team Builders International and JHAM Trust terminated. 
ADMISSION NO. 20: Admit you have refused to exercise your visitation rights 
with the children, Logan and Brighton Kotter, since Thanksgiving 2004. 
ADMISSION NO. 21: Admit you stated in a voice message to Bart Kotter that 
your intentions were to have no contact with the children or not give the children any 
attention until your summer visitation beginning July 1, 2005. 
3 
ADMISSION NO. 22: Admit you entered the North Logan home (Bart Kotter's 
residence) after you were divorced and took more than $40,000 in personal property 
from the home while Bart Kotter was away on a business trip. 
ADMISSION NO. 23: Admit the value of the business, Team Builders 
International, is $800,000. 
ADMISSION NO. 24: Admit you are in possession of the children's (Logan and 
Brighton) passports. 
ADMISSION NO. 25: Admit you are not entitled to alimony. 
DATED this /2^-day of April, 2005. 
regorytSkabelund 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Elizabeth Kotter 
PO Box 1955 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
DATED this / ^ - day of April, 2005 
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ADDENDUM 8 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BART KOTTER, 
Petitioner, 
VS 
ELIZABETH KOTTER, nka ELIZABETH 
VIENNA, 
Respondent, j 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case Number: 024100102 
This case is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Remaining Issues, Motion in Limine and Motion to Strike Respondent's Answer and Enter 
Default. Petitioner's Motions are supported by Memoranda and affidavits. Respondent has 
failed to timely respond to the Motions. Respondent has not addressed or disputed any issues 
raised by Petitioner. 
This case has been very difficult for the parties and the Court. An incredible amount of 
time and money has been spent on this case. Many judicial hours and resources have been 
consumed by the parties on this case. 
The case was filed on February 7, 2002. Since the case was filed the Court has held 
42 hearings. A trial was scheduled for January 11-13, 2006 to conclude this case. 
Respondent was informed of the trial dates, but Respondent's counsel was unable to 
communicate with Respondent to prepare for trial. On January 9, 2006, Respondent's 
attorney requested to withdraw from the case because of Respondent's lack of cooperation 
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and communication. Petitioner's counsel did not object to counsel's withdrawal. So, the Court 
allowed Attorney Wasserman to withdraw and the trial dates were stricken. 
On January 11, 2006, Petitioner filed and served on Respondent a Notice to Appoint 
Counsel or Appear. Respondent has not retained an attorney and has represented herself 
since then. Since the trial dates were stricken, neither party has requested new trial dates. 
However, there has been a flurry of handwritten pro se Motions filed by Respondent. The 
Motions do not comply with the Rules because they are not supported by memorandum or any 
affidavits. Also, no notices to submit for decision have been filed by Respondent. 
Part of the tortured history of this case began when the Court bifurcated the divorce on 
December 22, 2002. On October 7, 2003 a nine day custody trial was held before Judge Low. 
On February 9, 2004, Judge Low issued a Memorandum Decision awarding custody to 
Petitioner. 
Subsequently, the parties agreed to binding arbitration with Judge Low concerning the 
issues of award of business, value of business and alimony. Three days of mediation 
occurred on July 2, 2004 and on August 18, 2004 Judge Low issued a Memorandum Decision 
awarding the business to Petitioner subject to Respondent receiving one-half of the business 
value which Judge Low made findings on and that she would receive a "substantial alimony 
award." Memorandum Decision, August 18, 2004, Page 5. 
After Judge Low's decision on the business, Petitioner moved to disqualify Judge Low. 
The motion to disqualify by Petitioner caused substantial delay with the case because a judge 
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unfamiliar with all the proceedings and problems was brought into the case. The Court has 
tried to sort through the case file the best that it can to determine the twisted path of the case. 
On June 10, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment on remaining issues. 
Petitioner carefully supported his motion for summary judgment by affidavits of Bart Kotter, 
Allen Bum's, Patricia Lentz, Jack Draxler, Keith Christensen and Eric Marchant. Respondent 
has failed to file any responding memorandum or affidavit in opposition to the motion. Finally, 
on March 7, 2006, Petitioner filed a notice to submit for decision on the motion for summary 
judgment. 
Rule 7 (c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "a party opposing a motior 
shall file a memorandum in opposition within 10 days after service of the motion." Rule 7 (c) 
(3) (B) requires Respondent to specifically controvert each fact asserted by Petitioner. The 
motion for summary judgment has been filed for over nine months and Respondent has failed 
to file a memorandum in opposition and she has failed to specifically controvert the facts as 
alleged by Petitioner. Furthermore, she has not filed any affidavits disputing the numerous 
affidavits filed by Petitioner. Rule 56 (e) U.R.C.P. provides: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, 
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, 
but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment 
if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
The Court finds that Respondent has failed to comply with Rules 7 and 56. The Court 
finds Respondent has failed to file any memorandum and affidavits controverting Petitioner's 
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facts and filings. The Court finds Respondent has failed to set forth specific facts 
demonstrating genuine issues for trial. The Court finds that it is appropriate that partial 
summary judgment be entered against Respondent. 
As a further basis for granting partial summary judgment, the Court finds that Petitioner 
served Requests for Admissions on Respondent's counsel on April 12, 2005. Respondent 
failed to timely answer the requests for admissions. Petitioner filed a Motion for Requests for 
Admissions to be Deemed Admitted on May 27, 2005. On November 3, 2005, the Court 
issued a Memorandum Decision granting that the admissions be deemed admitted. 
Subsequently, an Order admitting the admissions was signed by the Court on January 6, 
2006. 
Rule 36, U.R.C.P. provides that a party receiving requests for admission must respond 
within 30 days after service or the requests are deemed admitted. In this case, Respondent 
has failed to respond for more than one year and she has not filed a motion to withdraw the 
admissions. Rule 36 (b) provides that any matter admitted is "conclusively established." 
Therefore, the Court finds that the requests are admitted and the facts admitted are 
conclusively established. 
As a further basis for summary judgment, the Court finds that Judge Low entered 
findings in the case after 3 days of binding mediation. These findings are set forth in his 
August 18, 2004 Memorandum Decision and became the law of case. Many of these findings 
apply to the motion for summary judgment and are binding on the parties. Judge Low's 
findings will be discussed further as the Court rules on each issue raised in the motion for 
summary judgment. 
The Court will address each of the remaining issues. 
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1. Business and business evaluation. 
The parties own a business known as Team Builders International, Inc. The history and 
development of Team Builders is set forth in Judge Low's August 18, 2004 Memorandum 
Decision. Judge Low's ruling has become the law of the case. The Court adopts Judge Low's 
findings and decision. 
Judge Low awarded the business to Petitioner subject to Respondent's one-half 
interest in it. Judge Low accepted the appraisal of Keith Christensen which valued Team 
Builders at $1,600,000.00 in May 2004. This value was used by Judge Low in awarding the 
business to Petitioner. The value is supported by the Christensen appraisal and was not 
disputed by Respondent. 
Petitioner asserts that the value of the business has decreased to $818,874.53. On 
March 22, 2005 Keith Christensen valued the business at $1,600,000.00 as it was valued in 
2004. However, in May 2005, Mr. Christensen valued Team Builders at $818,874.53 because 
he excluded the value of the JHAM contract asserting it was not a marital asset. 
Regarding value of the business, the Court finds that at no time in the arbitration 
hearing with Judge Low did Petitioner ever assert the business was worth $818,000.00. The 
parties always represented the value at $1,600,000.00. On that basis, Judge Low issued his 
ruling and this Court accepts Judge Low's findings. 
One reason Judge Low awarded the business to Petitioner was Judge Low felt he could 
best operate the business. It appears that he has run it well and it has increased in value 
because of the JHAM contract. Petitioner has successfully operated the business as Judge 
Low expected. The arbitration with Judge Low occurred on August 18,2004. Either party 
could have concluded this divorce much quicker. Since the divorce issues have not been 
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concluded the Court accepts Judge Low's valuation because he heard 3 days of testimony. 
The Court is allowed great discretion as to when assets are valued. Carlton v. Carlton. 756 
p2d 86, 88-89 (1988 Ut. App.). Furthermore, the Court finds the parties should share equally 
in any increase caused by the JHAM agreement. 
Therefore, the Court values Team Builders at $1,600,000.00. Respondent's interest is 
valued at $800,000.00 and she is awarded that amount in the equitable division of the martial 
estate. 
2. Real Property. 
In 2001, the parties purchased a house in Hailey, Idaho, which is occupied by 
Respondent. The house is awarded to Respondent. The only proof of value is provided by 
Petitioner. The Court finds the house is valued at $875,000.00 pursuant to the appraisal of 
Patricia Lentz. The current mortgage balance should be deducted from the appraised value to 
determine the net equity. The only mortgage balance that the Court has is $540,300.35 which 
is from June 2005. This figure should be updated by Petitioner. The Court finds there is at 
least $334,700.00 net equity in the house which should be awarded to Respondent. 
Respondent is liable for the mortgage on the Hailey house. 
The parties also own a house in North Logan, Utah. Petitioner has provided to the 
Court the only evidence the Court has of the house value. This property was appraised at 
$650,000.00 by Allen Burris. The mortgage balance in June 2005 was $886,670.00. The 
Court accepts these figures as its findings because they are undisputed by Respondent. 
Therefore, the Court finds the North Logan house has a negative net equity in excess of 
$200,000.00. This finding is further supported by the fact that the house has been listed for 
sale for 3 Yz years with no interested buyers. The Court hereby awards the North Logan 
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negative net equity will be dealt with later in this decision. 
The parties own two building lots in North Logan. On March 27, 2005 the Court issued 
a Memorandum Decision and signed an Order which allowed the sale of the building lots. The 
Court further ordered that the net sale proceeds would be divided as determined by the Court 
after a hearing. The lots have not sold. The Court has received an appraisal by Jack Draxler 
which values the lots at $46,000.00 each. The Court accepts this appraisal and orders that 
the lots are to be immediately sold. The Court orders that the net sale proceeds are to be 
applied to the mortgage balance on the North Logan house. The net proceeds shall be paid 
on this mortgage because of the large negative equity in the house. 
3. Personal Property. 
The personal property of the parties should be equitably divided. The Court has 
reviewed exhibits G, H and I of Petitioner's affidavit. The Court does not fully accept the 
values listed by Petitioner. Many values listed for Respondent are inflated. Therefore, the 
Court hereby sets a trial on May 31, 2006 at 9:00 a.m. to hear testimony from the parties and 
independent witness regarding the valuation of personal property. 
4. Alimony. 
In Judge Low's Memorandum Decision of August 18, 2004, he found that Petitioner 
should provide Respondent "...with a substantial alimony award." Then Judge Low used a 
yearly alimony award of $200,000.00 as an example. Judge Low also ruled that alimony 
would be awarded "according to needs and abilities as may be found." 
In determining alimony, the Court must look to the factors as set forth in U.C.A. §30-3-
5(8). In light of Judge Low's decision, the Court finds that for purposes of summary judgment 
Petitioner has not provided the Court with sufficient information concerning each factor. 
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Therefore, the issue of alimony will be considered at the May 31, 2006 trial and each party will 
be expected to provide competent testimony as to the alimony factors. Petitioner should be 
prepared to present evidence of cohabitation at the trial which Respondent should be 
prepared to rebut. 
5. Petitioner's Business Expenses. 
For purposes of summary judgment, Petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence 
to the Court of the reasonable and necessary business expenses he is claiming 
reimbursement for. This issue will be heard at the May 31, 2006 trial. 
6. Debts. 
Concerning division of debts, the parties have failed to adequately provide sufficient 
evidence for the Court to decide this issue on summary judgment. Therefore, the issues of 
debts and division of debts will be heard at the May 31, 2006 trial. 
7. Sale of Dodge truck bv Respondent. 
Petitioner asserts in his motion for summary judgment that Respondent sold a Dodge 
truck without Court permission. He also claims he should received a credit of $7500.00 for his 
share of the truck. Respondent has failed to respond and the Court agrees with Petitioner. 
Therefore, Petitioner is awarded a $7500.00 credit for his share of the Dodge truck. 
8. Attorneys Fees and Costs. 
These issues will be heard at the May 31, 2006 trial. 
9. Motion to Strike and Motion in Limine. 
Because of the remaining issues which are set for trial, the Court denies Petitioner's 
motion to strike. The Court finds Respondent has failed to answer interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents and the Court ordered Respondent to answer them on 
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September 30, 2004. Also, Respondent has failed to comply with the Court's pretrial order of 
October 5, 2005. Because Respondent has blatantly disregarded the Court's orders, the 
Court grants Petitioner's Motion in Limine. 
Dated this 7^ day of May, 2006. 
KotterfI Kotter/TLW/adb 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a <?opy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 024100102 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
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ADDENDUM 9 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BART KOTTER, 
Petitioner, 
VS 
ELIZABETH KOTTER, nka ELIZABETH 
VIENNA, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case Number: 024100102 
The trial in this case was held on May 31, 2006. Petitioner (Kotter) was present and 
represented by his attorney, Greg Skabelund. Respondent (Vienna) was present representing 
herself. At trial, the Court heard testimony from Kotter, Vienna and other witnesses. Since the 
trial, the Court has reviewed the evidence and exhibits offered and has reviewed the 
numerous files in the case. 
The long and difficult history of this case is set forth in the May 4, 2006 Memorandum 
Decision on Kotter's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will not repeat the tortured 
history of the case. The Court points out to the parties that its decision can only be based on 
evidence offered and received at trial and not on the parties' arguments or unfounded 
statements. Also, the Court informs the parties that Judge Low's ruling concerning custody 
and visitation on February 9, 2004 and his ruling concerning the business and related issues 
on August 18, 2004, establish a framework of the law of the case and that the Court must work 
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within this framework in ruling on the final issues. 
The remaining issues for decision are: division and value of personal property, value of 
real property, value of business, incomes of the parties, alimony, payment of debts and 
attorneys fees. 
1. Division and values of personal property. 
At trial, Kotter introduced Exhibit 3 which sets forth his inventory of personal property 
and values for his and Vienna's personal property. Also, Kotter presented testimony that 
Vienna entered his residence in May 2002 and removed property worth over $40,000.00. 
Vienna did not dispute this fact. 
As to the values of personal property, Kotter testified that he had auctioneers Gary and 
Betty Marble appraise the personal property. The method used was to take the replacement 
value and reduce it by 60%. The Court finds this method is reasonable and was uniformly 
applied to the personal property of both. The testimony about division of personal property 
and valuation was not disputed by Vienna. Vienna failed to provide any opposing lists or 
valuation. Also, throughout the case Vienna did not comply with discovery requests, which 
included personal property, even when two orders to compel were issued by the Court. 
Based upon the undisputed evidence, the Court finds the value of the personal property 
in Vienna's possession is $110,072.00 and in Kotter's possession is $46,120.00. 
2. Real Property. 
On May 4, 2006, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision which dealt with the real 
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property of the parties. The Hailey, Idaho house was awarded to Vienna and the Court valued 
the house at $875,000.00 pursuant to the appraisal of Patricia Lentz. The Court did not have 
a current mortgage balance. At trial, Kotter provided the mortgage balance of $532,839.14. 
Therefore, there is equity in the amount of $342,160.86 attributable to Vienna. 
Since the Memorandum Decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Kotter was 
able to sell the two North Logan lots for a net equity amount of $40,130.00. By agreement of 
the parties, this amount was to be split equally. The Court hereby orders that the net equity 
amount is to be split with one half awarded to each party. However, Vienna's portion is 
subject to an attorney's lien filed by Jim Jenkins. 
The parties also own a home in North Logan, Utah. The Jack Draxler appraisal values 
the home at $650,00.00. The Washington Mutual mortgage payoff amount is $856,078.79. 
According to Kotter this leaves a negative equity amount of $206,000.00. Kotter raised this 
issue at trial and had Candace Peterson who is a realtor testify regarding the value of the 
property. Ms. Peterson's testimony was in line with the Jack Draxler appraisal. 
Because Kotter brought testimony up concerning the value of the North Logan home, 
the Court received from Vienna, with no objection from Kotter, Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2. 
Exhibit 2 is an appraisal of the home as of November 2, 2001 which values the home at 
$1,755,000.00. Exhibit 1 is an appraisal as of March 4, 2002 valuing the home at 
$1,850,000.00. The Court finds that there is substantial conflicting reliable evidence 
concerning the value of the house. It makes no sense that Washington Mutual would loan 
Page - 3 -
more money to the Kotters than what the house is worth. However, the Court finds that the 
house has been on the market for many years and has not been able to sell. Furthermore, the 
Court finds that the testimony of Candace Peterson supports the fact that larger more 
expensive homes are difficult to sell because people would just as soon build their own home 
if they have the money to do so rather than buy an existing home. 
The Court, based upon Vienna's Exhibits 1 and 2, hereby rejects Kotter's evidence that 
there is approximately a negative equity of $206,000.00. However, the Court does not find 
that the equity value can be established from the appraisals from 2001 and 2002. The Court 
finds that the most reliable evidence is the loan amount from Washington Mutual. The Court 
hereby sets the value of the North Logan home at $850,000.00 and finds that there is no 
positive or negative equity in the North Logan home. 
3. Value of business and payment of Vienna's of share of business value. 
As previously covered in the Court's Memorandum Decision concerning the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Judge Low awarded the business to Kotter subject to Mr. Kotter paying 
one half of the value to Vienna. As set forth in Judge Low's Memorandum Decision dated 
August 18, 2004, Judge Low accepted the business appraisals submitted to the Court valuing 
the business at $1,600,000.00. In the Court's May 4, 2006 Memorandum Decision, the Court 
accepted Judge Low's valuation by the parties as the law of the case. 
At trial, Kotter placed evidence on the record indicating that income from the business 
has decreased since he took over the business. A major reason Kotter was awarded the 
business was because of his expertise and the fact that Judge Low felt he could best operate 
the business and maintain it's value or increase it's value. Kotter's argument that the business 
value has decreased because of slumping sales is not a reason for this Court to reject Judge 
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Low's valuation finding of $1,600,000.00. This value is supported by the appraisals submitted 
to Judge Low by Kotter. Therefore, the Court accepts the value at $1,600,000.00 which is to 
be divided equally between the parties such that each will receive an equity interest valued at 
$800,000.00. 
Next, Kotter argued at trial that Vienna has received more than $800,000.00 in 
payments during the pendency of this case and she has been paid her equity interest. The 
Court does not accept this argument. From the very beginning, it was the parties decision and 
understanding that each party would receive a distribution monthly from the business to pay 
mortgages, costs, and monthly living expenses. In other words, both parties would be 
supported from the business until the case was completed. As early as July 22, 2002 there 
are Findings and an Order on Order to Show Cause from a hearing on June 11, 2002 before 
Judge Judkins wherein it was ordered that the business proceeds were to be used to pay the 
mortgages, attorneys fees, accounting fees, credit card expenses, monthly payment to 
J.H.A.M. trust with the remaining balance of monthly proceeds to be split equally between the 
parties for their support. Also, the order includes a provision that each would be responsible 
for their own debts and monthly expenses each incurred. The Court has carefully reviewed the 
file and finds no orders from previous judges stating that Vienna's share of the business equity 
was being paid over time from the business proceeds. The payments made to Kotter and 
Vienna during the case proceedings are simply support and debt payments that each 
benefitted from. If Kotter wanted the matter to be treated differently during the long pendency 
of the proceedings he should have filed an order to show cause seeking relief from the Court. 
The payment issue raised by Kotter is further clarified by other orders from Judge Low. 
Specifically on January 5, 2004 there is an order regarding business receipts and appointment 
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of Gary Jones as special master to pay business debts and distribute any remaining proceeds 
to the parties. Also on December 15, 2004 there was a hearing with Judge Low in which he 
ordered that all business proceeds were to be received by Gary Jones and distributed for the 
payment of business debts, mortgages, salaries with the remainder to be split equally between 
the parties. An order to this effect was signed by Judge Low on February 22, 2005. 
Therefore, the Court does not accept Kotter's argument that Vienna has been paid her 
equity interest in the business. As such, the Court orders that Vienna's equity interest in the 
business is $800,000.00 and that Kotter will need to pay her that amount for her share of the 
business. 
4. Difference in payments from business. 
Since the parties separated and throughout the divorce action, the Court has issued 
several different orders regarding the payment of mortgages, debts and business income to 
Vienna and Kotter. The payment of the business income for the benefit of the parties has 
been overseen by Gary Jones. Exhibit 2 tabs C and D outline the various amounts paid to the 
parties for 2003 through 2006. This exhibit was not disputed by Vienna. 
The exhibit shows that Vienna has received approximately $60,000.00 more than 
Kotter. The Court finds that the payments should be equalized because that was the order of 
Judge Judkins and Judge Low. Therefore, Kotter should receive a $30,000.00 credit to 
equalize the disbursement of business income to both of the parties. 
5. Reimbursement to Kotter for business expenses in 2006. 
At trial, Kotter testified that he had not received any income from the business for the 
last nine months. He also testified that he had personally paid out of his pocket business 
expenses of approximately $7000.00. Kotter requested to be reimbursed for these business 
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expenses which he had paid personally. 
Vienna did not dispute the business expenses or the need for Kotter to be reimbursed 
this amount. Therefore, the Court hereby orders that Kotter shall receive a reimbursement 
credit of $7000.00 for business expenses he has personally paid in 2006. 
6. Dodge truck. 
Previously, the Court ruled that Vienna had improperly disposed of a Dodge truck and 
had received all of the proceeds from the sale. Also, the Court had ruled that Kotter was 
entitled to one half of the truck sale proceeds in the amount of $7500.00. The Court directs 
that Kotter should receive a credit towards the amount he owes Vienna in the amount of 
$7500.00 as his share of the truck sale proceeds. 
7. Alimony. 
The issue of alimony has been very difficult for the Court to determine for various 
reasons. Because this case has continued on for so long, much has changed in the case with 
regards to the parties financial condition and value of the business. Furthermore, both parties 
have failed to comply with previous orders of the Court. For example, Kotter was awarded the 
business based upon the fact that he would be able to best operate it and could continue to 
receive the kind of income the parties have received in the past. According to testimony at 
trial that has changed substantially. On the other hand, Vienna has failed to comply with the 
Court's orders with regards to production of documents and answers to interrogatories. Also, 
she chose to represent herself at trial and has failed to provide the Court a complete picture of 
her financial abilities and financial needs. 
Nevertheless, the Court must determine alimony based upon the law of the case and 
the current financial circumstances of the parties. The law of the case was established by 
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Judge Low in his August 18, 2004 Memorandum Decision. In the Memorandum Decision, 
Judge Low indicated Vienna was to receive a "substantial alimony award." Therefore, it was 
recognized early in the case that alimony would be awarded to Vienna. 
Kotter first argues that the Court should consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony pursuant to U.C.A. §30-3-5 (8)(b). At trial, the Court cautioned Kotter in presenting 
evidence and making the argument concerning fault. Judge Low previously considered fault 
and the past conduct and moral standards of both parties in his Memorandum Decision of 
March 2, 2004 regarding custody of the children. In that Memorandum Decision in paragraph 
13, Judge Low indicates that neither party came to the Court with a clean slate as far as past 
conduct and moral standards are concerned. Testimony was received that both parties had 
extramarital affairs which resulted in dishonesty and violation of their marital convenants. 
Judge Low found specifically that Kotter's undisputed extramarital relationship was "primary in 
the resulting divorce between these parties". 
It is clear that both parties are at fault in the destruction of this marriage. Their past 
conduct and moral standards are abysmal and both parties equally contributed to the 
destruction of this marriage. Therefore, the Court will not consider fault in awarding alimony. 
Next, Kotter argues that Vienna is cohabitating with another person and that she is not 
entitled to alimony pursuant to U.C.A. §30-3-5 (10). At trial, Kotter presented Shane Gilbert as 
a witness who is a private investigator. Mr. Gilbert investigated Vienna's relationship with an 
individual by the name of Todd McNeeley. The investigation started in August of 2004 and 
concluded in March or April of 2005. Mr. Gilbert presented evidence that Mr. McNeeley was 
residing Vienna's house. His pick up and trailer were parked there daily. His mail was being 
sent to Vienna's house. Mr. McNeeley had the same telephone number and address as 
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Vienna. When Mr. Gilbert contacted Mr. McNeeley at Vienna's house, he identified himself as 
her boyfriend and that he resided there. 
Vienna testified that Mr. McNeeley no longer resided in her house and had his own 
apartment. She presented Exhibit 3 which is a lease showing that Todd McNeeley has his 
own apartment and does not reside with Vienna. 
The Court finds that the problem with Kotter's argument is that the Court must 
determine whether Vienna is cohabitating as of the date of the trial. The last reliable evidence 
of Mr. Gilbert indicates that he had not observed Mr. McNeeley at Vienna's house after March 
or April 2005. Therefore, the only reliable evidence concerning current cohabitation are the 
statements of Vienna and the McNeeley lease which shows that McNeeley is not cohabitating 
with Vienna. Therefore, the Court disagrees with Kotter and finds no cohabitation between *e*. 
Vienna and Mr. McNeeley as of the date of the trial. 
Therefore, the Court finds that it must consider the alimony factors set forth in U.C.A. 
§30-3-5 (8)(a). The Court finds that the parties were married on August 4, 1984. As of the 
date of the bifurcation the parties had been married more than 18 years. During the course of 
the marriage the parties have had two children born to them. The custody of the children has 
been awarded previously to Kotter which is a factor that is considered by the Court with 
regards to the financial ability of Kotter to pay. Case law from the Utah Supreme Court would 
classify this marriage as a long term marriage requiring an award of alimony if the other factors 
are met. 
The Court must also consider whether Vienna worked in and operated a business 
which was awarded to Kotter. The Court finds that prior to separation, both parties 
participated fully in the business. This fact is supported and set forth in Judge Low's 
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Memorandum Decision of August 18, 2004. While the Court has previously awarded Vienna 
one half of the value of the business, it is through their joint efforts that the business still 
provides income to Kotter and this factor weighs in Vienna's behalf for an award of alimony to 
her. 
Next, the Court must look at the ability of Kotter to provide support. The parties have 
built a very successful business. The parties have received a large amount of income through 
the years from the business. It is undisputed by Vienna that the business income has declined 
during the last several years. The Court accepts the testimony of Gary Jones that there has 
been a decline in business income between 16 to 30 percent. Also, Gary Jones testified that 
Kotter received approximately $5000.00 per month business income and Melissa Kotter 
received $2000.00 per month business income. These amounts go to the payment of Kotter's 
monthly expenses and his ability to provide support. 
The Court also finds that the parties have spent huge amounts of business income on 
attorneys fees and experts. The testimony at trial was that in excess of $600,000.00 has been 
spent on attorneys and in excess of $100,000.00 had been spent on accountants and other 
experts. These fees have resulted in an enormous drain upon the business. This fact was 
supported in the testimony of Keith Christensen. The Court places great weight on the fact 
*-"} that the attorney fees and expenses will not continue which will result in substantially more 
/ income to Kotter through business. 
Gary Jones testified that after business expenses and attorney fees had been paid 
<during the last year there was approximately $5000 to $10,000 left each month to be 
C distributed to the parties. The Court has no other evidence before it disputing this fact. The 
/ 
Court considers this to be very reliable evidence. Therefore, the Court finds that Kotter's 
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monthly income is $7500.00 per month. 
The Court must also consider Vienna's earning capacity or ability to produce income. 
For some reason, Vienna has chosen not to pursue employment during the pendency of these 
proceedings. At trial, when questioned, she did not assert that she had any physical or mental 
disability that prevented her from working. Vienna has a college degree and other education 
and training. Also, she has been involved extensively in building up the parties business. At 
trial, Denise Iverson, from the Department of Workforce Services testified that Vienna has 
excellent training and excellent job possibilities. In her opinion, Vienna could earn 
approximately $40,000.00. The only evidence presented by Vienna to dispute this testimony 
was that she had applied at a few places and had been unable to find a job. The Court 
accepts the testimony of Ms. Iverson and finds that Vienna has the ability to earn income in 
the amount of $40,000.00 per year. 
Finally, the Court must consider the financial condition and needs of Vienna. This 
factor was not properly addressed by Vienna. She chose to represent herself and failed to 
provide to the Court a monthly budget. Kotter provided a monthly budget. Vienna provided 
testimony in a round about way of her financial condition. In particular, the fact that she was 
having a difficult time in exercising visitation with the children because she did not have any 
money. Also her financial condition was presented by Gary Jones in his testimony about 
distributions on her behalf from the business income. 
While the Court finds that there was not a monthly budget and financial condition 
information was woefully inadequate, that simply goes to the weight the Court would give the 
testimony in awarding alimony. Based upon what was presented to the Court, the Court finds 
that Vienna has a need to receive alimony from Kotter. Based upon what has been 
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presented, the Court hereby awards alimony in the amount of $3000.00 per month from Kotter 
to Vienna which shall begin with the month of July 2006. The Court will not set Vienna's 
alimony at an amount to equalize it with Kotter's monthly income at $7500.00 because Kotter 
has custody of the children and the related expenses for them. The Court hereby awards 
alimony pursuant to U.CA §30-3-5 (8)(h) for the duration of the marriage or until terminated 
or modified by the Court. 
8. Attorneys' fees. 
The Court has previously outlined the tortured history of this case. Both parties are at 
fault with regards to the problems before the divorce and the myriad of problems after the 
divorce was filed. The parties have created a nightmare with regards to this case and the 
attorney's fees incurred by the parties is abhorrent. Never has the Court seen attorneys fees 
and costs reach this level in a case like this. 
Because the Court has divided the property equally and attempted to equalize the 
incomes of the parties with regards to alimony, the Court hereby orders that each party will be 
responsible for their own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
9. Debts. 
At trial, neither party presented sufficient evidence with regards to outstanding debts 
and a request of one party or the other to be responsible for those debts. The Court hereby 
finds that the mortgages on the North Logan home and the Hailey home will be paid by the 
party which was awarded that property. All business debts have been considered in the 
valuation of the business and are the responsibility of Kotter. Any and all other debts 
individually incurred by the parties since the date of separation in 2002 will be the 
responsibility of the party that incurred those debts. Each party will indemnify and hold the 
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other party harmless from the debts that each is responsible for. 
10. Conclusion. 
Regarding the property division, the Court has considered the differences in values of 
real property, personal property, award of business to Kotter, difference in business payments 
to Vienna, Kotter's share of the truck and Kotter's share of business expenses that need to be 
reimbursed. In sorting these amounts out, the Court finds that Mr. Kotter owes Ms. Vienna 
$555,944.00 to equalize the property distribution in the case. Given the drain that this divorce 
has caused on the parties and the business, the Court recognizes that this amount needs to 
be paid out over time. The Court directs Kotter through his attorney to present in writing within 
30 days from the date of this Memorandum Decision a proposal with regards to payment. A 
copy of the proposal should be sent to Vienna who would have 20 days from the date of 
mailing to respond to the proposal by sending a written response to the Court. The Court will 
review the payment proposals from both parties and decide how this amount is to be paid. 
The Court hereby directs Kotter's counsel to prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and a Decree of Divorce conforming to this Memorandum Decision. 
11. Kotter's Motion to Amend Memorandum Decision dated May 4, 2006. 
Kotter has disagreed with several of the Court's findings and conclusions in the May 4, 
2006 Memorandum Decision. The Court has reviewed the Memorandum Decision and 
Kotter's motion. The Court finds that nothing needs to be corrected in it's decision and the 
Court denies the motion. 
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Dated this X^f day of July 2006. 
Thomas L. Willmore, District Court Judge 
Kotter vs Kotter/TLW/adb 
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ADDENDUM 10 
Gregory Skabelund #5346 
Attorney at Law 
2176 North Main, Suite 102 
North Logan, Utah 84341 
(435) 752-9437 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BART KOTTER, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v Case No. 024100102 
ELIZABETH KOTTER, Judge Thomas Willmore 
nka ELIZABETH VIENNA, Commissioner Dan Garner 
Respondent. 
flM)
 r ____ ? r ___^ 
*t*l**«h'o* ofuAyft*Co*?} fas M-hr>lt*c<4*dJt*ttPWAJSi'i frf-farfc U* flccM** ofJ«*** 
' This matter came before the court for Trial on May 31, 2006, the Honorable 7.C) 7-00^ 
Thomas Willmore presiding. Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by 
counsel, Gregory Skabelund. Respondent appeared in person and represented 
herself pro se. A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was signed and entered earlier on 
December 20, 2002. An Order on Custody was signed and entered by this court on 
February 9, 2004. An Order was signed and entered by this court on November 10, 
2004, awarding Petitioner the business known as Team Builders International Inc., a 
distributorship of Nikken. Finally, a Memorandum Decision was signed and entered 
May 4, 2006, which partially awards Petitioner Summary Judgment and grants 
Petitioner's Motion in L imine,***" r ' W ^ J + ^ ' W 5 ^ J !***<* a ^ 7 ^ 
•$<*.$. ft-frC*} i^*s MJ on ^Uy stj ^oo(? T f t f Court" /sswea 
FINDINGS C03/BART KOTTER Cx. M&**0r<M\ Ji\/\VA V€C.!$\&\ 0*1 J f \ | V A 7 / ^O0(fi , 
The court having heard and reviewed the evidence, including the witnesses, 
exhibits and the files and records in this matter on the remaining issues of the marriage, 
the court now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court reaffirms the Memorandum Decision and awards Petitioner /^Us 
Summary Judgment and grants.Petitioner's Motion in L i m i n e W M > ^ m i ^ ' ^ |>v -fU 6?v\f * f f e r jU frl** ow M*y 3 I ; >0©6, 
2. The court reaffirms the Order of February 9, 2004, relative to the custody, 
child support, and other aspects of the children. 
Parent-Time 
3. Respondent should be entitled to parent-time with the minor children as 
agreed upon by the parties but should be entitled to at least every other weekend from 
Friday afternoon at 3:00 p.m. (pick up at the children's school) until Sunday evenings at 
3:00 p.m. 
a. Midweek Parental Time. The Respondent should have at least one 
evening of parental time with the children each week as the parties may agree, or, if 
they cannot agree, from 5:00 to 8:30 p.m. on Wednesdays. 
b. Summer and Christmas Parental Time. For even-numbered years, 
Respondent should be entitled to the first six (6) weeks of the summer visitation and the 
first one-half (1/4) of the Christmas visitation. For odd-numbered years, Respondent 
should be entitled to the second (6) weeks of the summer visitation and the second 
one-half (1/£) of the Christmas visitation. 
c. Other Holiday and Special Event Parental Time. In exercising 
holiday and special event parental time, the parties should follow the schedule set forth 
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at Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 (1953, as amended). Holiday and special event parental 
time should take precedence over the Standard Weekly Rotation. A copy of said 
holiday visitation schedule is attached hereto, incorporated by reference, and marked 
as Exhibit "A". 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, Respondent should pick up the children 
from Petitioner's residence for commencement of Respondent's parent-time. At the 
conclusion of Respondent's parent-time, Petitioner should pick up the children from 
Respondent's residence. Pick up of the children should be curbside. 
d. Addresses and telephone numbers. Each party should keep the other 
party advised of his/her current address, telephone number, and e-mail address and, if 
possible, advise the other party thirty (30) days in advance of any move. 
Other Child Related Issues 
4. Petitioner and Respondent should split the minor children for state and 
federal income deductions. Once the oldest child reaches the age of majority, the 
parties should alternate the youngest child as an exemption for tax purpose, with 
Petitioner having the claim in odd numbered years and Respondent having the claim in 
even numbered years. Respondent should be entitled to claim the exemption for the 
child due child support only if she is current in her child support payments to the 
Petitioner. Otherwise, Petitioner should be entitled to claim the exemption. 
5. Both Petitioner and Respondent should each be required to maintain in 
effect a policy of dental, health, optical and accident insurance at all times that such 
may be available through their respective employers, at reasonable cost, with the minor 
children of the parties as named beneficiaries thereunder. Further, each party should 
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pay one-half of any deductible amounts, and all non-covered medical and dental 
expenses for said minor children. If Petitioner and Respondent are unable to secure 
said insurance, each party should be responsible for the payment of one-half of all 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for the minor children. 
6. The parties should equally pay any sums not covered by said insurance, 
including, but not limited to, the children's portion of health insurance premium as 
calculated pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15(5), physician care, inpatient and 
outpatient care and related expenses, mental health care, physical examinations, 
immunizations, prescription medications, medically necessary medical supplies, eye 
examinations, and corrective lenses. 
7. As required by Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15, each party should provide 
the other written notice and proof of medical, dental and orthodontic expenses incurred, 
and payments made thereon, by insurance or otherwise, within thirty (30) days of the 
date the expense is incurred. Each party should provide the other copies of statements 
or written notice received of payments made to a provider by insurance. If either party 
incurs any medical expenses on behalf of the children, the other party should reimburse 
the paying party within ten (10) days of receiving written notice from that party. 
8. If the children are insured under a policy of health and accident insurance 
issued through a parent, that parent should be entitled to either a credit or an addition 
to child support. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15, the premium should be 
calculated as follows: ($/ + [the number of insured individuals] = $/ + 2 = $/). The 
amount of the insurance premium paid by a parent may vary in the future based upon a 
change in the insurance premium paid for the benefit of the children. The insured 
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parent should provide the other parent with written verification of a change in insurance 
premiums. Upon written verification of the change in insurance premium, the parties 
may modify the amount of child support without further Court Order. 
9. In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, if either party 
incurs medical expenses on behalf of the children, they may be denied the right to 
receive compensation for said medical expenses if they fail to comply with Paragraph 7 
above. 
10. Any parent providing insurance for the benefit of the children should 
provide verification of coverage to the other parent upon initial enrollment of the 
children, and thereafter on or before January 2nd of each year. The parent should notify 
the other parent of any change of insurance carrier, premium or benefits within thirty 
(30) days of the date he or she first knew or should have known of the change. 
PARENTING PLAN 
A. Governing Principles. 
11. The parties desire to create an effective co-parenting relationship for the 
benefit of their minor children. The parties desire to raise happy and well adjusted 
children and to respect each other in their respective parenting roles. 
12. The parties realize that they each have different parenting functions and 
styles and should support and acknowledge the benefits to the children of having a 
healthy relationship with both parents. 
13. The parties should reduce the conflict between them and learn problem 
solving skills and implement those skills to eliminate future conflict. The parties should 
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have open communication and focus on the needs and interests of their children ahead 
of their own personal interests. 
14. To implement the vision of the parties' shared parenting plan, and 
because of their common concern for their children's emotional well being, the 
governing principals are as follows: 
a. The parties should have a co-parenting relationship which will be built on 
trust and respect; 
b. The parties should establish and maintain parental communication with 
each other to ensure that the other parent is informed about the children's 
needs; 
c. The parties should support each other in their respective parenting roles 
and to say positive words about the other parent to the children and to be 
restrained from saying anything negative about the other parent; 
d. The parties should listen to each other and do their best to understand the 
other's point of view; 
e. The parties should solve problems and make joint decisions by working 
through their decision making procedure which is described herein; 
f. Communication concerning the children should be conducted by e-mail; 
g. The parties should work together to improve their parenting skills and to 
share their ideas; 
h. The parties should live by the golden rule that they will treat each other as 
they would like to be treated; 
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i. The parties should start over and recommit to this Parenting Plan when 
one or both of them steps outside of the Plan and forgets about a 
commitment made in this Plan; and 
j . The parties should see the other parent as a resource, consultant and 
ally. The parties should be effectively working together as co-parents to 
promote the best interests of the children. 
15. In order to implement the Parenting Plan as outlined by the Governing 
Principles, the parties should communicate via e-mail. 
B. Parenting Meeting. 
16. The purpose of the e-mails between the parties should be to share 
information and discuss issues regarding the children in a positive manner. The parties 
should limit the communication to the needs of the children and the time-sharing 
schedule, information regarding the children, transportation logistics, and other 
parenting issues. Any disagreement regarding the children should be resolved in 
accordance with paragraphs 35 and 36 below. 
C. Time Sharing, Child Care and Kindergarten. 
17. The parties should cooperate to plan their children's time sharing 
schedule based on the following principles: 
a. The parties should trade favors and do their best to insure that the 
children have a meaningful time in both homes; 
b. The parties should be flexible with each other when minor changes are 
necessary; and 
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c. The parties should give as much advance notice as possible if changes 
are necessary. 
18. Day care should be paid by the party who incurred it. 
19. No non-prescribed drugs should be consumed or present within eight (8) 
hours before or while the children are visiting with each party. 
20. There should be no non-family person of the opposite sex residing either 
permanently or temporarily, with the Resident Parent while the children are with that 
parent. 
21. As set forth below, the parties should notify each other of events in the 
children's life so that both parties may have the opportunity to attend and participate in 
the event. 
D. Share Information. 
22. The parties should use their best efforts to communicate and share 
information with each via e-mail, and whenever else necessary, to convey information 
regarding the children's school work, school schedule, sports schedule, medical and 
dental treatment, counseling, emotional needs, accomplishments, and other information 
appropriate to share with the other parent. The parties should inform each other of 
dates and times for all scheduled therapy, medical, dental and orthodontic 
appointments. 
23. The parties, not the children, should notify the other parent of all school 
programs, church events, extracurricular activities, sports activities, and special 
occasions. 
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24. The parties should have access to the children's school, medical, 
religious, and other records. 
25. The parties should notify the other parent of significant illnesses involving 
the children and of any information relating to their medications. 
26. During the parties' e-mail communication, each party should summarize 
for the other all significant information relating to their children's progress. Each party 
should also share information relating to doctor or dentist appointments, plays, sports, 
special lessons, new skills, new language development, discipline challenges, etc., 
regarding their minor children. 
E. Property Belonging to or for the Use of the Children. 
27. Either parent may request that the other parent deliver certain of the 
children's personal effects, toys, clothing, sports equipment, etc. to them. If requested, 
the parent then in possession of these items should deliver the property with the 
children. The parent receiving items should return that property at the exchange of the 
children. All clothing should be returned in a clean condition. 
F. Consistency in Parenting. 
28. The parties' consistency in parenting should help them to raise an 
emotionally healthy and secure child. Therefore, the parties should discuss parenting 
strategies and develop, if possible, consistent rules and parenting approaches. 
29. The parties should implement, whenever possible, consistent bed times, 
discipline strategies and other rules. Moreover, the parties recognize that parenting will 
be more effective if they work together as a united front. 
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30. Special consideration should be given by each parent to make the 
children available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family 
reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant events in the 
life of the children or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently conflict with the 
parental time schedule. 
G. Changing Needs of the Children. 
31. It is understood that as the children get older, their needs will also change. 
This parenting plan anticipates that those needs will have to be addressed as they 
occur. To the extent that they cannot reach an agreement on their own to address 
those changes, they should be required to address the disputes as anticipated by 
paragraphs 35 and 36, Decision Making. Without intending to be all inclusive, the kinds 
of changes or circumstances that might arise in the future for further discussion could 
include: 
Child's desire to change time sharing arrangement; 
Child develops greater maturity and interest drift away from proposed parent time; 
Religious training and affiliation; 
Travel out of state alone or with other parent; 
International travel and passports; 
Obtaining driver's license, insurance and driving or owning a car; 
Military Service; 
Underage marriage; 
Alcohol or drug abuse or other criminal violations. 
H. Extracurricular Activities and Post High School Educational Expenses. 
32. Provided the parties mutually agree on the extracurricular activity and 
each is financially able to do so, both parties should equally share the cost associated 
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with the children's participation in sports, music, art, scouts or other extracurricular 
activities. 
33. If the parties cannot agree on the children's extracurricular activities, then 
either parent may enroll the children in extracurricular activities at his or her sole 
expense, provided that the children attend the disagreed upon activity only during the 
enrolling parent's parenting time. 
34. In addition, both parties recognize the value of post high school education 
to the children. If they are financially able to do so, each party should contribute to the 
children's post high school education related expenses. 
I. Decision Making. 
35. The parties should share decision making as follows: 
a. Dav-to-Dav Decisions: The party with whom the children are residing may 
make minor day-to-day decisions regarding the children's care without 
having to consult with the other parent. 
b. Major Decisions: During their e-mail communication, the parties should 
consult with one another and reach agreements on major issues 
concerning the medical, dental, and general welfare of their 
children. If the parties cannot reach an agreement on any major decision, 
it should be addressed in accordance with paragraph 36 below. 
c. Emergency Treatment: Either parent may initiate emergency medical, 
or dental treatment, and should notify and involve the other 
parent as soon as possible. 
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36. Procedure to be Utilized on Which the Parties are in Disagreement 
a. When any disputes between Petitioner and Respondent regarding the 
children occur, they should attempt to solve them on their own before 
resorting to any other process. If they are unsuccessful in that regard, 
they should confer with or solicit the assistance of other family members, 
friends or religious leaders upon whom they can agree. If necessary, they 
should meet with experts in the area of disagreement, i.e. neutral medical 
providers with disagreements on medical treatment. If this fails to assist 
the parties in reaching an agreement, either party may petition the Court 
for assistance. 
b. The parties may petition the Court for assistance only after making a 
good-faith attempt at completing the Decision Making procedures set forth 
herein, unless such delay will result in immediate and irreparable harm to 
the child. 
J. Discussions with the Children. 
37. If either party is questioned by the children regarding the reason for the 
parties, divorce, the party should inform the children that the divorce was a joint 
decision, and that neither parent places the blame on the other parent for the divorce. 
The parties should not discuss any specific information about the divorce or the 
breakdown of the parties' marriage with the children. 
38. If either party is questioned by the children regarding issues related to the 
other parent, such as economic issues, discipline issues, parenting issues, each party's 
post-divorce relationships, etc., the parent should refer the children to the parent about 
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whom the question was asked. The parties should discuss the children's questions at 
the next e-mail communication. 
Alimony 
39. The parties were divorced on December 20, 2002 after an 18-year 
marriage. On February 9, 2004, Petitioner was awarded the care, custody, and control 
of the parties' minor children. During the last eight (8) years of the parties' marriage, 
PetitionenDperated a business known as Team Builders International, Inc. During the 
marriage, Petitioner obtained no special training or received any education. 
Respondent, on the other hand, received a degree in International Relations, a 
bachelor's degree from Utah State University, and obtained a teaching certificate in 
English as a Second Language from Seattle University. 
40. During the course of the divorce proceedings, Respondent has asserted a 
claim for alimony. However, since this action commenced, there has been no # ^ 
temporary alimony award* The court finds that the issue of alimony has been difficult 
for this court to determine. Because this case has continued on for so long, much has 
changed in the case with regards to the parties' financial conditions and the value of the 
business. Further, according to the testimony at Trial, the income from Team Builders 
International, Inc. has changed. 4ramatteaHy>. Additionally, the Respondent has failed to 
comply with court orders with regard to production of documents and answers to 
interrogatories, has chosen to represent herself at Trial, and has failed to provide a 
complete picture of her financial ability and financial needs. The court must determine 
alimony based upon the law of the case and the current financial circumstances of the 
parties. The law of the case was established by Judge Low in his August 18, 2004 
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Memorandum Decision. In the Memorandum Decision, Judge Low indicated that the 
Respondent was to receive a substantial alimony award "according to needs and 
abilities as may be found." Therefore, it was recognized early in the case that alimony 
would be awarded to the Respondent. 
Fault 
41. The court considered fault of the parties in determining alimony pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(8)(b). Judge Low had previously considered fault and 
the past conduct and moral standards of both parties in his Memorandum Decision of 
March 2, 2004 regarding custody of the children. The court finds, based upon 
Judge Low's Memorandum Decision, that the past conduct and moral standards of both 
parties equally contributed to the destruction of the marriage. 
Jones Factors 
42. The court considered the evidence relative to the factors set forth in y y / , 
Respondent provided no evidence (although the court requested 
numerous times if Respondent was going to present any testimony) as to ^ 7 /w 
her financial conditions and/or needs. However, the court finds re "a -
. . / i - _ I e I I 
I 
o^w^abet^Hray* Respondent's needs of support; 
(b) Ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for k r Awr i jA j ^ crtiif c*f% 
himself/herself. Respondent presented no evidence as to her current 
income or her income making ability. Petitioner presented evidence that 
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Respondent holds a degree of a special certificate in International 
Relations from Utah State University and a bachelor's of arts in political 
science and speech from Utah State University. Petitioner also presented 
evidence that Respondent holds an ESL Certificate to teach English as a 
secondary language from Seattle University. Denise Iverson, an 
employment specialist, testified that Respondent, based upon her 
background and training, could easily make as much as $40,000 or more 
per year. At trial, the Respondent testified that she did not assert any 
physical or mental disability that prevented her from working, but for some 
reason the Respondent has chosen not to pursue employment during the 
pendency of these proceedings. The court finds that the Respondent, 
prior to separation, worked in and fully participated in the business; 
(c) Ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Accountant Keith 
Christensen of Christensen, King & Associates, Accountant Gary Jones, 
the Petitioner, and the files and records contained in this matter 
established that Petitioner has insufficient ability to provide additional 
support to the Respondent. The evidence established that Team Builders 
International, Inc. is currently experiencing average yearly decline in 
revenue of 18.52% while the business expenses remain constant (This 
decline in revenue is similar to other major Nikken distributorships). 
Evidence established that Petitioner has business and personal debt in 
excess of $1,642,476.55. The court finds that there have been huge 
amounts of business expenses, including $700,000 in attorney's fees, 
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accounting fees, and experts, which has resulted in enormous drain on _ , 
the business. Testimefly-^stetefeheel Petitione/Viad insufficient income flMJ 
after the payment of the minimum business and personal expenses. 7** ^ ^ ' * / ^ / 1 < P / 
43. The court finds that this is a long-term marriage, that Petitioner receives 
approximately $5,000 per month business income, and that his wife, Melissa Kotter, 
receives approximately $2,000 per month in business income. The court finds that the 
Petitioner has a monthly income of $7,000 per month. 
44. Based upon the above, the court awards alimony in the sum of $3,000 per 
month from Petitioner to the Respondent which should begin July 2006. Alimony 
should continue for the duration of the marriage (18 years), or until it is terminated or 
modified by the court, or if Respondent remarries, dies, or is cohabiting with another 
person, or in accordance with the provisions found in Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 et 
seq. 
Cohabitation 
45. The court finds the Respondent refuted the evidence establishing that 
Respondent had been cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex after the parties' 
divorce on December 20, 2002 as set forth in §30-3-5(10) Utah Code Annotated. 
46. Petitioner artjued that Respondent had been cohabiting with a person of 
the opposite sex and waas not entitled to alimony in accordance with §30-3-5(10) Utah 
Code Annotated. Trial evidence presented Shane Gilbert as a witness, who was a 
private investigator/ Mr. <Silbert presented evidence that Mr. Todd McNeley was 
residing in the Respondenfsshome, that his pickup and trailer were parked there daily, 
his mail was bqjfng sent to the Respondent's home, and that he had some telephone 
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numbe\s and addresses with the Respondent. Mr. Gilbert also testified that 
Mr. McNetey/fesided at the Respondent's home when he identified himself as her 
boyfrien^K T^e Respondent testified that Mr. McNeley no longer resides in her home 
and Kas his ovfcn apartment. 
47. \Overthe objection of Petitioner and despite the court having granted 
Petitioner's Mywon in Limine, the Respondent presented Exhibit 3, which at least 
showed tf>dit Todct McNeley has his own apartment and does not reside with the 
Respjamdent. 
48. i Admissions were presented into evidence that: 
(a) Tobd McNeley ha^cohabited with Respondent for the last twelve (12) 
months 
^ 
(b) Respondent ana Todd McNeley have had sexual relations with each 
other on afmost ja daily basis and have done so for the last twelve (12) 
months; 
(c) Todd Mcf^eley resides with Respondent at 10 Desperado, Hailey, 
Idaho; 
(d) Respo/ident'k and Todd McNeley's common residence has been 
10 Desperado, Hailey, Idaho, for the last twelve (12) months; 
(e) Tod/l McNeley receives mail and has his clothing, toiletries, and all 
otherpersonal effects at 10 Desperado, Hailey, Idaho; 
(f) Respondent's and Todd McNeley's common residence is 
10A)esperado, Hailey, laeho; 
(g) Respondent has taken\extensive vacations with Todd McNeley; 
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(h) Respo^ent is not entitled to alimony. 
49. The court accepted Respondent's evidence, took the statements of 
Respondent, and found that McNeley was not cohabiting with Respondent at the time 
of this Trial. 
Team Builders International Inc. 
50. The court reaffirms and reiterates in its entirety the court ruling of 
August 18, 2004, that the business known as Team Builders International Inc., a 
distributor of Nikken, all personal property titled or associated with the business, and all 
income should be and is hereby awarded to Petitioner. 
TV** . Value 
51. A The only evidence presented of the valuation of the business was 
presented by Accountant Keith Christensen of Christensen, King & Associates. 
Keith Christensen estimated the value of Team Builders International Inc. at the time of 
the divorce (December 20, 2002) at $1,629,100.00 (with JHAM). Respondent 
presented no evidence as to the value of Team Builders International. The Petitioner's 
Trial evidence established that since January 1, 2003, the business income has been 
declining at the rate of 18.52% per year (with JHAM). On January 1, 2003, the 
business was grossing $77,024.51 per month and had average stipulated business 
expenses of $19,000.00 per month for an average of $58,024.51 net per month. As of 
May 31, 2006, the business was grossing an average of $32,285.69 per month and had 
average stipulated business expenses of $19,000.00 per month which net the business 
$13,285.69 per month. Based upon the current rate of decline in income where the 
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expenses remain relatively constant, the evidence established that the value of the 
business, as of May 31, 2006, is between $358,402.00 and $477,500.00 (with JHAM). 
fO" $&A&^^ court accepts the language as set forth in the Memorandum 
Decision of Judge Low dated August 18, 2004 that the business has a value of 
$1,600,000 and equally divides the parties' equity interest valued at $800,000. The 
Petitioner then presented evidence that Respondent, since this action commenced, has 
been paid in excess of $878,687.00 toward the payment of Respondent's portion of the 7 uj 
business. The court does not accept this argument** &ft*\**J ** 7 ^ ° ^ 27^0°* 
Reimbursement to Petitioner for Business Expenses 
52. The court finds that for a period of nine (9) months that Petitioner was 
excluded from payment of the business expenses out of the gross proceeds of 
Team Builders International, Inc. As a result, Petitioner paid business expenses of 
$159,841.00 "out of his pocket". The court finds that Petitioner should receive an offset 
of $79,920.50 against Respondent's share of the business. 
Difference in Payments from Business 
53. The court finds that since the parties separated and throughout the 
divorce action, the court has issued several different orders regarding the payment of 
mortgages, debts, and business income to Petitioner and Respondent. The payment of 
the business income for the benefit of the parties has been overseen by Gary Jones. 
Exhibit 2 tabs C and D, presented by Petitioner at trial, outline the various amounts paid 
to the parties for 2003 through 2006. This exhibit was not disputed by Respondent. 
The exhibit shows that Respondent had received approximately $60,000.00 more than 
Petitioner. The court finds that the payments should be equalized because that was the 
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order of Judge Judkins and Judge Low. The court finds that Petitioner should receive 
$30,000.00 credit against Respondent's share of the business. 
Real Property 
54. The court finds that during the course of the marriage, the parties have 
accumulated the following real property: (1) a home currently occupied by the 
Respondent located at 10 Desperado, City of Hailey, County of Blaine, State of Idaho; 
(2) a home currently occupied by Petitioner located at 2006 East 2750 North, City of 
North Logan, County of Cache, State of Utah, with attached acres of land; and 
(3) two building lots in the City of North Logan, County of Cache, State of Utah. 
55. Hailey home. The court finds that the home located at 10 Desperado, 
City of Hailey, County of Blaine, State of Idaho, is occupied by the Respondent and was 
acquired on December 24, 2001, by the parties for $700,000.00. It has a current 
mortgage amount of $532,839.14 and is appraised at an amount of $875,000.00 
leaving $342,160.86 in positive equity in the Hailey home. 
56. North Logan home. The court had previously found in Petitioner's Motion 
for Summary Judgment the value of the North Logan home at $650,000.00. Over 
Petitioner's objections, the Respondent presented two (2) exhibits on the North Logan 
home for $1,755,000.00 dated November 2, 2001, and one for $1,850,000.00 dated 
March 4, 2002. The court finds that the North Logan home and attached acreage is 
occupied by the Petitioner and was purchased in July 1998 for $750,000.00. The 
evidence established that the most recent appraisal (May 4, 2004) on the home and 
acreage is appraised at $650,000.00 by Allen Burris, and this value is in line with 
testimony of realtor, Candace Peterson. This value was based upon the actual 
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marketability of the home. The home has been on the market for the last four and one-
half (4/4) years with no interested buyers. Notwithstanding, the court finds that there 
was substantial conflicting reliable evidence concerning the value of the home. The 
court finds that it makes no sense that Washington Mutual would lend money to the 
Petitioner for more than the house is worth. Additionally, the court found that the home 
has been on the market for many years, and that, based upon the testimony of 
Candace Peterson, the larger, more expensive homes are very difficult to sell because 
people would just as soon build their own home if they have money rather than to buy 
an existing home. Notwithstanding, the court now finds that the North Logan home is 
valued at $850,000.00 and finds that there is no positive or negative equity in the 
North Logan home (2006 East 2750 North, North Logan, Utah 84341), and, as such, 
Respondent's judgment set forth herein should not attach. 
57. North Logan building lots. The court finds that the parties' acquired 
two (2) building lots in 1999. They were appraised for $46,000.00 per lot. The lots 
were sold in May 2006 for $117,500.00. After the payment of the mortgage and costs 
of sale on said lots, there was a remaining balance of $40,103.15, which the court 
ordered split between the parties. By court order, the $40,103.15 was deposited with 
the court. Thirty-seven Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-seven Dollars and Sixty-six Cents 
($37,457.66) was paid to Respondent's attorney, Jim Jenkins, for past due attorney 
fees leaving a balance of $2,645.49 that remains with this court, which should be 
awarded to Petitioner. 
58. Division of real property. Respondent should be awarded the Hailey 
home and the Petitioner should be awarded the North Logan home and attached 
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acreage. Petitioner should receive $188,486.51 credit against Respondent's share of 
the business. This is calculated by the Hailey home equity of $171,080.43 and 
proceeds from the building lot of $17,406.08 that was awarded to Petitioner but was 
paid to Respondent's attorney for attorney fees. 
Personal Property 
59. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties have 
accumulated personal property. The court values Respondent's personal property at 
$110,064.80 and Petitioner's personal property at $46,120.00. Respondent has 
$63,944.80 greater in personal property than the Petitioner. Petitioner should receive 
$31,972.40 credit against Respondent's share of the business. 
Debts 
60. The parties have acquired business and marital debts and obligations 
during the course of the marriage. Each party should be responsible for, and hold the 
other party harmless from liability thereon, their own debts incurred after the date of 
separation on February 7, 2002. 
Petitioner should be responsible for, and hold Respondent harmless from liability 
thereon, the following debts and obligations: 
Personal 
A. Washington Mutual (North Logan mortgage) of $860,000.00; 
B. One-half of American Express with a total balance of $5,217.20; 
C. Honda Financial (SUV) of $33,396.37; 
D. America First Credit Union (Harleys) of $46,466.01 ; 
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Business 
E. American Express S&T of $50,998.26; 
F. Optima American Express of $16,050.71; 
G. Capital One of $21,205.05; 
H. Chase of $7,654.15; 
I. CareCredit of $1,479.40; 
J. Citibank of $14,452.62; 
K. MBNA of $46,143.69; 
L Sams Club of $463.09; 
and, 
M. Any other obligations incurred by Petitioner since separation. 
61. Respondent should be responsible for, and hold Petitioner harmless from 
liability thereon, the following debts and obligations: 
A. Washington Mutual (Hailey mortgage) of $533,000.00; 
B. One-half of American Express with a total balance of $5,217.20; 
C. Greenscape Landscaping (amount unknown); 
D. American Express (amount unknown); 
E. Loan on Lexus SUV (amount unknown); 
F. All tax obligations owed to any taxing authority; 
and, 
G. Any other obligations incurred by Respondent since separation. 
The court hereby finds that the mortgages on the North Logan home and the 
Hailey home should be paid by the party who was awarded that property, all business 
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debts should be considered in the valuation of the business as the responsibility of the 
Petitioner, and all other individual debt since the parties' separation should be the 
responsibility of the party who incurred that particular debt. 
Attorney Fees 
62. During the course of the proceedings, Respondent has a greater amount 
of attorney's fees even though for some periods of time she was unrepresented by 
counsel. Notwithstanding, the court finds that each party should pay their own costs 
and attorney's fees. 
Miscellaneous 
63. The court reaffirms the Memorandum Decision of May 6, 2006 awarding 
Petitioner $7,500.00 (share of sale of Respondent's truck) judgment against 
Respondent. Petitioner should receive credit of $7,500.00 against Respondent's share 
of the business. 
64. The court reaffirms the judgment of November 3, 2005 against 
Respondent for back medical costs of $8,832.33. Petitioner should receive credit of 
$8,832.33 against Respondent's share of the business. 
65. The court reaffirms the May 4, 2006 judgment against Respondent for 
attorney's fees in the sum of $500.00. Petitioner should receive credit of $500.00 
against Respondent's share of the business. 
66. Petitioner is entitled to a total credit of $347,211.74 (see paragraphs 52, 
53, 58, 59, 63, 64, and 65) against Respondent's $800,000.00 share of the business 
set forth in paragraph 51. Petitioner owes Respondent $452,788.26 which should be 
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paidat the rate of $5,000.00 per month payable on the last day of the month at-tha* 
s t e r ^ ^ - a t o Ow.36-% ifltefeet™'PaymoRtn ghnnlrl continue until paid^n-fati? 
67. Each party should promptly at any time or times required, make, execute, 
and deliver any releases, documents, and instruments that may be necessary to carry 
out into effect the covenants, conditions, and provisions contained in the Order in this 
matter. 
68. All property and money received or retained by each party pursuant to the 
Order should be the separate property of such party free and clear of any right, interest, 
or claim of the other party, and each party should thereafter own, have, and enjoy, 
independently of any claim or right of the other party, all items of real and personal 
property then or thereafter belonging to him or her, and .each party should have the right 
to deal with or dispose of his or her separate property, both real and personal, fully and 
effectually, in all respects and for all purposes. 
69. Gary Jones, the court-appointed accountant, is hereby released of his 
duties to the court and parties and is ordered to turn over all records in his possession 
to Petitioner's attorney. The Nikken monthly checks should be redirected directly to 
Petitioner. 
70. The Lis Pendens placed upon the North Logan home (2006 East 2750 
North, North Logan, Utah 84341) should be immediately lifted and should have no force 
or effect. 
71. Each party, after the entry of the Order, should be solely responsible for 
all debts incurred by him or her. Neither party should thereafter incur any debts, 
obligations, or liabilities on the parties' credit or do anything for which the other party 
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may be legally liable. Each party should indemnify and hold harmless the other from 
any debts, obligations, or liabilities that may exist or come into existence in violation of 
the foregoing. 
DATED this jLfr day offlovembef, 200y. 
BY THE COURT: 
*S I 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Notice to Respondent: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for the Petitioner will 
submit the above and foregoing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to 
the Court for its signature upon the expiration of the five (5) days from the date of this 
notice plus three (3) days for mailing. Unless written objection is prior to the time, 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, kindly govern yourself 
accordingly. 
DATED this / j * day of November, 2006. 
foxGregorwSKabelund 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Elizabeth Vienna 
10 Desperado Drive 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
DATED this I (* day of November, 2006. 
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EXHIBIT A 
30-3-35.5. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children under five years of 
age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children under five years old. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall 
be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child 
shall be entitled: 
(a) for children under five months of age: 
(i) six hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or the noncustodial 
parent preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar 
to the child; and 
(ii) two hours on holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) 
through (i) preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting, or other 
environment familiar to the child; 
(b) for children five months of age or older, but younger than ten months of age: 
(i) nine hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or the noncustodial 
parent preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar 
to the child; and 
(ii) two hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) 
through (i) preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting, or other 
environment familiar to the child; 
(c) for children ten months of age or older, but younger than 18 months of age: 
(i) one eight hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(ii) one three hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(iii) eight hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) 
through (i); and 
(iv) brief telephone contact and other virtual parent-time, if the equipment is 
reasonably available, with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week, provided 
that if the parties cannot agree on whether the equipment is reasonably available, the 
court shall decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time is reasonably available, 
taking into consideration: 
(A) the best interests of the child; 
(B) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and 
(C) any other factors the court considers material; 
(d) for children 18 months of age or older, but younger than three years of age: 
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the 
noncustodial parent or court; however, if the child is being cared for during the day 
outside his regular place of residence, the noncustodial parent may, with advance notice 
to the custodial parent, pick up the child from the caregiver at an earlier time and return 
him to the custodial parent by 8:30 p.m.; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree 
from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time may be: 
(A) two one-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the 
noncustodial parent; 
(B) one week shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining week shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical one-week period of uninterrupted time 
for vacation; and 
(v) brief telephone contact and virtual parent-time, if the equipment is reasonably 
available, with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week, provided that if the 
parties cannot agree on whether the equipment is reasonably available, the court shall 
decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time is reasonably available, taking into 
consideration: 
(A) the best interests of the child; 
(B) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and 
(C) any other factors the court considers material; 
(e) for children three years of age or older, but younger than five years of age: 
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the 
noncustodial parent or court; however, if the child is being cared for during the day 
outside his regular place of residence, the noncustodial parent may, with advance notice 
to the custodial parent, pick up the child from the caregiver at an earlier time and return 
him to the custodial parent by 8:30 p.m.; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree 
from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(A) two two-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the 
noncustodial parent; 
(B) one two-week period shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining two-week period shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial 
parent consistent with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time 
for vacation; and 
(v) brief telephone contact and virtual parent-time, if the equipment is reasonably 
available, with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week, provided that if the 
parties cannot agree on whether the equipment is reasonably available, the court shall 
decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time is reasonably available, taking into 
consideration: 
(A) the best interests of the child; 
(B) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and 
(C) any other factors the court considers material. 
(3) A parent shall notify the other parent at least 30 days in advance of extended 
parent-time or vacation weeks. 
(4) Virtual parent-time shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
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30-3-35. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall 
be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child 
shall be entitled: 
(a) (i) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court 
from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, one weekday from the time the childfs 
school is regularly dismissed until 8:30 p.m., unless the court directs the application of 
Subsection (2)(a)(i); 
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the 
decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, from the time the child's school is 
regularly dismissed on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, unless the court directs the 
application of Subsection (2)(b)(i); 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not be 
made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall 
be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday 
period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free 
from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, parent-time over a scheduled holiday 
weekend may begin from the time the child's school is regularly dismissed at the 
beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the holiday weekend; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the 
following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. 
until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along 
for the birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless 
the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out for 
the holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the 
holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-
32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday 
is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the 
following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the 
discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on 
Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the 
holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend 
beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the 
holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including New Year's Day, 
as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 
p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years and the even 
year holidays in odd years; 
(i) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning 
at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year 
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; 
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time 
during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended 
parent-time shall be 1/2 of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the 
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be 
provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
(o) telephone contact and other virtual parent-time, if the equipment is reasonably 
available, shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration, provided that if the 
parties cannot agree on whether the equipment is reasonably available, the court shall 
decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time is reasonably available, taking into 
consideration: 
(i) the best interests of the child; 
(ii) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and 
(iii) any other factors the court considers material. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either parent 
concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the parent-
time order. 
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ADDENDUM 11 
Gregory Skabelund #5346 
Attorney at Law 
2176 North Main, Suite 102 
North Logan, Utah 84341 
(435) 752-9437 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BART KOTTER, 
Petitioner, ORDER 
v Case No. 024100102 
ELIZABETH KOTTER, Judge Thomas Willmore 
nka ELIZABETH VIENNA, Commissioner Dan Garner 
^
 w Respondent. 
' This matter came before the court for Trial on May 31, 2006, the Honorable 74. }0O &, 
Thomas Willmore presiding. Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by 
counsel, Gregory Skabelund. Respondent appeared in person and represented herself 
pro se. A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was signed and entered earlier on 
December 20, 2002. An Order on Custody was signed and entered by this court on 
February 9, 2004. An Order was signed and entered by this court on November 10, 
2004, awarding Petitioner the business known as Team Builders International Inc., a 
/ 
distributorship of Nikken. Finally, a Memorandum Decision was signed and entered 
May 4, 2006, which partially awards Petitioner Summary Judgment and grants ' 
Petitioner's Motion in Limine, ^ ' c c / jo jte M« I °f"fi* /****$> ^ ^ 
7-7, ^ Ool% 
ORDER.FINAL2/BART KOTTER 
jlsx^lr? 
The court having heard and reviewed the evidence, including the witnesses, 
exhibits, and the files and records in this matter on the remaining issues of the 
marriage, and the court having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law now enters the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The court reaffirms the Memorandum Decision and awards Petitioner JZ^ 
Summary Judgment and grants Petitioner's Motion in Limine.^ukj**-* /° w™'^* 
2. The court reaffirms and reiterates the Order of February 9, 2004, relative 
to the custody, child support, and other aspects of the children. 
Parent-Time 
3. Respondent shall be entitled to parent-time with the minor children as 
agreed upon by the parties but shall be entitled to at least every other weekend from 
Friday afternoon at 3:00 p.m. (pick up at the children's school) until Sunday evenings at 
3:00 p.m. 
a. Midweek Parental Time. The Respondent shall have at least one 
evening of parental time with the children each week as the parties may agree, or, if 
they cannot agree, from 5:00 to 8:30 p.m. on Wednesdays. 
b. Summer and Christmas Parental Time. For even-numbered years, 
Respondent shall be entitled to the first six (6) weeks of the summer visitation and the 
first one-half (14) of the Christmas visitation. For odd-numbered years, Respondent 
shall be entitled to the second (6) weeks of the summer visitation and the second 
one-half (14) of the Christmas visitation. 
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c. Other Holiday and Special Event Parental Time. In exercising 
holiday and special event parental time, the parties shall follow the schedule set forth at 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 (1953, as amended). Holiday and special event parental 
time shall take precedence over the Standard Weekly Rotation. A copy of said 
holiday visitation schedule is attached hereto, incorporated by reference, and marked 
as Exhibit "A". % 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, Respondent shall pick up the children 
from Petitioner's residence for commencement of Respondent's parent-time. At the 
conclusion of Respondent's parent-time, Petitioner shall pick up the children from 
Respondent's residence. Pick up of the children shall be curbside. 
d. Addresses and telephone numbers. Each party shall keep the other party 
advised of his/her current address, telephone number, and e-mail address and, if 
possible, advise the other party thirty (30) days in advance of any move. 
Other Child Related Issues 
4. Petitioner and Respondent shall split the minor children for state and 
federal income deductions. Once the oldest child reaches the age of majority, the 
parties shall alternate the youngest child as an exemption for tax purpose, with 
Petitioner having the claim in odd numbered years and Respondent having the claim in 
even numbered years. Respondent shall be entitled to claim the exemption for the 
child due child support only if she is current in her child support payments to the 
Petitioner. Otherwise, Petitioner shall be entitled to claim the exemption. 
5. Both Petitioner and Respondent shall each be required to maintain in 
effect a policy of dental, health, optical and accident insurance at all times that such 
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may be available through their respective employers, at reasonable cost, with the minor 
children of the parties as named beneficiaries thereunder. Further, each party shall pay 
one-half of any deductible amounts, and all non-covered medical and dental expenses 
for said minor children. If Petitioner and Respondent are unable to secure said 
insurance, each party shall be responsible for the payment of one-half of all reasonable 
and necessary medical and dental expenses for the minor children. 
6. The parties shall equally pay any sums not covered by said insurance, 
including, but not limited to, the children's portion of health insurance premium as 
calculated pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15(5), physician care, inpatient and 
outpatient care and related expenses, mental health care, physical examinations, 
immunizations, prescription medications, medically necessary medical supplies, eye 
examinations, and corrective lenses. 
7. As required by Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15, each party shall provide the 
other written notice and proof of medical, dental and orthodontic expenses incurred, 
and payments made thereon, by insurance or otherwise, within thirty (30) days of the 
date the expense is incurred. Each party shall provide the other copies of statements 
or written notice received of payments made to a provider by insurance. If either party 
incurs any medical expenses on behalf of the children, the other party shall reimburse 
the paying party within ten (10) days of receiving written notice from that party. 
8. If the children are insured under a policy of health and accident insurance 
issued through a parent, that parent shall be entitled to either a credit or an addition to 
child support. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15, the premium shall be 
calculated as follows: ($/ -*• [the number of insured individuals] = $/ •*• 2 = $/). The 
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amount of the insurance premium paid by a parent may vary in the future based upon a 
change in the insurance premium paid for the benefit of the children. The insured 
parent shall provide the other parent with written verification of a change in insurance 
premiums. Upon written verification of the change in insurance premium, the parties 
may modify the amount of child support without further Court Order. 
9. In addition to any other sanctions provided by the Court, if either party 
incurs medical expenses on behalf of the children, they may be denied the right to 
receive compensation for said medical expenses if they fail to comply with Paragraph 7 
above. 
10. Any parent providing insurance for the benefit of the children shall provide 
verification of coverage to the other parent upon initial enrollment of the children, and 
thereafter on or before January 2nd of each year. The parent shall notify the other 
parent of any change of insurance carrier, premium or benefits within thirty (30) days of 
the date he or she first knew or should have known of the change. 
PARENTING PLAN 
A. Governing Principles. 
11. The parties desire to create an effective co-parenting relationship for the 
benefit of their minor children. The parties desire to raise happy and well adjusted 
children and to respect each other in their respective parenting roles. 
12. The parties realize that they each have different parenting functions and 
styles and shall support and acknowledge the benefits to the children of having a 
healthy relationship with both parents. 
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13. The parties shall reduce the conflict between them and learn problem 
solving skills and implement those skills to eliminate future conflict. The parties shall 
have open communication and focus on the needs and interests of their children ahead 
of their own personal interests. 
14. To implement the vision of the parties' shared parenting plan, and 
because of their common concern for their children's emotional well being, the 
governing principals are as follows: 
a. The parties shall have a co-parenting relationship which will be built on 
trust and respect; 
b. The parties shall establish and maintain parental communication with 
each other to ensure that the other parent is informed about the children's 
needs; 
c. The parties shall support each other in their respective parenting roles 
and to say positive words about the other parent to the children and to be 
restrained from saying anything negative about the other parent; 
d. The parties shall listen to each other and do their best to understand the 
other's point of view; 
e. The parties shall solve problems and make joint decisions by working 
through their decision making procedure which is described herein; 
f. Communication concerning the children shall be conducted by e-mail; 
g. The parties shall work together to improve their parenting skills and to 
share their ideas; 
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h. The parties shall live by the golden rule that they will treat each other as 
they would like to be treated; 
i. The parties shall start over and recommit to this Parenting Plan when 
one or both of them steps outside of the Plan and forgets about a 
commitment made in this Plan; and 
j . The parties shall see the other parent as a resource, consultant and 
ally. The parties shall be effectively working together as co-parents to 
promote the best interests of the children. 
15. In order to implement the Parenting Plan as outlined by the Governing 
Principles, the parties shall communicate via e-mail. 
B. Parenting Meeting. 
16. The purpose of the e-mails between the parties shall be to share 
information and discuss issues regarding the children in a positive manner. The parties 
shall limit the communication to the needs of the children and the time-sharing 
schedule, information regarding the children, transportation logistics, and other 
parenting issues. Any disagreement regarding the children shall be resolved in 
accordance with paragraphs 35 and 36 below. 
C. Time Sharing, Child Care and Kindergarten. 
17. The parties shall cooperate to plan their children's time sharing schedule 
based on the following principles: 
a. The parties shall trade favors and do their best to insure that the 
children have a meaningful time in both homes; 
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b. The parties shall be flexible with each other when minor changes are 
necessai/: and 
c. The parties sha,\' qive as much advance notice as possible if changes 
are necessary. 
18. Day care shall be paid by the party who incurred it. 
19. No non-prescribed drugs shall be consumed or present within eight (8) 
hours before or while the children are visiting with each party. 
20. There shall be no non-family person of the opposite sex residing either 
permanently or temporarily, with the Resident Parent while the children are with that 
parent. 
21. As set forth below, the parties shall notify each other of events in the 
children's life so that both parties may have the opportunity to attend and participate in 
the event. 
D. Share Information. 
22. The parties shall use their best efforts to communicate and share 
information with each via e-mail, and whenever else necessary, to convey information 
regarding the children's school work, school schedule, sports schedule, medical and 
dental treatment, counseling, emotional needs, accomplishments, and other information 
appropriate to share with the other parent. The parties shall inform each other of dates 
and times for all scheduled therapy, medical, dental and orthodontic appointments. 
23. The parties, not the children, shall notify the other parent of all school 
programs, church events, extracurricular activities, sports activities, and special 
occasions. 
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24. The parties shall have access to the children's school, medical, religious, 
and other records. 
25. The parties shall notify the other parent of significant illnesses involving 
the children and of any information relating to their medications. 
26. During the parties' e-mail communication, each party shall summarize for 
the other all significant information relating to their children's progress. Each party shall 
also share information relating to doctor or dentist appointments, plays, sports, special 
lessons, new skills, new language development, discipline challenges, etc., regarding 
their minor children. 
E. Property Belonging to or for the Use of the Children. 
27. Either parent may request that the other parent deliver certain of the 
children's personal effects, toys, clothing, sports equipment, etc. to them. If requested, 
the parent then in possession of these items shall deliver the property with the children. 
The parent receiving items shall return that property at the exchange of the children. All 
clothing shall be returned in a clean condition. 
F. Consistency in Parenting. 
28. The parties' consistency in parenting shall help them to raise an 
emotionally healthy and secure child. Therefore, the parties shall discuss parenting 
strategies and develop, if possible, consistent rules and parenting approaches. 
29. The parties shall implement, whenever possible, consistent bed times, 
discipline strategies and other rules. Moreover, the parties recognize that parenting will 
be more effective if they work together as a united front. 
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30. Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the children 
available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, 
religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant events in the 
life of the children or in the life of either parent which may inadvertently conflict with the 
parental time schedule. 
G. Changing Needs of the Children. 
31. It is understood that as the children get older, their needs will also change. 
This parenting plan anticipates that those needs will have to be addressed as they 
occur. To the extent that they cannot reach an agreement on their own to address 
those changes, they shall be required to address the disputes as anticipated by 
paragraphs 35 and 36, Decision Making. Without intending to be all inclusive, the kinds 
of changes or circumstances that might arise in the future for further discussion could 
include: 
Child's desire to change time sharing arrangement; 
Child develops greater maturity and interest drift away from proposed parent time; 
Religious training and affiliation; 
Travel out of state alone or with other parent; 
International travel and passports; 
Obtaining driver's license, insurance and driving or owning a car; 
Military Service; 
Underage marriage; 
Alcohol or drug abuse or other criminal violations. 
H. Extracurricular Activities and Post High School Educational Expenses. 
32. Provided the parties mutually agree on the extracurricular activity and 
each is financially able to do so, both parties shall equally share the cost associated 
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with the children's participation in sports, music, art, scouts or other extracurricular 
activities. 
33. If the parties cannot agree on the children's extracurricular activities, then 
either parent may enroll the children in extracurricular activities at his or her sole 
expense, provided that the children attend the disagreed upon activity only during the 
enrolling parent's parenting time. 
34. In addition, both parties recognize the value of post high school education 
to the children. If they are financially able to do so, each party shall contribute to the 
children's post high school education related expenses. 
I. Decision Making. 
35. The parties shall share decision making as follows: 
a. Dav-to-Dav Decisions: The party with whom the children are residing may 
make minor day-to-day decisions regarding the children's care without 
having to consult with the other parent. 
b. Major Decisions: During their e-mail communication, the parties shall 
consult with one another and reach agreements on major issues 
concerning the medical, dental, and general welfare of their 
children. If the parties cannot reach an agreement on any major decision, 
it shall be addressed in accordance with paragraph 36 below. 
c. Emergency Treatment: Either parent may initiate emergency medical, 
or dental treatment, and shall notify and involve the other 
parent as soon as possible. 
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36. Procedure to be Utilized on Which the Parties are in Disagreement 
a. When any disputes between Petitioner and Respondent regarding the 
children occur, they shall attempt to solve them on their own before 
resorting to any other process. If they are unsuccessful in that regard, 
they shall confer with or solicit the assistance of other family members, 
friends or religious leaders upon whom they can agree. If necessary, they 
shall meet with experts in the area of disagreement, i.e. neutral medical 
providers with disagreements on medical treatment. If this fails to assist 
the parties in reaching an agreement, either party may petition the Court 
for assistance. 
b. The parties may petition the Court for assistance only after making a 
good-faith attempt at completing the Decision Making procedures set forth 
herein, unless such delay will result in immediate and irreparable harm to 
the child. 
J. Discussions with the Children. 
37. If either party is questioned by the children regarding the reason for the 
parties' divorce, the party shall inform the children that the divorce was a joint decision, 
and that neither parent places the blame on the other parent for the divorce. The 
parties shall not discuss any specific information about the divorce or the breakdown of 
the parties' marriage with the children. 
38. If either party is questioned by the children regarding issues related to the 
other parent, such as economic issues, discipline issues, parenting issues, each party's 
post-divorce relationships, etc., the parent shall refer the children to the parent about 
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whom the question was asked. The parties shall discuss the children's questions at the 
next e-mail communication. 
Alimony 
si \r 3 9 \ The parties were divorced on December 20, 2002 after an 18-year 
* \ 7 
marriage. Oto February 9, 2004, Petitioner was awarded the care, custody, and control 
of the parties' minor children. During the last eight (8) years of the parties' marriage, 
Petitioner operateckpbusiness known as Team Builders International, Inc. During the 
marriage, Petitioffer obtained no special training or received any education. 
Respondentyon the othet hand, received a degree in International Relations, a 
bachelor^degree from Utah State University, and obtained a teaching certificate in 
Engli^n as a Second Language from Seattle University. 
4 0 . \ During the cours^ of the divorce proceedings, Respondent has asserted a 
claim for alinwiy. Howeve/since this action commenced, there has been no 
temporary alimofw awarcK The court finds that the issue of alimony has been difficult 
for this court to det^nriine. Because this case has continued on for so long, much has 
changed in the case/with regards to the parties' financial conditions and the value of the 
business. Further/accoraing to the testimony at Trial, the income from Team Builders 
International, Inof has changed dramatically. Additionally, the Respondent has failed to 
comply with co/irt orders with regard to production of documents and answers to 
interrogatories, has chosen to represent herself at Trial, and has failed to provide a 
complete picture of her financial ability and financial needs. The court must determine 
alimony based upon the law of the ca\e and the current financial circumstances of the 
parties/ The law of the case was established by Judge Low in his August 18, 2004 
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Memorandum Decision/ln the Memorandum Decision, Judge Low indicated that the 
Respondenrwas ^receive a substantial alimony award "according to needs and 
j abilities as rpay b^ found." Therefore, it was recognized early in the case that alimony 
would ^awarded toHhe Respondent, i t A 6 JL 
41. The court considered fault of the parties in determining alimony pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotate/§30-3-5(8)(b). Judge Low had previously considered fault and 
the past conduct ahd/moral standards of both parties in his Memorandum Decision of 
March 2, 2004 regardVj custody of the children. The court finds, based upon 
Judge Low's Memriorandurn Decision, that the past conduct and moral standards of both 
parties equajfy contributed to\the destruction of the marriage. 
Jones Factors 
42. The court considered the evidence relative to the factors set forth in 
Jones v. Jones, 7Q P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) and as set forth in Utah Code Annotated 
§30-3-5(8X3), 
^ x l M i (a) Financial cotiditio/is and needs of the spouse claiming support. 
I Respondent provided no evidence (although the court requested 
numerous times ^Respondent was going to present any testimony) as to 
her financial coraitionfe and/or needs. However, the court finds in "a 
round about way" Respondent's needs of support; 
(b) Ability of/the receiving apouse to produce sufficient income for 
himself/herself. Respondenrpresented no evidence as to her current 
income/br her income making ability. Petitioner presented evidence that 
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Responafent holds a degree of a special certificate in International 
Relations from Utah State University and a bachelor's of ^ns in political 
science and\speech from Utah State University. Petitioner also presented 
evidence that Respondent holds an ESL Certificate/o teach English as a 
secondary language from Seattle University. Depise Iverson, an 
employment specialist, testified that Respondent, based upon her 
background and framing, could easily mak^as much as $40,000 or more 
per year. At trial, the Respondent testified that she did not assert any 
physical or mental disability that prevej/ted her from working, but for some 
reason the Respondent hsas chosen not to pursue employment during the 
pendency of these proceedings. The court finds that the Respondent, 
prior to separation, worked in W d fully participated in the business; 
(c) Ability of the responding spo\jse to provide support. Accountant Keith 
Christensen of Christensert; King xk Associates, Accountant Gary Jones, 
the Petitioner, and the fihes and records contained in this matter 
established that Petitioner has insufficient ability to provide additional 
support to the Respondent. The evidence established that Team Builders 
International, Ino/is currently experiencing average yearly decline in 
revenue of 18^62% while the business expenses remain constant (This 
decline in revenue is similar to other major Nikken distributorships). 
Evidence/established that Petitioner has business and personal debt in 
excess/of $1,642,476.55. The court finds that fyiere have been huge 
amcjunts of business expenses, including $700,000 in attorney's fees, 
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accountingNees, andexperts, which has resulted in enormous drain on 
^ i i the business, ^ /^stimony established Petitioner had insufficient income 
^ after the^yment oMie minimum business and personal expenses. 
43. \he court/ffhds that this is a long-term marriage, that Petitioner receives 
approximately $5/6}O0 per month business income, and that his wife, Melissa Kotter, 
receives approximately $2,000 per month in business income. The court finds that the 
^y 
Petitioner h^s a monthlyVicome of $7,000 per month. 
44. Based upon the above, the court awards alimony in the sum of $3,000 per 
month from Petitioner to the Respondent which shall begin July 2006. Alimony shall 
continue for the duration of the marriage (18 years), or until it is terminated or modified 
by the court, or if Respondent remarries, dies, or is cohabiting with another person, or in 
accordance with the provisions found in Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 et seq. 
Cohabitation 
45. The court finds the Respondent refuted the evidence establishing that 
\ Respondent had been cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex after the parties' 
divorce on December 20, 2002 as set forth in §30-3-5(10) Utah Code Annotated 
46. Petitioner araued that Respondent had been cohabiting with a person of 
the opposite sex and wa£ notSentitled to alimony in accordance with §30-3-5(10) Utah 
Code Annotated. Triar evidenceWesented Shane Gilbert as a witness, who was a 
private investigator/Mr. Gilbert presented evidence that Mr. Todd McNeley was 
residing in the Respondent's home, thart his pickup and trailer were parked there daily, 
his mail was b^ing sent to the Respondent's home, and that he had some telephone 
numbers an/addresses with the Respondent. Mr. Gilbert also testified that 
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Mr. McNeley resided at the Respondent's home when he identified himself as her 
boyfriend. Tf&e Respondent testified that Mr. McNeley no longer resides in her home 
and has his owti apartment. 
47. Over the objection of Petitioner and despite the court having granted 
Petitioner's Motion m Limine, the Respondent presented Exhibit 3, which at least 
showed that Todd McNeley has his own apartment/and does not reside with the 
Respondent. 
48. Admissions v\)ere presented intoyfevidence that: 
(a) Todd McNeley has\;ohabited witl/Respondent for the last twelve (12) 
months; 
(b) Respondent and Todd (VlcNefey have had sexual relations with each 
other on almost a daily bas is^d have done so for the last twelve (12) 
months; 
(c) Todd McNeley reside^with Respondent at 10 Desperado, Hailey, 
Idaho; 
(d) Respondent's and Todd McNeley1^ common residence has been 
10 Desperado, Hailey, Idaho, for the lak twelve (12) months; 
(e) Todd McNeley receives mail and has Yois clothing, toiletries, and all 
other personar effects at 10 Desperado, HalJey, Idaho; 
(f) Respondent's and Todd McNeley's commqp residence is 
10 Desperado, Hailey, Idaho; 
(g) Respondent has taken extensive vacations wl>(h Todd McNeley; 
(h)>Respondent is not entitled to alimony. 
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49. The\.c0ljrt accepted Respondent's evidence, took the statements of 
Respondent, ap<3 fouqd that McNeley was not cohabiting with Respondent at the time 
of this Tria)/ 
Team Builders International Inc. 
j l / v 50. The court reaffir-me-and reiterates in its- entirety-the oe^rt-futiftg-ef 
August 18,-g094» that the business known as Team Builders International Inc., a 
distributor of Nikken, all personal property titled or associated with the business, and all 
income shall be and is hereby awarded to Petitioner. 
Value 
c 
51. Ishe only evidence presented of the valuation of the business was 
presented by Accountant Keith Christensen of Christensen, King & Associates. 
Keith Christensen estimated the valued of Team Builders International Inc. at the time of 
the divorce (December 20, 2002) a/$1,629,100.00 (with JHAM). Respondent 
presented no evidence as\o the/value of Team Builders International. The Petitioner's 
Trial evidence established tha/since January 1, 2003, the business income has been 
declining at the rate of 18.52% per year (with JHAM). On January 1, 2003, the 
business was grossing $Y7,024.5l\per month and had average stipulated business 
expenses of $19,000.(30 per month for an average of $58,024.51 net per month. As of 
May 31, 2006, the husiness was grossing an average of $32,285.69 per month and had 
average stipulate^ business expenses or$19,000.00 per month which net the business 
$13,285.69 per fdonth. Based upon the current rate of decline in income where the 
expenses remain relatively constant, the evidence established that the value of the 
business, asr of May 31, 2006, is between $358^02.00 and $477,500.00 (with JHAM). 
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Becision-of4y4g^LQW dated-Aagtist 16r2004 that the business has avafcre-efr> 
$1,600,000 and equally divides the parties' equity interest valued at $800,000. A r e -
Potitinnnr thpn prpgpnted px/iHAnnoJifcunt Rf¥>pnnA*nt r i n r o thir n n t i n n ^ m m o n r r a H fop** 
boon paid in-cxcess-of $87^i6fl:fr£Q4Qwa^^ 
businooo. The-eewt-^es-net-aeeopt-this af-giunenL 
Reimbursement to Petitioner for Business Expenses 
52. The court finds that for a period of nine (9) months that Petitioner was 
excluded from payment of the business expenses out of the gross proceeds of 
Team Builders International, Inc. As a result, Petitioner paid business expenses of 
$159,841.00 "out of his pocket". The court firate-that Petitioner shetrid -receive an offset 
of $79,920.50 against Respondent's share of the business. 
Difference in Payments from Business 
53. The court finds that since the parties separated and throughout the 
divorce action, the court has issued several different orders regarding the payment of 
mortgages, debts, and business income to Petitioner and Respondent. The payment of 
the business income for the benefit of the parties has been overseen by Gary Jones. 
Exhibit 2 tabs C and D, presented by Petitioner at trial, outline the various amounts paid 
to the parties for 2003 through 2006. This exhibit was not disputed by Respondent. 
The exhibit shows that Respondent had received approximately $60,000.00 more than 
Petitioner. The court finds that the payments should be equalized because that was the 
order of Judge Judkins and Judge Low. The court ftftete-thtert Petitioner sbetrid-feeeive *<. 
$30,000.00 credit against Respondent's share of the business. 
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Real Property 
54. The court finds that during the course of the marriage, the parties have 
accumulated the following real property: (1) a home currently occupied by the 
Respondent located at 10 Desperado, City of Hailey, County of Blaine, State of Idaho; 
(2) a home currently occupied by Petitioner located at 2006 East 2750 North, City of 
North Logan, County of Cache, State of Utah, with attached acres of land; and 
(3) two building lots in the City of North Logan, County of Cache, State of Utah. 
55. Hailey home. The court finds that the home located at 10 Desperado, ^ ) 
City of Hailey, County of Blaine, State of Idaho, is 0Geup^-by4he RespondentaRd-was 
mortgage amount of $532,839.14 and is appraised at an amount of $875,000.00 
leaving $342,160.86 in positive equity in the Hailey home. 
56. North Logan home. \he court hatfpreviously found in Petitioner's Motion 
for Summary Judgment the value of tjie North/Logan home at $650,000.00. Over 
Petitioner's objections, the Responden\pre/ented two (2) exhibits on the North Logan 
home for $1,755,000.00 dated November 2, 2001, and one for $1,850,000.00 dated 
March 4, 2002. The court finds that ttye North Logan home and attached acreage is 
occupied by the Petitioner and was/(Surchase l^ in July 1998 for $750,000.00. The 
evidence established that the moj£t recent appraisal (May 4, 2004) on the home and 
acreage is appraised at $650,QOO.OO by Allen Bunris, and this value is in line with 
testimony of realtor, Candac^ Peterson. This valuevwas based upon the actual 
marketability of the home/The home has been on the market for the last four and one-
half (4!4) years with no interested buyers. Notwithstanding, the court finds that there 
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was substantial cbqflicting reliable evidence concerning^hf^value of the home. The 
court finds that it makes rtOsSense that Washington Mutual would lend money to the 
Petitioner for more than the hou le^s^r th . Additionally, the court found that the home 
has been on the market forp^ny year^aqd that, based upon the testimony of 
Candace Peterson^the larger, more expensive frames are very difficult to sell because 
people wj^tf just as soon build their own home if theylta^e money rather than to buy 
af^^m§^ome: Uo^N^s^f^4i^^he court now finds that the North Logan home is 
valued at $850,000.00 and finds that there is no positive or negative equity in the * ^ ^ 
aAa chants jfyfe 
North Logan home (2006 East 2750 North, North Logan, Utah 84341), and, ac such, 
57. North Logan building lots. The court finds that the parties' acquired 
two (2) building lots in 1999. They were appraised for $46,000.00 per lot. The lots 
were sold in May 2006 for $117,500.00. After the payment of the mortgage and costs 
of sale on said lots, there was a remaining balance of $40,103.15, which the court 
ordered split between the parties. By court order, the $40,103.15 was deposited with 
the court. Thirty-seven Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-seven Dollars and Sixty-six Cents 
($37,457.66) was paid to Respondent's attorney, Jim Jenkins, for past due attorney 
fees leaving a balance of $2,645.49 that remains with this court, which sbetdthbe jt<U 
awarded to Petitioner. 
58. Division of real property. Respondent shall be awarded the Hailey home 
and the Petitioner shall be awarded the North Logan home and attached acreage. 
Petitioner should receive $188,486.51 credit against Respondent's share of the 
business. This is calculated by the Hailey home equity of $171,080.43 and proceeds 
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from the building lot of $17,406.08 that was awarded to Petitioner but was paid to 
Respondent's attorney for attorney fees. 
Personal Property 
59. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties have 
accumulated personal property. The court values Respondent's personal property at 
$110,064.80 and Petitioner's personal property at $46,120.00. Respondent has /"7*6t/ 
$63,944.80 greater in personal property than the Petitioner. Petitioner-should-receive 
$31,972.40 credit against Respondent's share of the business. 
Debts 
60. The parties have acquired business and marital debts and obligations 
during the course of the marriage. Each party shall be responsible for, and hold the 
other party harmless from liability thereon, their own debts incurred after the date of 
separation on February 7, 2002. 
Petitioner shall be responsible for, and hold Respondent harmless from liability 
thereon, the following debts and obligations: 
Personal 
A. Washington Mutual (North Logan mortgage) of $860,000.00; 
B. One-half of American Express with a total balance of $5,217.20; 
C. Honda Financial (SUV) of $33,396.37; 
D. America First Credit Union (Harleys) of $46,466.01; 
Business 
E. American Express S&T of $50,998.26; 
F. Optima American Express of $16,050.71; 
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G. Capital One of $21,205.05; 
H. Chase of $7,654.15; 
I. CareCredit of $1,479.40; 
J. Citibank of $14,452.62; 
K. MBNA of $46,143.69; 
L Sams Club of $463.09; 
and, 
M. Any other obligations incurred by Petitioner since separation. 
61. Respondent shall be responsible for, and hold Petitioner harmless from 
liability thereon, the following debts and obligations: 
A. Washington Mutual (Hailey mortgage) of $533,000.00; 
B. One-half of American Express with a total balance of $5,217.20; 
C. Greenscape Landscaping (amount unknown); 
D. American Express (amount unknown); 
E. Loan on Lexus SUV (amount unknown); 
F. All tax obligations owed to any taxing authority; 
and, 
G. Any other obligations incurred by Respondent since separation. 
The court hereby #nds that the mortgages on the North Logan home and the 
Hailey home shall be paid by the party who was awarded that property, all business 
debts shall be considered in the valuation of the business as the responsibility of the 
Petitioner, and all other individual debt since the parties' separation shall be the 
responsibility of the party who incurred that particular debt. 
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Attorney Fees 
62. During the course of the proceedings, Respondent has a greater amount 
of attorney's fees even though for some periods of time she was unrepresented by 
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counsel. Notwithstanding, the oourt finds that each party shall pay their own costs and 
attorney's fees. 
Miscellaneous 
63. The court reaffirms the Memorandum Decision of May 6, 2006 awarding 
Petitioner $7,500.00 (share of sale of Respondent's truck) judgment against 
Respondent. Petitioner should receive credit of $7,500.00 against Respondent's share 
of the business. 
64. The court reaffirms the judgment of November 3, 2005 against 
Respondent for back medical costs of $8,832.33. Petitioner should receive credit of 
$8,832.33 against Respondent's share of the business. 
c 65. The court reaffirms the May 4, 2006 judgment against Respondent for 
attorney's fees in the sum of $500.00. Petitioner should receive credit of $500.00 
against Respondent's share of the business. 
66. Petitioner is entitled to a total credit of $347,211.74 (see paragraphs 52, 
53, 58, 59, 63, 64, and 65) against Respondent's $800,000.00 share of the business 
set forth in paragraph 51. Petitioner owes Respondent $452,788.26 which shall be paid 
at the rate of $5,000.00 per month payable on the last day of the month «Hhe-stattrtwy-
rate-rrf-erSfo^^ Pdyiirenlbbliall-eefttii 
67. Each party shall promptly at any time or times required, make, execute, 
IjJ and deliver any releases, documents, and instruments that may be necessary to carry 
out into effect the covenants, conditions, and provisions contained in the Order in this 
matter. 
68. All property and money received or retained by each party pursuant to the 
Order shall be the separate property of such party free and clear of any right, interest, 
or claim of the other party, and each party shall thereafter own, have, and enjoy, 
independently of any claim or right of the other party, all items of real and personal 
property then or thereafter belonging to him or her, and each party shall have the right 
to deal with or dispose of his or her separate property, both real and personal, fully and 
effectually, in all respects and for all purposes. 
69. Gary Jones, the court-appointed accountant, is hereby released of his 
duties to the court and parties and is ordered to turn over all records in his possession 
to Petitioner's attorney. The Nikken monthly checks shall be redirected directly to 
Petitioner. 
70. The Lis Pendens placed upon the North Logan home (2006 East 2750 
North, North Logan, Utah 84341) shall be immediately lifted and shall have no force or 
effect. 
71. Each party, after the entry of the Order, shall be solely responsible for all 
debts incurred by him or her. Neither party shall thereafter incur any debts, obligations, 
or liabilities on the parties' credit or do anything for which the other party may be legally 
liable. Each party shall indemnify and hold harmless the other from any debts, 
obligations, or liabilities that may exist or come into existence in violation of the 
foregoing. 
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DATED this "Ufi day of Wevemfeer, 200^. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Notice to Respondent: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for the Petitioner will 
submit the above and foregoing Proposed Order to the Court for its signature upon the 
expiration of the five (5) days from the date of this notice plus three (3) days for mailing. 
Unless written objection is prior to the time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration, kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this / f> day of November, 2006. 
yGregcyry/Skabelund 
^ Attorney fo r Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
ORDER in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Elizabeth Vienna 
10 Desperado Drive 
Hailey, Idaho 83333 
DATED this 7£ day of November, 2006. 
)L<^y y • PA4<J^^L.^£I 
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EXHIBIT A 
u i a n v->< 
30-3-35.5. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children under five years of 
age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children under five years old. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall 
be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child 
shall be entitled: 
(a) for children under five months of age: 
(i) six hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or the noncustodial 
parent preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar 
to the child; and 
(ii) two hours on holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) 
through (i) preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting, or other 
environment familiar to the child; 
(b) for children five months of age or older, but younger than ten months of age: 
(i) nine hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or the noncustodial 
parent preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar 
to the child; and 
(ii) two hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) 
through (i) preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting, or other 
environment familiar to the child; 
(c) for children ten months of age or older, but younger than 18 months of age: 
(i) one eight hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(ii) one three hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(iii) eight hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) 
through (i); and 
(iv) brief telephone contact and other virtual parent-time, if the equipment is 
reasonably available, with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week, provided 
that if the parties cannot agree on whether the equipment is reasonably available, the 
court shall decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time is reasonably available, 
taking into consideration: 
(A) the best interests of the child; 
(B) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and 
(C) any other factors the court considers material; 
(d) for children 18 months of age or older, but younger than three years of age: 
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the 
noncustodial parent or court; however, if the child is being cared for during the day 
outside his regular place of residence, the noncustodial parent may, with advance notice 
to the custodial parent, pick up the child from the caregiver at an earlier time and return 
him to the custodial parent by 8:30 p.m.; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree 
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from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time may be: 
(A) two one-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the 
noncustodial parent; 
(B) one week shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining week shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical one-week period of uninterrupted time 
for vacation; and 
(v) brief telephone contact and virtual parent-time, if the equipment is reasonably 
available, with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week, provided that if the 
parties cannot agree on whether the equipment is reasonably available, the court shall 
decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time is reasonably available, taking into 
consideration: 
(A) the best interests of the child; 
(B) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and 
(C) any other factors the court considers material; 
(e) for children three years of age or older, but younger than five years of age: 
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the 
noncustodial parent or court; however, if the child is being cared for during the day 
outside his regular place of residence, the noncustodial parent may, with advance notice 
to the custodial parent, pick up the child from the caregiver at an earlier time and return 
him to the custodial parent by 8:30 p.m.; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree 
from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(A) two two-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the 
noncustodial parent; 
(B) one two-week period shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining two-week period shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial 
parent consistent with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time 
for vacation; and 
(v) brief telephone contact and virtual parent-time, if the equipment is reasonably 
available, with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week, provided that if the 
parties cannot agree on whether the equipment is reasonably available, the court shall 
decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time is reasonably available, taking into 
consideration: 
(A) the best interests of the child; 
(B) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and 
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(C) any other factors the court considers material. 
(3) A parent shall notify the other parent at least 30 days in advance of extended 
parent-time or vacation weeks. 
(4) Virtual parent-time shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
Amended by Chapter 321, 2004 General Session 
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30-3-35. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall 
be considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child 
shall be entitled: 
(a) (i) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court 
from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, one weekday from the time the child's 
school is regularly dismissed until 8:30 p.m., unless the court directs the application of 
Subsection (2)(a)(i); 
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the 
decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, from the time the child's school is 
regularly dismissed on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, unless the court directs the 
application of Subsection (2)(b)(i); 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not be 
made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall 
be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday 
period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free 
from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, parent-time over a scheduled holiday 
weekend may begin from the time the child's school is regularly dismissed at the 
beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the holiday weekend; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the 
following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. 
until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along 
for the birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless 
the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out for 
the holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
' (iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the 
holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on 
the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-
32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday 
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is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the 
following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the 
discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on 
Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the 
holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend 
beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a 
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the 
holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including New Year's Day, 
as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 
p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years and the even 
year holidays in odd years; 
(i) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning 
at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year 
beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; 
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time 
during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended 
parent-time shall be 1/2 of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the 
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be 
provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
(o) telephone contact and other virtual parent-time, if the equipment is reasonably 
available, shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration, provided that if the 
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parties cannot agree on whether the equipment is reasonably available, the court shall 
decide whether the equipment for virtual parent-time is reasonably available, taking into 
consideration: 
(i) the best interests of the child; 
(ii) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual parent-time; and 
(iii) any other factors the court considers material. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either parent 
concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the parent-
time order. 
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